

# Use of Force Report 2023



**NYPD**  
New York City Police Department



# Use of Force Report

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2023

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Safeguarding the largest city in our nation remains the dedicated mission of every member of the New York City Police Department (NYPD). This commitment, performed in concert with those we serve, strives to enhance the well-being of our city while placing the utmost value on human life and the dignity of each individual within the community. While critical to protecting the safety of every New Yorker, these efforts reflect the principles of professionalism, transparency, and accountability in which the men and women of the NYPD function.

Since 2016, these principles have helped to form the Use of Force Report, a comprehensive accounting of force application by and against NYPD members annually. Documenting and investigating force incidents ensure that members adhere to the highest standards of service, exercise the utmost restraint, and remain responsible for the justifiable and proper application of any and all uses of force. Though force may be, at times, inevitable, the overwhelming majority of interactions annually between members and the public conclude without any utilization of force.

Department policies are clear and stand as an affirmation committed to the welfare of this city. Any application of force, while potentially enhancing public safety, may also impact trust and relations with the community. The NYPD's continued diligence in advancing strategies, procedures, training, and technology remains at the forefront of the foundation of policing New York City.

# In Memoriam



**Police Officer Adeed Fayaz**  
End of Watch 2-7-2023

In Memoriam



**Detective Troy Patterson**  
End of Watch 4-29-2023



# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report is the eighth annual Use of Force Report presented by the New York City Police Department. A confirmation of the department's unwavering commitment to reducing crime and increasing safety, this report serves to further amplify the accountability and transparency that has become associated with the use, reporting, and investigation of force. The New York City Police Department (NYPD) recorded 48 police firearms discharges in 2023, a decrease from the year prior, and the third lowest total in this report's history. The decrease in 2023's firearms discharges ends a trend of consecutive annual increases in firearms discharges that occurred during the previous two years. This decrease in firearms discharges occurred while the total number of arrests increased for the fourth straight year and as both gun arrests and weapons related calls for service amounted to the second highest totals in their respective categories during the history of this report. For the year, the department recorded an overall increase in force used both by, and against, members of the service. This report seeks to provide a detailed accounting of all aspects of force, from the lowest level of physical force up to and including the intentional discharge of a firearm in adversarial conflicts that involved members of the service during the past year.

Evidencing the NYPD's dedicated adherence to accountability is its policy in which every firearm discharge by a member of the service, whether intentional or unintentional, is thoroughly investigated and accounted for. It should be noted that a firearms discharge does not include a discharge during an authorized training session, nor does it include a discharge into a firearms safety station located within an NYPD facility, a Department of Correction facility, or a Health and Hospitals Corporation facility. While the circumstances of a discharge into a safety station are documented, neither of these types of discharge incidents are included in this report. In 2007, the NYPD began to

publicly release the precursor to this report, the Annual Firearms Discharge Report, to present a full classification of all discharge incidents, including the number of subjects and bystanders killed and wounded, animal shootings, unintentional discharges, unauthorized uses of department firearms, and police suicides with firearms. That report's initial collection of force data has developed into an indispensable element of the NYPD's analysis of the use of force and further underscores the department's long-standing commitment to the continuous evaluation and development of policy and practice that best serves members and the community alike.

In 2016, in correspondence with the evolution of force policies and the development of an improved reporting mechanism, the NYPD introduced the Use of Force Report to replace the Annual Firearms Discharge Report. The annual Use of Force Report has since progressed to consider every instance of reportable force utilized both by, and against members of the service to provide an extensive, transparent recollection of incidents and data considered among the most critical to the department and the public alike. Detailing how, where, when, and why force is utilized provides invaluable context that allows for a candid assessment, both internally and externally, of the policy, practice, and strength of departmental training. Such thorough policy and documentation also intends to provide better context regarding force incidents and injuries in situations where force, despite any and all efforts of prevention by a member, remains the unavoidable outcome.

The department's use of force policies and procedures are found in the Department Manual. The manual, along with the NYPD Force Dashboard, are publicly available on-line at the NYPD website, [www.nyc.gov/nypd](http://www.nyc.gov/nypd). The dashboard, a dynamic consolidation of the department's use of force data, is highly transparent, interactive, and user-friendly, providing users with data visualizations to

explore the characteristics of force incidents. This includes, but is not limited to, data regarding members of the service, subjects, types of force, locations, the basis for an encounter, and injuries. Additionally, the dashboard includes legal context, insight on data collection, and details on department policy.

The department publicly releases, as appropriate, body-worn camera video and other extrinsic evidence if it may provide context and understanding of a critical incident, which often involve a firearms discharge by a member of the service or a use of force that results in the death or serious physical injury of subject. These videos may be found at [www.youtube.com/nypd](http://www.youtube.com/nypd).

As has been detailed in previous Use of Force Reports, from 2016-2019, the types of force utilized by NYPD personnel were initially classified into three separate levels. As of October 2019, however, the department added a fourth category, making the 2020 report the first text to fully integrate the current four-level use of force policy structure.

Level 1 force consists of hand strikes, foot strikes, forcible takedowns, discharging Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray, discharging conducted electrical weapons (CEWs) in cartridge mode, and using mesh restraining blankets to secure subjects. Level 2 force includes the intentional striking of a person with any object (including a baton, other equipment, etc.), police canine bites, or using CEWs in “drive-stun” mode. Level 3 force consists of the use of physical force that is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury, except for firearms discharges. Level 4 force consists of any discharge of a firearm by a member of the service or from a firearm belonging to a member of the service. Level 4 classification, though added to policy in October 2019, was not included in the 2019 Use of Force Report in order to arrange the data in a coherent manner for public consumption. Any Level 4 incident in 2019 was presented under the previous designation from the three levels of force classification system formerly in place. Due to this modification that occurred within both policy and its related data collection, the department may, going forward, adjust the manner in which comparisons of certain historical force data is made.

Directly incorporated into current NYPD force policy is a comprehensive mechanism which includes a component of both oversight and investigation. Department policy requires all levels of force to be documented on Threat, Resistance or Injury (TRI) Reports. Level 1 force incidents, the lowest level of force, are investigated by the member’s immediate supervisor. Level 2 force incidents are investigated by department executives in the rank of captain or above. Level 3 force incidents, where physical force capable of causing death or serious physical injury was used but the subject’s injuries are not life- threatening, fall under the investigative lead of the Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB). The most serious incidents, Level 4 force occurrences, those of which involve police firearms discharges, and cases in which a subject dies or is seriously injured and likely to die, are investigated by the Force Investigation Division (FID). Prior to the October 2019 policy modifications, Level 4 force incidents fell within the Level 3 classification.

A use of force incident is often complex and frequently involves numerous individuals, both members of the service and subjects. The highest level of force used by any member of the service involved, or the most severe injury sustained by any subject involved, is the determining factor of the incident’s level of classification as well as any subsequent reporting and investigative requirements. The department continues to embrace the challenge of seeking and applying innovative methods to further enhance current force policy and practice. This remains a crucial facet of the NYPD’s persistence toward meeting and exceeding recognized best practices, towards a consistent evolution of policy for compliance on both the city and state level, and to continuously advance the trust and partnership of the community which the department serves.

## FIREARMS DISCHARGES

While a comparison with historical discharge data highlights the department’s significant decline in discharges and related force data dating back to the onset of the department’s official recordkeeping in 1971, a more recent comparison also highlights a significant decline in firearms discharges. In 2023, the department reversed the trend of the two previous years of consecutive increases in firearms discharges to record 48 total firearms discharges, a 22.6% decrease from the previous year and the third lowest annual total since this report commenced.

Thirty discharge incidents in 2023 were intentional discharges by members of the service in the course of adversarial conflicts with criminal subjects, a decrease from 40 in 2022. Though no members of the service

were shot and killed in adversarial conflicts in 2023, three members were shot and injured in this category of discharge. Sixteen subjects were struck by police gunfire in 2023; seven sustained fatal injuries and nine sustained non-fatal injuries. In seven adversarial conflict incidents, subjects discharged firearms directly at members of the service. Two intentional firearms discharge incidents in 2023 were animal attacks, a decrease from three incidents the year prior. Unintentional discharges decreased from 11 in 2022 to eight in 2023. Eight firearms discharge incidents in 2023 were categorized as unauthorized uses of NYPD firearms, equal to the total in 2022, three of which were member suicides, a total that equals the previous year. Additionally, two members were shot and killed in two separate unauthorized discharge incidents that occurred during 2023.

## CONDUCTED ELECTRICAL WEAPONS

In 2023, the department experienced 1,496 CEW discharge incidents, an increase of 14.3% from the 1,308 incidents during the prior year. Of these 1,496 discharge incidents, 1,396 were intentional discharges, including 716 deployments that occurred during crime in progress situations and 363 which occurred as members were endeavoring to control an emotionally disturbed person. The remaining deployments occurred in a myriad of situations including vehicle stops, wanted suspect incidents, violent prisoner interactions, and in the course of investigating past crimes. There were no fatalities attributed directly to the deployment of a CEW in 2023. In 917 incidents, or 65.7% of the 1,396 intentional discharge incidents, the utilization of CEWs were deemed to be effective. Ineffective CEW discharges were attributed to several different causes, the most common included the probes falling out of the subject, a subject fighting through the pain, probes being too far from the surface, or probes missing the subject.

## OBSERVATIONS IN NYPD USE OF FORCE

During the course of 2023, the department recorded 9,777 total reportable force incidents— 95.2% were classified as Level 1, 3.0% as Level 2, 1.5% as Level 3, and 0.3% as Level 4. Within these 9,777 reportable force incidents, 8,006 incidents — 81.9% of the total — involved the minimal amount of reportable physical force (e.g., hand strikes, foot strikes, and forcible takedowns of subjects). Additional incidents involving the utilization of force included 161 uses of OC spray, 68 uses of impact weapons, and a single police canine bite. The 9,777 total reportable force incidents represents an 18.2% increase from 2022's 8,270 total reportable force incidents.

Members of the service utilized force in 1,607 encounters with emotionally disturbed persons, which represents approximately 0.9% of the 174,853 calls for service regarding emotionally disturbed persons. The most commonly recorded category of incident in which members utilized force was during a crime/violation in progress, an incident type that often results in the arrest of a subject; however, arrests where members used force represents approximately just 3.4% of the total amount of arrests effected by members of the NYPD. Situations involving emotionally disturbed persons and violent prisoner interactions were the next two most commonly recorded type of force encounters in 2023. Since 2020, these three incident types, crimes/violations in progress (which includes arrests), emotionally disturbed persons, and violent prisoner interactions have been the three most common situations, annually, in which members of the service utilize force.

Substantial injuries are generally those that require treatment at a hospital. Serious injuries are generally those that require admission to a hospital. During 2023, a total of 12,860 individuals were subjected to some level of force utilized by a member of the service. Of those subjects, approximately 97.2% sustained no injuries or minor injuries. Approximately 1.1%, 146 subjects, were substantially injured, and 220, approximately 1.7%, were seriously injured. A total of 5,383 members of the service, approximately 18.8% of all the members involved in force incidents during 2023, sustained an injury. Of that number, 347, or 6.4%, of members injured during force incidents in 2023 were substantially or seriously injured.





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# NYPD USE OF FORCE POLICY

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## LEGAL STANDARDS

In New York State and nationwide, police officers are authorized to utilize a reasonable amount of force when encountering specific circumstances. Both federal and state law define the criteria of these circumstances and determine the extent of reasonable force.

Two Supreme Court cases, *Tennessee v. Garner*, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) and *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), established the constitutional standards for police uses of force. In *Garner*, the standard governing the use of deadly force was set forth, namely that officers may use deadly force when there is probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of death or serious physical injury. *Graham* established that the review of an officer's use of force must be conducted with an objective reasonableness standard. The Court wrote that "the 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with 20/20 hindsight."

"Reasonableness" as a standard is also recognized at the state level where it was central to the case of *People v. Benjamin*, 51 NY2d 267 (1980). In this case, the New York State Court of Appeals observed that "it would, indeed, be absurd to suggest that a police officer has to await the glint of steel before he can act to preserve his safety." *Benjamin*, similar to *Graham*, acknowledges the stress under which officers make life or death use of force decisions when determining the appropriateness of an officer's use of force.

Additional guidance on the use of force comes from New York State Penal Law §35.30. This article allows that police officers may use force when they "reasonably believe such to be necessary" to protect life and property, to effect arrests, and to prevent escape from custody.



## NYPD POLICY

The primary duty of every member of the service is to protect human life, including the lives of individuals being placed into police custody. NYPD policy emphasizes the value of human life, the application of reasonable force, and the utilization of less lethal alternatives. It further prioritizes that members, whenever possible, use de-escalation techniques in an effort to gain safe and voluntary compliance from subjects in order to reduce or eliminate any need for force. Members of the service are held accountable for the proper use of force and responsible for applying it in a manner consistent with existing law as well as with departmental policy, which is more restrictive and holds members to a higher level of restraint than both federal and state law. For example, state law allows the use of deadly physical force in the protection of property, a use of force that is strictly prohibited under department policy. Additionally, the utilization of deadly physical force against a person, as outlined in Patrol Guide 221-01, is permitted to “protect members of the service and/or the public from imminent serious physical injury or death.” Therefore, it is plausible that an incident could occur when the application of force is permissible under New York State and/or federal law yet violates department policy.

Department policy maintains that “force may be used when it is reasonable to ensure the safety of a member of the service or a third person, or otherwise protect life, or when it is reasonable to place a person in custody or to prevent escape from custody” (Patrol Guide 221-01). In accordance with this standard of reasonableness, any application of force that is deemed to be “unreasonable under the circumstances...will be deemed excessive and in violation of department policy” (Patrol Guide 221-01). In this context, while the use of force is broadly defined to incorporate an array of force options a member may utilize to gain compliance or control of a subject, excessive force will not be tolerated. Members of the service who use excessive force will be subject to department discipline, up to, and including dismissal.

Compliance, the objective in any law enforcement encounter, is often accomplished through the mere, straightforward use of verbal commands. However, in times when these commands prove insufficient or when a subject elects to ignore directions or resist, members may employ an assortment of force options to compel a subject to submit to lawful authority. NYPD policy directs that “when appropriate and consistent with personal safety, members of the service will use de-escalation techniques to safely gain voluntary compliance from a subject to reduce or eliminate the necessity to use force. In situations in which this is not safe and/or appropriate, members of the service will use only the reasonable force necessary to gain control or custody of a subject” (Patrol Guide 221-01). These force options include physical force, less-lethal options (e.g., OC Spray, conducted electrical weapons, or impact weapons), and even deadly physical force, when justified. Progressing sequentially from one level of force to the next is not a requirement. Members may, as an incident develops, escalate from verbal commands to drawing a CEW or de-escalate from utilizing force to employing verbal commands.

The firearms policy of the NYPD is structured upon a strategic approach towards the safe and effective utilization of force. This includes a comprehensive training curriculum that comprises, though not limited to, tactical communications, crisis intervention, de-escalation, oversight enhancement, and a clear definition of what constitutes an authorized discharge. This approach has proven to have had a positive impact on the department’s application of force over the last five decades—most notably when comparing the current annual totals to historical data in categories such as member discharges, subjects shot, subjects killed, and rounds discharged. In 2023, the result of this approach was a decline in the total number of firearms discharges that the department experienced as compared to the year prior, recording 48 total discharge incidents, a 22.6% decrease from the 62 incidents in 2022.

Furthermore, while these 48 firearms discharge incidents represent a significant decrease from the previous year, they also stand as the third lowest discharge total ever recorded since the department began tracking such incidents in 1971. Beyond this considerable historical achievement, 2023’s adversarial conflict-related firearms discharge incidents, when compared to the same categories in 2022, signify a substantial reduction in the total annual amount of subjects shot and killed, of subjects shot and injured, the total number of rounds discharged, and the total number of members involved in this category of discharge incident.

The department’s policy regarding the documentation of force used by, and against, members of the service was established in 2016 and has evolved considerably since that time. The policy, which has expanded from the originally designated three force levels to the current establishment of four levels, including deadly physical force, defines the method of reporting or investigation that must ensue after every incident, regardless of the level that force was utilized. Modifications to the shape of the policy have been instituted in order to enhance user interface, improve accuracy, and to clearly define oversight responsibilities. These policy modifications may, however, have a bearing on the comparison between contemporary and historical force data.

## LEVELS OF FORCE

### **Level 1**

#### **(Physical Force/Less-Lethal Device)**

Level 1 includes the use of hand strikes, foot strikes, forcible takedowns, wrestling/grappling with an actively resisting subject, the discharge of OC spray, the discharge of a CEW in “cartridge mode,” and the use of mesh restraining blankets to secure subjects.

### **Level 2**

#### **(Use of Impact Weapon/Canine/Less-Lethal Device)**

Level 2 includes the use of any object as an impact weapon, a police canine bite, and the discharge of a CEW in “drive stun” mode.

### **Level 3**

#### **(Use of Deadly Physical Force, except Firearm Discharge)**

Level 3 includes the use of physical force that is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury, except for firearms discharges.

### **Level 4**

#### **(Firearm Discharge)**

Level 4 includes any discharge of a firearm by a member of the service or from a firearm belonging to a member of the service. Level 4 was introduced in October of 2019 and was not included in the reporting data until 2020.

### 2023 Levels of Force





Figure 1

### **Non-Reportable Uses of Force**

Actions that are not reportable uses of force include: ordering a person to lie on the ground; guiding them to the ground in a controlled manner; or the mere use of equipment such as Velcro straps or polycarbonate shields to restrain subjects, unless an injury is sustained.



## INJURIES AND FORCE CATEGORIES

The degree to which a subject or bystander sustains an injury, as a result of police action, can elevate the categorization of the incident and determine its classification and investigation as a Level 1, Level 2, Level 3, or Level 4 use of force.

Physical injuries to subjects such as minor swelling, contusions, lacerations, abrasions, and complaints of substantial pain are categorized as Level 1 force incidents.

Physical injuries that are consistent with the application of Level 2 force (e.g., unconsciousness, the loss of a tooth, lacerations requiring stitches or staples) will elevate an incident to Level 2. An allegation or suspicion of excessive force with no injury, the attempted suicide of a prisoner resulting in no injury or a minor physical injury, or the use of any prohibited act, other than the alleged or suspected use of a chokehold or prohibited method of restraint, will also result in a Level 2 classification.

Serious physical injuries that result in a Level 3 classification include, but are not limited to: broken/fractured bones, injuries requiring hospital admission, heart attacks, strokes, aneurysms, or other life-threatening/serious illnesses and injuries. Alleged or suspected use of a chokehold or a prohibited method of restraint, alleged or suspected excessive force accompanied by serious physical injury or attempted suicide of a prisoner that causes a serious injury elevate an incident to a Level 3 classification.

Any death or serious injury with a likelihood of death to a subject or bystander will result in a Level 4 classification.

## FORCE INVESTIGATION AND REVIEW

The department's force review process includes robust internal oversight processes. The NYPD's use of force oversight and management controls include:

### **Immediate Supervisor**

The immediate supervisor is an available supervisor, not involved in the incident, assigned to the same command as the member involved in a force incident. The immediate supervisor must be at least one rank higher than all involved members. In the event that a supervisor of an appropriate rank is not available, the duty captain will determine who will assume the responsibilities of the immediate supervisor. Level 1 uses of force are investigated by immediate supervisors.

### **Duty Captain**

The duty captain is the front-line executive, supervising all personnel performing duty within a patrol borough, during hours when commanding officers/executive officers are not present. In the absence of the commanding officer/executive officer of a command, the duty captain will investigate Level 2 uses of force.

### **Duty Chief**

The duty chief is the principal operations commander of the NYPD, when no other department executive of a higher rank is present, who acts as a representative of the Chief of Department and responds to serious incidents within New York City, including police-involved firearms discharges and deaths in police custody. The duty chief may assist in force investigations during hours when command and borough executives are not present.

### **Investigations Division**

Geographically assigned units that investigate instances of non-criminal violations of department regulations and lesser misconduct, as well as domestic incidents and certain criminal incidents involving members of the NYPD. The duty captain may call upon the investigations units to assist on Level 2 force investigations.

### **First Deputy Commissioner**

The First Deputy Commissioner, the second highest ranking member of the department, oversees numerous units, including those with a direct association with the review and/or investigation of force. These include the Force Investigation Division, responsible for investigating the most serious force incidents, the Professional Standards Division, tasked with monitoring use of force data and the quality of force investigations, the Department Advocate's Office, which prosecutes administrative disciplinary cases, and the Deputy Commissioner, Trials, which presides over the NYPD's internal discipline trials.

The First Deputy Commissioner also chairs the Use of Force Review Board, which reviews the most serious force cases, determines whether the actions of a member of the service were within policy and makes disciplinary recommendations to the Police Commissioner when uses of force fall outside policy.

### **Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB)**

IAB serves as the recipient of all allegations of misconduct involving members of the service and seeks to combat police corruption by analyzing allegations, examining trends, and conducting comprehensive investigations that ensure the highest standards of integrity. All Level 3 use of force incidents fall under the investigative responsibility of IAB.

### **Force Investigation Division (FID)**

All Level 4 incidents, defined as incidents involving firearms discharges by members of the service and incidents in which subjects have died or are seriously injured and likely to die, are investigated by FID. This unit also reviews the tactics employed in each incident to derive tactical lessons learned and to make both general training recommendations and training recommendations specifically for the individual members of the service involved in discharge incidents.

### **Professional Standards Bureau**

The Professional Standards Division works with the city's inspector general and other governmental agencies to collaboratively improve policing and community relations. The Professional Standards Division assesses compliance with NYPD policies, identifies and develops programs to minimize risk to the department, and provides oversight of the NYPD's performance monitoring programs. Sub-units of this bureau include the Quality Assurance Section, the Enterprise Risk Management Section, and the Compliance Section. The Professional Standards Division and the First Deputy Commissioner's Office lead Compliance Stat meetings with borough and bureau personnel which, among other topics, assesses compliance with force policies and seeks to ensure that use of force investigations are both timely and comprehensive.

### **Deputy Commissioner, Department Advocate**

The Department Advocate's Office administratively prosecutes all employees of the New York City Police Department for violations of the department's rules, regulations, and procedures, and makes recommendations to the First Deputy Commissioner concerning suspensions and restorations to duty of department personnel. Attorneys provide legal guidance to investigative units, analyze department investigations, draft charges and specifications, negotiate and submit case dispositions for the Police Commissioner's review, and litigate disciplinary matters before the Deputy Commissioner of Trials.

### **Deputy Commissioner, Trials**

The Deputy Commissioner of Trials presides over the administrative trials of department disciplinary cases, and renders written findings of fact and recommendations to the Police Commissioner consistent with department rules, policies, and applicable statutes and case law.

### **Use of Force Review Board**

The Use of Force Review Board is an oversight mechanism for maintaining the integrity of the department's force policy. Composed of senior executive staff members, the board reviews the most serious force cases and renders determinations regarding the actions of members of the department during force encounters.

## TRAINING

Department training functions as the foundation to provide its members a heightened capacity towards critical decision with regard to force or any other aspect of policing on a daily basis. Training curricula are consistently assessed and, if necessary, revised due to the analysis of use of force data, modifications in city or state legislation, tactical enhancements, and innovations within the technological field.

### **Training Bureau**

The Training Bureau oversees the department's training and educational programs, further providing members and recruits with the most up-to-date academic, tactical, and technological training available. In-service training for members of the service routinely includes: instruction regarding key tactical and de-escalation innovations and strategies, Crisis Intervention Team training, modifications of law and department procedure, and guidance concerning effective communication skills to foster positive community interactions and collaboration.

Starting during their time as recruits in the academy, all uniformed members of the service complete a rigorous firearms training course and are required to re-qualify semi-annually, for the entirety of their career, for the use of their service and off-duty weapons. This training, incorporating the practical knowledge, awareness, and mechanical proficiency essential for the safe and competent use of a firearm and/or a less lethal weapon, seeks to improve the effort towards the abatement of force and the amplification of safety. Members of the service assigned to specialized units such as, but not limited to, the Emergency Service Unit or the Strategic Response Group, receive additional specialized firearms training due to the nature of their assignments.

The principal goal of every member of the NYPD, as emphasized in policy as well as in firearms and any use of force training, is simply to protect life. This includes the life of any victim, bystander, subject, and other member of the service. Patrol Guide 221-01 instructs members that "the use of deadly physical force against a person can only be used to protect members of the service and/or the public from imminent serious physical injury or death." Situations occur, however, that in order to protect life, it may be necessary to utilize deadly physical force. In determining when and how one must use deadly force, a member's judgment must rely on a host of factors, often with critical immediacy, including the overall circumstances, their situational ability, existing law, department policy, and most significantly, training. Members of the service are trained to utilize deadly physical force in order to "stop the threat," which means putting an end to a subject's ability to threaten imminent death or serious physical injury. To achieve this result amidst a dynamic firearms situation, members are trained to shoot at the center mass of the subject, the largest target available. A subject's arms and legs are more uncertain targets as both are often smaller, less static, and a firearms strike in either of these extremities has a smaller probability of stopping the potentially deadly actions of a subject.

Encompassing academic lessons, physical training, and tactical instruction, use of force training begins while members are assigned as recruits attending the Police Academy. Academically, recruits are required to successfully complete the Use of Force chapter of the Academy's Law curriculum which focuses on the justifiable use of force as specified in the New York State Penal Law along with the professional standards reflected within department policy. Recruits apply this lesson along with its emphasis on circumstances requiring force, de-escalation, and approved force options, into credible, realistic situations during Scenario Based Training in an effort to demonstrate proper tactics and evaluate techniques. Consolidating contemporary legal issues and departmental policy with established best practices and tactical innovations provides an optimal learning experience for recruits who, upon graduation, are likely to perform patrol duty, an assignment that includes a high volume of public engagement and interaction.

Additionally, recruits undergo a physical and tactical training curriculum that includes assorted force-related courses of instruction. Among them are the Use of Force course, which informs recruits on force options under fluctuating circumstances and Use of Force Case Law, which provides recruits the capacity towards streamlining determinations and decisions regarding the use of force. Beyond lectures focused on relevant topics such as the Critical Decision Making Model and the Fourth Amendment, recruits are trained and certified in the use of both firearms and less lethal weapons and also receive approximately 50 hours of physical training encompassing force tactics including strikes, takedowns, defensive drills, handcuffing, and proper methods of restraint.



# FIREARMS DISCHARGES

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## OVERVIEW

While inherent and, at times, inexorable within policing, the use of force by a member of the NYPD remains a decidedly significant matter of critical concern to the department and the public alike. Among any manner in which a member may use force, a police firearms discharge stands as the most serious, and subsequently most scrutinized, application of force. These incidents, often sudden and intense, introduce the potential for trauma, volatility, and, at times, instability on members of the service, the public, and the relationship between the two.

This relationship includes the known calls for service that members respond to in addition to innumerable untold encounters and interactions that occur between members and the public annually. In 2023, this includes an excess of 6.8 million 911 service calls, 1.3 million 311 service requests, as well as countless interactions, both planned and unplanned, that occurred between members and the public. While the vast majority of these interactions did not involve or result in any use of force by a member of the service, every interaction is impactful, often life-altering, and serves to further shape the department's relationship with our community partners.

To aid in the development of procedure, the implementation of policy, and the foundation of training, the department began, in 1971, to collect data regarding police firearms discharges. This data was instrumental towards creating the predecessor to this report, the Annual Firearms Discharge Report, in 2007. In 2016, as an updated and comprehensive use of force policy was instituted by the department, that report evolved into its current version, the Use of Force Report, intended to encapsulate not just firearms discharges but all aspects of the use of force by, and against, members of the service.

The 48 firearms discharge incidents in 2023 are the third lowest annual total since the inception of this report in 2016. Representing a decrease of more than 22% from the previous year, 2023's firearms discharges are the lowest yearly total since 2020, a timeframe impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, and stands to reiterate the department's commitment to effective policing through a focus on training and de-escalation in accompaniment with robust policies that emphasize safety, restraint, and the value of human life.

Regardless of its category or circumstance, every firearms discharge incident is thoroughly investigated and examined by the department. In addition to providing an understanding of such incidents, these investigations are intended to create a safer community for both the public and members of the service by identifying, and subsequently facilitating, the growth and improvement necessary within departmental policy, training, and technological resources. The discharge data in this report has been compiled from Preliminary Investigation Worksheets, medical examiner's reports, arrest and complaint reports, Force Investigation Division reports, Use of Force Review Board findings and recommendations, quarterly and annually publicly reported data tables, the NYPD Force Dashboard, and previous Annual Firearms Discharge Reports. While the department values the progressive exploration and examination of all police firearms discharges, the relatively small amount of discharges the department experiences on an annual basis may limit the scope of conclusions that may be elicited or trends that may be forecasted.

Even when an intentional firearm discharge by a member of the service is deemed justifiable in a court of law, the Department conducts a comprehensive review

of the incident for procedural violations, tactical deviations, and any factors that may suggest modifications, either to policy or procedure, are necessary. If, upon the review of a firearms discharge incident, a determination is made to impose discipline, the discipline may not necessarily result from the actual discharge of the firearm, but from a violation of other Department procedures within the scope of the event.

All members who discharge their firearm in a discharge incident are required to attend a firearms tactical review session conducted by the Training Bureau’s Firearms and Tactics Section, regardless of the circumstances of the discharge.

**DISCHARGE CATEGORIES**

**Intentional Discharge-Adversarial Conflict (ID-AC)**

An ID-AC occurs when a member of the service intentionally discharges a firearm during a confrontation with a subject. There were 30 ID-AC incidents during 2023.

**Intentional Discharge-Animal Attack (ID-AA)**

An ID-AA occurs when a member of the service intentionally discharges a firearm to defend against an animal attack. There were 2 ID-AA incidents in 2023.

**Unintentional Discharge**

This occurs when a member of the service unintentionally discharges a firearm. Eight incidents in 2023 were categorized as unintentional discharges.

**Unauthorized Discharge**

This occurs when a member of the service intentionally discharges a firearm outside the scope of their employment, or when another person illegally discharges a member’s firearm. There were 8 unauthorized discharge incidents in 2023, of which three incidents were member suicides.

Historical Snapshot 2016-2023								
	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Adversarial Conflict	37	23	17	25	25	36	40	30
Animal Attack	11	9	4	6	2	5	3	2
Unintentional Discharge	14	12	8	8	10	4	11	8
Unauthorized Discharge	10	8	6	13	6	7	8	8
<b>Total Discharges</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>48</b>

Figure 2

**ADDITIONAL DISCHARGE CATEGORIES**

**Mistaken Identity**

This occurs when a member of the service intentionally discharges their firearm on another member in the mistaken belief that the member is a criminal subject. These discharge incidents do not include crossfires, which occur when a member inadvertently strikes another member of the service while discharging a firearm at a different subject.

**Intentional Discharge-No Conflict**

This occurs when a member of the service discharges a firearm to summon assistance.

No discharge incidents in 2023 were categorized as either a mistaken identity or an intentional discharge-no conflict. Due to the infrequency of these such incidents—the last of which occurred in 2009 and 2016, respectively—both categories have commonly been excluded from this report.

Adversarial Conflicts, 2016-2023




Figure 3

Animal Attacks, 2016-2023




Figure 4



### Unintentional Discharges, 2016-2023




Figure 5

### Unauthorized Discharges, 2016-2023




Figure 6

### Total Discharges, 2016-2023




Figure 7

## New York City Police Department Firearms Discharge Incidents, 1971-2023




Figure 8

## INTENTIONAL DISCHARGES – ADVERSARIAL CONFLICT

Forty-four uniformed members of the service intentionally discharged their weapons in an adversarial conflict in 2023. These 44 members, approximately 0.13% of the department's 2023 average of 33,748 uniformed members, represent the fewest number of discharging members during an adversarial conflict during the last five years and the third lowest annual total in this category since this report began in 2016. This decrease, 29 less than the 73 members that intentionally discharged firearms in adversarial conflicts in 2022, coincides with the fifth consecutive annual decline in the department's uniformed staffing figures.

Since 2016, the inception of this report, the department has averaged 29 intentional discharge-adversarial conflict (ID-AC) incidents annually. Within the ID-AC incidents occurring during that period, when the department averaged roughly 35,441 uniformed members of the service, approximately 0.1% of members intentionally discharged their weapons in adversarial conflicts.

Members of the service responded to more than 6.8 million 911 calls for service in 2023, an almost 5% decrease from 2022 and just the second time in the history of this report that the department experienced an annual decline from the year prior in calls for service. Weapons related calls for service totaled 76,032, a slight decrease of less than 0.9% from 2022 but still represents the second highest annual total of weapons related calls since this report began in 2016. For the fourth consecutive year, the arrest total increased from the year prior. In 2023, arrests totaled 226,875, a 19.5% increase from 2022 and also marking the highest annual total going back to 2019. Arrest for weapons amounted to 39,880 in 2023, 4,446 of which were gun arrests, a decrease of approximately 4.6% from the total in 2022 but still the second highest annual total of gun arrests in the history of this report.

While tasked with an ever-evolving collection of both responsibility and accountability, the NYPD remains focused on identifying and arresting those subjects who choose to arm themselves with illegal firearms. This focus occurs concurrently with the thousands of additional interactions that members of the service experience annually with the public, many replete with the risk of unpredictable risk and volatility. These interactions include investigative encounters, vehicle stops, responding to calls for a person in crisis and then escorting thousands of such persons safely to hospitals and care facilities. In the overwhelming majority of encounters with the public, including those in which a uniformed member placed an armed subject or a person in crisis into custody, members of the service did not discharge their firearm.

In 2023, the department experienced 30 ID-AC incidents involving 44 members of the service who intentionally discharged their firearms. These adversarial incidents involved 32 subjects. In seven separate ID-AC incidents, subjects discharged firearms directly at members of the service. Within the 30 ID-AC incidents occurring in 2023, members of the service shot 16 subjects, of whom seven died.

While there were no fatal injuries to any member of the service as a result of a 2023 ID-AC incident, three members were shot and injured by subject gunfire in adversarial conflicts during this time period. This marks the second straight annual decline in this category of member injury, representing a 25% decrease from 2022 and the lowest annual total dating back to 2018, when the department experienced just one member shot and injured as a result of this type of incident.

### 2023 Adversarial Conflicts in Context

6.8 Million  
Calls for Service

1.3 Million  
311 Service Requests

33,748  
Uniformed Members  
of the Service (UMOS)

226,875  
Arrests

174,953  
Calls for Emotionally  
Disturbed Persons

76,032  
Weapons Calls

4,446  
Gun Arrests

48  
Total Firearms  
Discharge Incidents

44  
UMOS Involved in  
Adversarial Conflicts

30  
Adversarial Conflicts

7  
ID-AC Subjects  
Fired at UMOS

3  
UMOS Shot & Injured by  
ID-AC Subjects

32  
ID-AC Subjects Fired  
Upon by Police

16  
Total ID-AC  
Subjects Shot

7  
ID-AC Subjects  
Shot & Killed

Figure 9 S



## MEMBERS OF THE SERVICE

No members of the service were shot and killed consequential to an ID-AC incident in 2023, though two members were shot and killed as the result of two separate unauthorized discharge incidents. Both of those incidents are detailed within the Unauthorized Discharge section of this report.

Five separate ID-AC incidents in 2023 resulted in injuries to six members of the service, including three members who were shot by subject gunfire in three separate incidents. The remaining three member injuries occurred in two separate incidents. In the first incident, an off-duty member struggled for control of their weapon while engaged in a physical altercation with two subjects. During the struggle, the firearm was discharged resulting in injuries to both the member and to one subject. The remaining incident accounted for two member injuries, one member stabbed and another member slashed, both by the same subject.

## SUBJECT DEATHS

Since the inception of this report in 2016, an average of approximately eight subjects have been shot and killed in ID-AC incidents annually. Calendar year 2023 fell below that average, totaling seven subjects shot and killed in ID-AC incidents, a 46.2% decrease from the previous year and the third lowest annual total in this category in the history of this report. This indicates that a subject fatality occurred in 23.3% of ID-AC incidents for the year, significantly lower than in 2022 when 32.5% of adversarial conflict incidents resulted in a subject fatality. Since 2016, the onset of this report, 29.6% of ID-AC incidents resulted in a subject shot and killed by a member of the service.

Of the seven subjects killed by police gunfire in 2023, six possessed a weapon that appeared to be capable of causing death or serious physical injury. Four subjects possessed a cutting instrument and two members possessed firearms. The remaining subject claimed to possess a cutting instrument. All of the seven ID-AC incidents in which subjects were killed are further described in Appendix B.

## SUBJECT INJURIES

Nine subjects were shot and injured as a result of a police firearm discharge in 2023, a 40.0% decrease from 2022 and lower than the approximate 12 subjects injured in ID-AC incidents annually during the history of this report. This total of nine subjects also equals 2017 for the second lowest annual total in this category of subject injuries since the Department began tracking such statistics in 1971.

Of the nine subjects shot and injured in ID-AC incidents in 2023, two subjects were armed with firearms, two subjects were armed with imitation firearms, and three subjects were armed with cutting instruments.

These nine subject injuries occurred during nine separate incidents. Four of the incidents consisted of subjects armed with a firearm or an imitation firearm, including three incidents in which subjects were shot as a result of pointing their firearm or imitation firearm directly at a member of the service.

## ID-AC Incidents Subject Injuries and Deaths, 2016-2023




Figure 10

Of the four incidents during which subjects were armed with a firearm or imitation firearm, one occurred as members, who were conducting a canvass, located the subject who then pointed a firearm in the direction of the members. One incident occurred as a member conducting a canvass encountered the subject who dropped, then subsequently ignored verbal commands and attempted to retrieve their firearm. One incident took place when the subject ignored verbal commands then raised and pointed an imitation pistol at members of the service. The final incident occurred as the subject pointed an imitation firearm at members of the service and depressed the trigger causing an audible popping sound from the CO2 canister.

Three incidents occurred as subjects were shot and injured while brandishing cutting instruments. The first incident occurred when members discharged their firearms at a subject who, after producing a knife from his pocket and disregarding verbal commands to drop the weapon, advanced towards members while brandishing the knife. The second incident occurred when members discharged their firearms at a subject advancing at them while brandishing a knife who, just prior, had stabbed another individual at the location. The final incident took place when members encountered a subject armed with scissors who, after ignoring commands to drop the weapon, advanced at the discharging member while brandishing the scissors.

Of the remaining two incidents that resulted in a subject shot and injured, one occurred as an off-duty member was the victim of physical force by two subjects during a physical altercation. The remaining incident took place when an off-duty member was involved in a physical altercation with a subject.

### BYSTANDER INJURIES

There were no bystanders injured or killed as a direct result of, or incidental to, police action during an ID-AC incident in 2023, marking the first year since 2020 that no bystanders were injured or killed. There had been one bystander injured, and none killed, in relation to an ID-AC incident in 2022.

### OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

An actual or perceived weapon or dangerous instrument was involved in 28 of the 30 ID-AC incidents in 2023. In 16 incidents, the weapon or dangerous instrument utilized was a firearm, 12 of which were semiautomatic pistols, one was a revolver, and two were imitation firearms. In the remaining incident, the subject fled and the firearm was not recovered on scene. In 14 of the 16 incidents, the firearms were determined to be loaded and capable of discharging live rounds at the time of the incident. This includes the unrecovered firearm, as substantiated by ballistic evidence collected on scene. In the remaining two incidents, the weapon possessed by the ID-AC subject in both instances was an air pistol, defined in this report as an imitation firearm.



## Threat Type in ID-AC Incidents, 2023




Figure 11

Seven ID-AC incidents involved subjects in possession of cutting instruments, six incidents in which the subject possessed knives and one in which the subject possessed scissors. In three incidents, ID-AC subjects operated a vehicle in a manner capable of causing serious physical injury to members of the service and/or bystanders on the scene. Two ID-AC incidents occurred involving the perceived threat of a weapon, a firearm in one incident and a knife in the other. Of these two occurrences, a loaded firearm was recovered at the scene of the first incident and, in the second incident, it was the subject themselves that, while assaulting a civilian, stated that they were in possession of a knife. In the two remaining incidents, the discharging member was the victim of physical force utilized by the ID-AC subject.

There were a total of 32 subjects involved in ID-AC incidents in 2023; 30 known subjects and two unknown subjects. Of the 30 known subjects, all were male and ranged in age from 16 to 78 with a median age of 33. Of all the known ID-AC subjects, 43.3% were between the ages of 21 and 39, 30.0% were aged 40 or over, and 26.7% were under 21 years of age. Otherwise stated, 13 subjects were between the ages of 21 and 39, nine were aged 40 or over, and eight were under 21 years of age.

The race and ethnicity of the 30 known ID-AC subjects was determined by eyewitness reports, the subject's self-identification, existing government-issued documentation, racial/ethnic physical characteristics, medical examiner reports, and other available sources. Of the 30 known subjects involved in ID-AC incidents, 16 were Black, 13 were Hispanic, and one was White. Expressed as percentages, 53.4% were Black, 43.3% were Hispanic, and 3.3% were White. The racial and ethnic composition of the ID-AC subjects generally corresponds to the 716 known criminal shooting suspects associated with the 974 criminal shooting incidents that occurred in New York City during 2023. Among the 716 identified criminal shooting suspects, approximately 66.1% were Black, 29.6% were Hispanic, 2.2% were Asian, and 2.1% were White. Among 2023's known 1,150 criminal shooting victims, approximately 65.5% were Black, 29.0% were Hispanic, 2.8% were Asian, 2.4% were White, and 0.1% were American Indian. The race of approximately 0.2% of these victims remains unknown.

## Gunfire in New York City, 2023




Figure 12

## Race/Ethnicity of Known Criminal Shooting Suspects vs. Known Criminal Shooting Victims vs. Known ID-AC Subjects, 2023




Figure 13

Forty-four members of the service intentionally discharged their weapons during ID-AC incidents in 2023. All 44 discharging members in 2023's ID-AC incidents were male, marking the first time in the history of this report that a female member of the service did not discharge a firearm in this category of incident. The uniformed staff of the NYPD, taken as an average over the course of 2023, was approximately 20.2% female, 79.7% male and 0.1% were non-binary, other, or unknown. Of the 44 members of the service involved in 2023's ID-AC incidents, 63.6% were White, 22.7% were Hispanic, 11.4% were Black, and 2.3% were Asian.

### Race/Ethnicity of Members in ID-AC Incidents, 2023




Figure 14

When viewed by rank, the largest portion of the department is made up by those serving in the rank of police officer, accounting for almost two-thirds of the department's uniformed staff. Members of the service in this rank, as well as members with fewer years of service, are among the likeliest members to be serving in a patrol capacity. This assignment has among it an exceptionally high volume of interaction and engagement with the public through daily encounters, response to service calls, enforcement, and quality of life activity. Due in part to these factors, this assignment leads to an increased possibility of encountering situations that may result in an adversarial conflict.

### Rank of Members in ID-AC Incidents vs. Department Staffing, 2023




Figure 15



## Rank of Members in ID-AC Incidents, 2016-2023




Figure 16

Of 2023's 30 ID-AC incidents, 80.0%, or 24, occurred in relation to a member's performance on patrol. Of the remaining six ID-AC incidents, two occurred while the involved members were off-duty, one taking place in Queens and the other which occurred in the Bronx. Three ID-AC incidents occurred in relation to a warrant and the remaining incident transpired in relation to the member's performance of a non-patrol related investigation.

Within these 24 patrol-related ID-AC incidents in 2023, 38 members of the service discharged their firearms, a total that accounts for 86.4% of all the discharging members in adversarial conflicts. Of these 38 members, those in the rank of police officer accounted for 92.1%—35 of 38 discharging members— and of these members, 85.7% had 10 years of service or less at the time of their respective discharge incident. The remaining three members in patrol-related ID-AC incidents—two sergeants and one detective—had between 12 and 16 years of service with the department at the time of their respective incidents.

When viewed solely by rank, 2023's 30 ID-AC incidents involved 38 police officers, four detectives, and two sergeants. Annually since this report began in 2016, police officers have made up the highest percentage of the department—approximately two-thirds of the total uniformed staff—and has accounted for the more than 72% of all members who discharged their firearms in an ID-AC incident. In 2023, police officers represented 86.4% of members discharging their firearm in an adversarial conflict.

Accounting for the second largest percentage of the department at more than 15%, detectives were also responsible for the second highest total, four, of ID-AC discharging members in 2023. This total, which, represents 9.1% of discharging members in 2023 ID-AC incidents, is slightly below the annual average as this rank has, since this report began in 2016, accounted for approximately 11% of all members who discharged firearms in an ID-AC incident.

The remaining two discharging members in ID-AC incidents in 2023 held the rank of sergeant, a total that accounts for 4.5% of discharging members in this category of discharge incident. This rank, which made up more than 12% of the total uniformed members in 2023, has annually accounted for approximately 12% of all ID-AC discharging members since 2016, the creation of this report. No member of the service in the rank of lieutenant, captain, or above discharged a firearm in an ID-AC incident during 2023.

Of the discharging members involved in an ID-AC incident during 2023, 79.5%, 35 members, had 10 years or less of service with the department at the time of their discharge. Of these 35 members, 33 held the rank of police officer and two members held the rank of detective.

Twenty-one, 70.0%, of all ID-AC incidents in 2023 involved only a single discharging member of the service. In seven instances, 23.3% of the total, two members of the service discharged their firearms. In the remaining two incidents, accounting for 6.7% of the 2023 total, one involved four discharging members and one involved five discharging members of the service.

Of the three members of the service shot by subject gunfire during ID-AC incidents in 2023, all three occurred in separate incidents, two of which involved just a single discharging member of the service and the remaining incident involved two discharging members of the service. Both of the remaining two incidents that resulted in member injuries not attributed to subject gunfire involved just a single discharging member of the service.

In 25 of the 30 ID-AC incidents that occurred in 2023, the involved members, 39 in total, were attired in a uniform. In the remaining 5 incidents, all involving a single members, each were attired in plainclothes. Of the 39 members involved in an ID-AC incident in which they were attired in a uniform, all but one were performing patrol-related functions. The remaining member was performing duty in relation to effecting a warrant. The remaining five members of the service, all of whom were attired in plainclothes at the time of their respective ID-AC incidents, included three on-duty members—two detectives and one police officer— as well as two off -duty members in the rank of police officer. Of the three on-duty plainclothes members, two were attempting to effect a search warrant and the remaining member was performing an investigative function.

Forty members, 90.9%, of all those who discharged their firearms during an ID-AC incident in 2023, were assigned to the Patrol Services Bureau. Three members, 6.8% of the total, were assigned to the Detective Bureau, and the remaining one member, 2.3%, was assigned to Special Operations.

Member Assignment, ID-AC Incidents, 2023



Figure 17

Fourteen of 2023’s ID-AC incidents occurred during the second platoon, between the hours of 7:31 a.m. and 3:30 p.m.; 10 took place during the third platoon, between the hours of 3:31 p.m. and 11:30 p.m.; and six incidents took place during the first platoon, between the hours of 11:31 p.m. and 7:30 a.m. Calendar year 2023 marks just the second time in the history of this report that the third platoon did not experience the highest annual amount of ID-AC incidents. However, since 2016, 46.3% of all adversarial discharge incidents have occurred during the third platoon, followed by 31.8% on the first platoon and the remaining 21.9% on the second platoon.

ID-AC Incidents by Platoon, 2023




Figure 18

Geographically, 80.0% of the 30 adversarial conflicts that occurred in 2023 took place within three of the five counties of New York City. The Bronx led all boroughs with 12 incidents, which represents 40.0% of the annual total, followed by seven incidents in Queens (23.3%), then Brooklyn’s five instances to represent 16.7% of the annual total. Of the remaining six incidents, three took place in Manhattan (10.0%), two occurred in Staten Island (6.7%) and one incident took place beyond the confines of New York City in Orange County. Though the Bronx and Staten Island both saw increases in ID-AC incidents during 2023, Brooklyn, Manhattan, and Queens all saw a reduction in incidents, most notably Brooklyn which posted its lowest annual total in the history of this report and in Manhattan, which recorded its fewest ID-AC incidents since 2018.

### ID-AC and Criminal Shooting Incidents by Borough, 2023




Figure 19

Adversarial conflict discharge incidents occurred in 21 separate precincts throughout New York City in 2023, a 27.6% decrease from the previous year when 29 separate precincts, the highest annual total in this report’s history, experienced an ID-AC incident. Seven precincts experienced multiple ID-AC incidents, matching the same total as took place in 2022, however, neither Manhattan nor Staten Island contained a precinct in which multiple incidents occurred. The Bronx had four commands account for nine separate ID-AC incidents, including the 44th Precinct with three incidents and two apiece in the 42nd, 50th, and 52nd Precincts. Queens had two commands, the 103rd and the 114th Precincts, that experienced two incidents apiece and Brooklyn had one command, the 67th Precinct, in which with two incidents were recorded. Though several commands have, since the inception of this report, experienced multiple ID-AC incidents in the same calendar year, 2022 was the first year that featured three separate commands—the 42nd, 43rd, and 60th Precincts—that each recorded three separate incidents. From 2016 through 2021, never had there been more than two commands that experienced three separate incidents in a calendar year. Calendar year 2023, with only one three ID-AC incident command, was a return to that trend.


From 2016, the onset of this report, the highest percentage of ID-AC incidents took place in Brooklyn, where 31.8% of all adversarial conflict incidents were recorded. The Bronx followed closely with 29.2%, then Queens with 17.2%, Manhattan with 15.0% and Staten Island with 3.4% of all incidents. The remaining 3.4% of incidents occurred in various locations beyond the confines of New York City.

During the same timeframe, 16 separate precincts did not experience an ID-AC incident while another 14 precincts recorded just a single incident each, including two precincts that last experienced an ID-AC in 2016 and two more precincts that last recorded such an incident in 2017. Together, these 30 precincts represent approximately 39% of the NYPD’s overall total of 77 precincts.

Since beginning this report in 2016, eight precincts, the Bronx’s 42nd, 43rd, 44th, 47th, and 52nd Precincts and Brooklyn’s 67th, 73rd, and 75th Precincts, have accounted for more than 29% of all ID-AC incidents within the five boroughs of New York City. Additionally, four more precincts, the 40th, 41st, 48th, and 113th Precincts, located in the Bronx and Queens respectively, accounted for more than 10% of the total adversarial conflict incidents during this time. These 12 precincts, which represents just 15.6% of the NYPD’s total of 77 precincts, remain responsible for well more than one-third of the department’s ID-AC incidents over the last eight years while also having a notable geographical correlation with the criminal shooting incidents that occurred over that time.



# Criminal Shooting Incidents vs. NYPD Intentional Discharges Adversarial Conflicts, 2023



Produced by the Data Analysis and Mapping Section - OMAP - 02/21/24

Figure 20

Adversarial conflict firearms discharges are more likely to occur in areas of New York City where greater levels of criminal gun violence takes place. Since 2007, when the department began to map police discharges and criminal shootings in this report’s predecessor, the Annual Firearms Discharge Report, the “Criminal Shooting Incidents vs. NYPD Intentional Discharges-Adversarial Conflicts” maps have demonstrated a general consistency of geographical correlation between adversarial discharge incidents and criminal gun violence. As shown on the map on page 37, the frequency and locations of ID-AC incidents in 2023 are comparable to New York City’s criminal gun activity and criminal shooting incidents during that same timeframe.

A total of 175 rounds were discharged by uniformed members of the service during ID-AC incidents in 2023, a 61.8% decrease from the 458 rounds discharged in 2022 and the lowest annual total in this category since 2018. Marking the first decrease since 2020, this total reverses the trend of the previous two years that each saw an annual increase in total rounds discharged. Since 2016, the department has averaged approximately 255 rounds discharged in ID-AC incidents annually, an amount that 2023’s total falls significantly below. The two incidents that account for the highest number of rounds discharged in 2023 combined to total 56 rounds as compared to 2022, when the two incidents with the highest amount of rounds discharged combined to total 179. The two incidents with the highest number of rounds discharged in 2023 also account for one subject shot and killed as well as one subject shot and injured.

In 21 of the 30 ID-AC incidents that occurred in 2023, the total number of rounds discharged by all involved members were between one and five. These 21 incidents, which involved 22 discharging members, who discharged a total of 51 rounds, accounted for 70% of this year’s ID-AC incidents which also represents the highest annual percentage of this discharge grouping within ID-ACs in the history of this report.

Overall since this report’s inception in 2016, over 61% of all adversarial conflict incidents have involved between just one and five rounds discharged by members of the service.

**Rounds Discharged per ID-AC Incident, 2023**




Figure 21

**Rounds Discharged per Member in ID-AC Incident, 2023**




Figure 22

## OBJECTIVE COMPLETION RATE

When discussing ID-AC incidents, the “objective completion rate” is the means by which the department determines the effectiveness of a police firearms discharge. When a member of the service properly and lawfully perceives a threat serious enough to necessitate the use of a firearm and discharges a firearm properly and lawfully at a specific threat, the most relevant measure of success is whether the member ultimately stops the threat. This is the objective completion rate, and it is determined irrespective of the number of rounds discharged at a particular subject. The objective is considered to be completed when the actions of the subject, specifically those actions that threaten imminent serious physical injury or death are stopped by a member’s use of deadly physical force. The objective completion rate is used for statistical and informational purposes, and is not a factor considered in the investigation of individual incidents. The department does not calculate a “hit percentage” when describing an ID-AC incident, in part because the percentages are sometimes unknown (for example, in cases when a subject flees) and also because of the widely differing circumstances in individual incidents.

In 2023, by discharging their firearms and striking at least one subject, members of the service successfully stopped the threat in 16 of 30 ID-AC incidents, an objective completion rate of 53%. This is a 12% decrease from the year previous year and the first annual decline in this category since 2020. It should be noted, however, as the subjects in two incidents fled, were not apprehended and may have been struck by the members’ firearms discharge, 2023’s objective completion rate may be higher than reported.

Objective Completion Rate, 2016-2023




Figure 23

## SHOOTING DISTANCE

Investigations resulting from adversarial discharges determined the distance of 42 discharging members in relation to the respective subjects during the occurrence of their ID-AC incidents. Twenty members discharged their weapons at a distance of 15 feet or less from their target subjects, including seven members who discharged their weapon from five feet or less. Twenty-two members were determined to be at a distance of more than 15 feet from their subject at the time of discharge. Uniformed members of the service are trained to discharge their weapon at a target from a distance as far away as 75 feet. However, these close-contact adversarial conflicts elevate the intensity and urgency of a situation that already demands immediate, life-or-death decisions by each discharging member. Such decisions are often accompanied by just a momentary timeframe for a member to determine whether or not to discharge their firearm.

IC-AC Distance to Target by Discharging Member, 2023





Figure 24

## INTENTIONAL DISCHARGES – ANIMAL ATTACK

Every encounter that a member of the service faces carries with it the potential for an assortment of significant challenges, many of which are compounded when an incident includes the unpredictability of an animal. While the NYPD responds to thousands of service calls annually specific to an animal or an animal-related condition, this report does not encompass every call for service concerning an animal or each animal incident involving a member of the service. Only instances involving police firearms discharges are discussed within this text. In 2023, the NYPD recorded two Intentional Discharge-Animal Attack (ID-AA) incidents, both of which occurred within incidents that members responded to for reasons other than an animal call or condition.

The two firearm discharges in 2023 classified as ID-AA incidents represents a 33.3% decrease from such incidents the year prior and the department's second straight annual decrease in ID-AA discharge incidents. Additionally, 2023 equaled 2020 as the lowest annual total of ID-AA incidents since the inception of this report and is an 81.8% decrease from the highest annual total, 11 occurrences in 2016, of ID-AA incidents during that same time.


**Rounds Discharged per Member in ID-AA Incidents, 2023**



*Figure 25*


Members of the service, as per department policy, are permitted to discharge a firearm at a dog or other animal only to protect themselves or another from imminent physical injury and there is no opportunity to retreat or other reasonable means to eliminate the threat. Though members are equipped with less-lethal force options such as batons and OC spray, when encountering an animal attack, the volatility of the circumstances may not allow these options to be neither practical nor effective.

**Rounds Discharged per ID-AA Incident, 2023**




*Figure 26*

**ID-AA Incidents by Platoon, 2016-2023**



*Figure 27*

**ID-AA Incidents by Borough, 2023**



*Figure 28*

The two ID-AA incidents in 2023 each involved a single, on-duty discharging member of the service who had responded to 911 service call unrelated to an animal. One of these service calls was in regard to a dispute involving a knife and one call was reported as an ambulance case. Of these two discharge incidents, one occurred as the result of a dog aggressively advancing on members of the service while the other incident transpired when a dog aggressively attacked, and bit, a member of the service before then charging at another member of the service on scene.

Both of the 2023 ID-AA incidents occurred on the third platoon. Since this report began in 2016, almost half (48%) of all ID-AA incidents have occurred during the third platoon.

A total of two members of the service discharged their firearms during ID-AA incidents in 2023, both of whom were male, held the rank of police officer, and were assigned to patrol duty. This represents a 50.0% decrease from the previous year, and equals 2020 for the lowest total number of discharging members in ID-AA incidents since the creation of this report in 2016.

Though the total number of rounds discharged during 2023's ID-AA incidents did not change from the previous year, the five rounds discharged in 2023 matched 2022 for the second lowest annual ID-AA discharge total since this report began in 2016. Of the five rounds discharged in 2023, one member discharged a single round during one incident while one member discharged four rounds during the other incident. As a result of these discharges, two canines were shot and killed. In 2023, one member of the service sustained an injury during an ID-AA due to a bite from an aggressive dog.

Brooklyn and Staten Island experienced one ID-AA apiece in 2023. While 2023 was the first time in the history of this report that the Bronx did not experience an ID-AA, it also marks the fourth consecutive year that the boroughs of Manhattan and Queens did not record any ID-AA incidents.

### UNINTENTIONAL DISCHARGES

The NYPD experienced eight unintentional discharge incidents in 2023, an approximate 27.3% decrease from the previous year and an annual total equal to both 2018 and 2019 for the second lowest year-end total of this discharge type since the creation of this report in 2016.

Each incident involved a single member of the service unintentionally discharging a single round, including two incidents in which two members were injured, the first time since 2019 that a member was injured due to this category of discharge. No bystanders or subjects were injured in any of 2023's unintentional discharge incidents. Six incidents, however, did result in minor property damage.

Four unintentional discharge incidents occurred while the members were on-duty, a 55.5% decrease from 2022 when nine incidents occurred on duty. Of these four, two transpired within a department facility, one occurred within a court building, and the final incident took place within a residential building.

Rank, Unintentional Discharge vs. Department Staffing, 2023




Figure 29



Four incidents occurred while the discharging members were off-duty, a 100% increase from 2022 when the department experienced just two of these such instances. All four off-duty discharges took place in the residence of the respective discharging member and two of these incidents account for the aforementioned injuries sustained by two members of the service.

Seven incidents involved members discharging their own firearms, four of which were their service pistols, one was an off-duty pistol, one was a privately owned pistol, and one privately owned rifle. The remaining incident occurred when a member of the service discharged a firearm recovered from a subject as the result of an arrest.

Of the members that unintentionally discharged a firearm in 2023, seven held the rank of police officer and one held the rank of detective. Three of the members were assigned to the Patrol Services Bureau, two were assigned to the Detective Bureau, two were assigned to the Housing Bureau, and the remaining member was assigned to the Criminal Justice Bureau. In each year since 2016, the inception of this report, members in the rank of police officer have had the highest annual percentage of unintentional discharges among all the uniformed ranks of the department.

**Years of Service, Unintentional Discharge vs. Department Staffing, 2023**




Figure 30

**Years of Service**

Three members that unintentionally discharged a firearm in 2023 had less than five years of service with the department. Two members had between eleven to fifteen years and of the remaining three, one member had seven years, one member had seventeen years, and the final member had eighteen years of service. Since 2016, members with less than five years of service have had the highest annual percentage of unintentional discharges in four separate years and have tied for the highest percentage in an additional three years.

**Handling**

Four of 2023’s unintentional discharge incidents occurred as the result of a member mishandling a firearm unrelated to the actions of loading/unloading or holstering. Two incidents transpired while the discharging members were on-duty, one as a member mishandled a firearm while taking police action in the performance of patrol and the other when a member mishandled a firearm while attempting to remove it from a locker inside a police facility. The two remaining incidents occurred as two members, both of whom were off-duty, mishandled firearms within their respective private residences.

**Loading**

Four unintentional discharge incidents occurred with relation to the actions of loading/unloading a weapon. Of these four incidents, two took place while the discharging members were on-duty, one inside a police facility with a firearm recovered as the result of an arrest and the other occurring in a court building with a member’s off-duty weapon. The final two instances took place while the discharging members were off duty and within each of their respective private residences.

## UNAUTHORIZED DISCHARGES

Eight firearms incidents in 2023 were categorized as unauthorized discharges, the same annual total as 2022 and the first year since 2021 that did not experience an annual increase of this classification of discharges. Among these eight incidents were three completed suicides by members of the service, an amount that matches the same annual total of member suicides by firearm that the department has experienced in each of the previous three years.

The remaining five incidents consisted of various circumstances but did not include a member suicide. Collectively, these five incidents accounted for two members of the service being shot and killed as well as the completed suicides of two non-members. Additionally, the actual unauthorized discharge is attributed to a member of the service in just two of these five incidents while in three incidents, the respective discharges are solely attributed to non-members. With specific regard to unauthorized discharges that did not involve a member suicide, 2023's five incidents equals 2022 as the second highest annual total of this category of incidents since the inception of this report in 2016.

There were four members of the service directly involved in these five incidents, all males holding the rank of police officer, three of whom were assigned to patrol-related functions within the Patrol Services Bureau and the remaining member performed investigative duties within the Detective Bureau. At the time of their respective incidents, none of these four members had more than five years of service with the department.

Of the five incidents, two resulted in a member of the service being shot and killed. In the first incident, an off-duty member of the service, along with his civilian family member, were the victims of a robbery when the subject discharged a firearm, mortally wounding the member of the service. In response, the civilian retrieved the member's firearm and discharged it at the subject who subsequently fled, though was later apprehended. The member of the service was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased.

The second incident in which a member died occurred when, while off-duty, a member of the service was shot and killed by a family member who had gained access to that member's firearm. The family member was subsequently discovered with an apparent self-inflicted fatal gunshot wound.

Neither of these two instances included a firearms discharge by either of the involved member of the service.



The remaining three occurrences included an incident when an off-duty member, after being involved in a vehicle collision, discharged a firearm in the direction of another vehicle. There were no reported injuries as a result of the discharge and that member was arrested and suspended from duty. In a separate incident, an on-duty member discharged their firearm, sustaining an apparently self-inflicted injury. That member was placed on modified duty prior to the subsequent termination of their service with the department. The last unauthorized discharge incident was the result of a non-member gaining access to a member’s firearm and discharging it in a completed suicide. No member of the service was involved within this discharge incident.

Since this report began in 2016, members holding the rank of police officer have been responsible for more than three-quarters of all unauthorized discharge incidents. In a similar manner across that time period, males, irrespective of rank, have accounted for more than three-quarters of all the members involved in this category of discharge incidents. Since the inception of this report in 2016, the rank and the gender of those members involved in an unauthorized discharge incident comparatively relates with the overall rank and gender demographics of the department during the corresponding period.

### UNIFORMED MEMBERS OF THE SERVICE SUICIDES BY FIREARM

Three uniformed members of the service died by suicide utilizing a firearm in 2023, a number that equals the annual total of suicides by firearm that occurred in each of the previous three years. Of the 2023 suicides by firearm, all three members were males that held the rank of police officer. At the time of their respective incidents, all of which occurred while the members were off-duty, one member had 16 years of service, one member had four years of service, and the remaining member had served with the department for just one year.

Two of the incidents took place within the residence of the respective member, and one incident occurred within the member’s personal vehicle as it was parked along a residential street. None of the incidents included any other reported injuries beyond those sustained by the member of the service.

Since this report began in 2016, 33 members of the service have died by suicide by firearm. The vast majority of these members, 87.9%, were male and the remaining 12.1% were female, percentages that remain comparative to the gender demographics of both the department and suicide statistics nationwide. When viewed through the collective lens of race and gender, white males make up the highest percentage of member suicides by firearm, a statistic that, again, similarly correlates to the race and gender data categories of the department.

Members in the rank of police officer, who account for the largest percentage of uniformed members within the department, similarly represent the highest percentage of members who died by suicide by firearm. Additionally, among all the members who died in suicide by firearm incidents since 2016, over 36% had accumulated between six to ten years of service with the department, almost half were between 31 to 41 years of age, and the majority of the members were assigned to patrol related duties.

UMOS Suicides by Firearm by Year, 2016-2023




Figure 31

## HEALTH AND WELLNESS

Inherent within the duties of any member of the service are stressors potentially fraught with varying aspects of trauma, both emotional and psychological, which may impact a member on a professional and personal level. The department recognizes this and, in response, has placed the well-being and resiliency of its members at the forefront as signified by the introduction of an abundance of resources, both internal and external, available to members. Assistance and resolution resources available internally include the Employee Assistance Unit, the Interim and Critical Incident Support Service, the Counseling Services Unit, the Chaplain's Unit, the NYPD Helpline, Peer Support, the Early Intervention Program, and the Psychological Evaluation Unit. Among the external resources available are Police Officers Providing Peer Assistance (POPPA), Finest Care, the Police Self Support Group, NYC 988, and the Crisis Text Line.

Since 2019, the Health and Wellness Section (HWS) has been a powerful component of the department's commitment to enhancing the health, morale and overall well-being, both professionally as well as on a personal level, of all members of the service. By offering a host of resources, many available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, HWS firmly supports and encourages positive physical and mental health of all members.

Overseen by HWS, the Employee Assistance Unit (EAU) serves as the critical peer support catalyst for the department by providing assistance with regard to a myriad of issues a member may face. Beyond responding to critical incidents, this unit, which features both uniformed and civilian members, remains a compassionate resource of support and even features three K-9 therapy dogs to assist in this task.

Additional HWS offerings include Finest Care, a free and confidential counseling service provided in partnership with Northwell Direct and the Critical Incident Stress Management Program, implemented to assist members in the aftermath of critical, high stress, or traumatic incidents.

Members may also rely on the Peer Support Program for a more informal, yet confidential, form of support and guidance. Consisting of more than 400 volunteer peer representatives embedded in commands citywide, this program allows its members to maintain their regular duty assignments while providing co-workers a familiar and local resource of support. This includes imparting information on physical and mental health, suicide prevention, and working to overcome any stigma that members may associate with seeking help.

In a further effort to address member well-being, the NYPD provides its members an assortment of resources accessible electronically through departmental desktops, on phone applications within departmental cell phones, and publicly on various social media pages, including several specifically dedicated to member wellness. Moreover, as approaches to member well-being within the law enforcement community evolve, HWS works steadfastly to introduce any enhancements and updates, as deemed necessary, to policy and training for the overall benefit of member wellness. Included in such enhancements is the NYPD's proactive virtual approach that offers webinars and virtual meetings on an assortment of wellness topics such as grief support, fitness, nutrition, finance, resiliency, and retirement planning. With the availability of flexible scheduling unique to each member, a convenience of access, and a measure, if preferred, of privacy, these methods can offer an immediate and substantial impact.

Recognizing the impact that member well-being bears on the NYPD's mission, the department regularly evaluates the causative circumstances of issues that place a burden of stress, be it large or small, on members. By better understanding these conditions and their influences, the department strives to effectively bolster support services through the positive introduction and adaptation of available resources and programs.





# CONDUCTED ELECTRICAL WEAPONS



Commonly referred to as tasers or electronic control weapons/devices, conducted electrical weapons (CEWs) are a less-lethal use of force option utilized by law enforcement personnel. CEWs, under department policy, should only be used against persons who are actively resisting, exhibiting active aggression, or in order to prevent individuals from physically injuring themselves or other person(s) actually present. Intended to augment a members force options during a confrontational situation, these less-lethal devices can be utilized to provide a greater margin of safety for both subjects and members of the service alike. The use of a CEW is prohibited in situations that do not require the use of physical force.

There are two separate modes in which a CEW may be deployed: “cartridge” mode and “drive-stun” mode. Cartridge mode, also known as “probe deployment” is the primary mode of operation and qualifies as a Level 1 force incident under department policy. Drive-stun mode, as outlined within department policy, should not be the primary method of use unless exceptional circumstances exist. While utilized at a significantly lower rate than that of cartridge mode, drive-stun mode qualifies as a Level 2 force incident. In an effort to mitigate the risk of weapons confusion, members of the service are instructed that CEWs are to be worn on the support side of the gun belt, opposite the member’s firearm. Though a national standard for CEW use within law enforcement does not presently exist, NYPD policy remains largely consistent with the best practices recommended by nationally recognized independent bodies, including the Police Executive Research Forum, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and the National Institute of Justice.

CEWs use replaceable cartridges containing compressed nitrogen to propel two small probes that are attached to the handheld unit by insulated conductive wires. The wires transmit short controlled pulses of electricity in five-second cycles that stimulate the skeletal muscles of the human body. These short electrical pulses affect the sensory and motor functions of the peripheral nervous system causing temporary incapacitation by preventing coordinated muscular action, without affecting vital organs. Once the five-second cycle is complete, an immediate recovery occurs. CEWs collect and store data regarding each use for post-incident review.

A total of 31,889 uniformed members of the service were trained and authorized to use the 7,704 CEWs that were deployed to personnel on a rotating deployment basis in 2023. While the number of actual CEWs deployed decreased 12.3% from the prior year, the total number of members trained and authorized in 2023 increased 22.0% from 2022, a year which was just the second time in the history of this report that experienced a decline in annual total of this category. The growth in members trained in CEW usage can be attributed in part to the training of newly hired recruits, the natural attrition of uncertified personnel through retirement, and improvements to training availability, scheduling, and certification opportunities. Additionally, the number of members trained and certified in CEWs in 2023 represents a 190.5% increase from 2016, the inception of this report, when just 10,979 uniformed members of the service, approximately one-third of the entire department, were CEW-trained and authorized. Calendar year 2023’s total of CEW trained and authorized members represent 94.5% of all current uniformed members of the service department-wide.

A CEW deployment in cartridge mode is a force option that allows members of the service to engage a non-compliant and/or aggressive subject from a distance, affording a member additional reaction time to assess these unique, often hostile situations in order to develop and employ the safest tactical solution. Furthermore, CEWs often aid to rapidly facilitate the goal of control and compliance, an achievement that often minimizes the likelihood of injury or fatal consequences to either a member or a subject. However, in situations where a subject presents an imminent threat of serious physical injury or death to a member or another person on scene, the utilization of a CEW may not be an appropriate or reasonable force option.

For the year 2023, there were 1,496 CEW discharge incidents, which involved 1,773 individual discharges. Multiple CEW discharges, it should be noted, may occur during a single incident and there may be CEW discharges that occurred during incidents that were ultimately classified under a higher level of force, such as in a firearms discharge incident when a CEW was also utilized. CEW discharge incidents and individual discharges both increased during 2023, each category rising by 14.4% from their respective total during the previous year. The increase in CEW discharge incidents and individual CEW discharges may be attributable to the increased number of trained personnel as well as to the total amount of calls for service, that although down from the previous year, still represents the second highest total in this report’s history, as well as the 19.5% increase in arrests in 2023 as compared to the previous year.

Of the CEW discharge incidents occurring in 2023, the highest percentage, 72.2% of the all incidents, occurred during situations when members of the service encountered a crime in progress or where members were attempting to subdue an emotionally disturbed person (EDP). This percentage comparably relates to the historical percentage of CEW discharge incidents recorded annually since 2016, where approximately 76% of all CEW discharge incidents were attributed to arrests (which includes the category of crimes in progress) or EDP situations. Crime in progress situations accounted for 716 of 2023’s 1,496 CEW discharge incidents while another 363 incidents occurred as members were attempting to bring an EDP into custody. The remaining CEW discharge incidents occurred in situations that among them included: vehicle stops, wanted suspects, past crime investigations, and suspicious activities.

### 2023 CEW Discharge Incidents, Event Type




Figure 32

An emotionally disturbed person, as defined by the NYPD Patrol Guide, is a person who appears to be mentally ill or temporarily deranged and is conducting themselves in a manner that a uniformed member of the service reasonably believes is likely to result in serious injury to themselves or others. A majority of encounters with EDPs are not arrest-related situations. Consistent with New York State Mental Hygiene Law—which spells out the conditions under which a person can be involuntarily removed to a hospital for examination or treatment—members of the service are directed by Department policy to take an EDP into protective custody for the subject’s safety and the safety of the public, and to ensure that proper medical and psychiatric evaluation can take place at a safe location.

Often, most notably upon the point of initial contact, the emotional and/or psychological status of a subject is not known by the responding member of the service. Trained to recognize behavioral and situational cues, members utilize these indicators to form an appropriate approach to interact and respond to a person in crisis, including the use of all necessary all time and de-escalation strategies. Despite the unique challenges these such situations may present, members are trained to handle every EDP situation with patience and understanding while solely employing just the reasonable amount of force necessary to achieve control or custody of a subject. Despite such efforts, these situations are unpredictable, and when a member’s verbal directions fail or a subject exhibits active aggression, a CEW discharge may remain as one of the safer options for both the subject and members of the service. Of the 174,953 service calls in 2023 that were classified as an EDP situation, just a fraction, 362 in total, included a CEW discharge incident. The vast majority of EDP-related calls for service in 2023 were, as has been since this report began in 2016, handled and resolved by NYPD personnel without any need to utilize a CEW or force in any manner.

### CEW DEPLOYMENT MODE

As previously indicated, there are two separate modes in which a conducted electrical weapon can be deployed: “cartridge” mode and “drive-stun” mode. The primary method of deployment, as per department policy, is cartridge mode, also known as probe mode. When utilized in this mode, two metal probes are propelled by the CEW’s cartridge toward a subject across an intervening space. This mode, which may cause neuromuscular incapacitation and thus immobilize a subject, is advantageous to a member as it provides ample separation from the intended subject.

In 2023’s 1,496 CEW discharge incidents, 1,110, approximately 74.2%, were cartridge mode deployments. Though the vast percentage of all CEW discharge incidents annually since 2016 have been cartridge mode deployments, this method has experienced an annual decrease, percentage-wise, among overall CEW discharge incidents each year since 2018. From 2018, when it represented 88.0% of all discharges, it fell to 86.5% in 2019, 83.3% in 2020, 81.1% in 2021, 78.5% in 2022, and the current percentage of 74.2% in 2023.

Drive-stun mode discharges, the secondary method of deployment, accounted for 316 discharge incidents in 2023, approximately 21.1%, of all discharge incidents during the year. In this deployment mode, the CEW is brought into direct contact with the subject’s body or clothing, without a cartridge or after a cartridge has been discharged. A discharge of this type does not, by itself, achieve the immobilizing effects of probe deployment as this mode does not generally cause neuromuscular incapacitation. Contrary to the annual decrease, percentage-wise, in cartridge mode use annually since 2018, the percentage of drive-stun mode deployments has, as a consequence, risen over that time from 5.6% in 2018, 7.7% in 2019, 12.0% in 2020, 13.9% in 2021, 16.5% in 2022, and to the current 21.1% of all discharge incidents in 2023.

Though less common among CEW discharge incidents, circumstances may develop in which a concerted use of both modes, cartridge and drive-stun, becomes necessary. As an example, during instances when just one probe penetrates a subject or when the distance between probes renders them insufficient, the use of a CEW in drive-stun mode is necessary to “complete the circuit” in order to achieve neuromuscular incapacitation. In 2023, 4.7% of all CEW discharge incidents occurred in which both cartridge and drive-stun modes were utilized. Since 2018, the overall percentage of deployments in which both modes were utilized, has remained comparatively similar, averaging nearly 5.0% annually.




Figure 33



## CEW EFFECTIVENESS

Every application of force by a member of the service occurs with a distinct, but sincere, goal: the safe, effective control of violent, actively resistant and/or aggressive subjects without a need to utilize any further manner of force. This goal encompasses all manners of force, CEW discharges included. NYPD Patrol Guide 221-08 has, since October 2019, defined CEW effectiveness as: “Any immediate reaction, even if momentary, that causes a change in an actively aggressive subject’s or emotionally disturbed person’s physical actions and/or psychological behavior as the result of a pre-deployment verbal warning, activation, laser warning, warning arc, or discharge of a CEW.” It is important to emphasize that the majority of these actions —verbal warning, CEW activation (arming the CEW by releasing the safety), laser warning, and warning arc —are all actions that would likely occur prior to the actual discharge of a CEW.

A comprehensive review of 2023’s force data reveals that of the 1,496 total CEW discharge incidents, 917 were categorized as effective in gaining rapid control of the subject. Additionally, 1,396 of all discharge incidents during this period were categorized as intentional. Of these intentional CEW discharge incidents, 65.7% were deemed effective.

A single ineffective discharge incident often has multiple, simultaneous causes. Calendar year 2023’s ineffective discharge incidents in were most frequently attributed to such circumstances as the probes falling out of the subject, the subject fighting through the pain, probes being too far from the surface area, or the probes missing the subject.

Effectiveness of CEW Discharges, 2023




Figure 34

## DISCHARGING PERSONNEL

Members in the rank of police officer and sergeant were responsible for 91.4%—1,621 of 1,773—of all individual CEW discharges that occurred in 2023. Likewise, these two ranks represent 90.4% of the discharging personnel—1,353 of 1,496— in 2023’s total CEW discharge incidents. Unlike members performing investigative duties or members serving in higher supervisory ranks, police officers and sergeants performing patrol-related functions are often the initial members on the scene of an incident that may result in a CEW discharge. The nature of a patrol assignment also elevates the probability for a member to encounter, and ultimately engage in, a hostile interaction with a subject. As such, personnel in the rank of police officer have, since 2017, accounted for the highest proportion of both individual discharges, as well as overall discharge incidents, annually.

CEW Discharges by Rank, 2023




Figure 35

## TIME AND PLACE OF CEW DISCHARGES

Following the precedent in place since 2017, the majority of CEW discharge incidents in 2023, like the six years prior, occurred on the third platoon, from 3:31 p.m. to 11:30 p.m. During these hours, 728 instances occurred, representing 48.7% of all discharge incidents for the year. The second platoon, 7:31 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., recorded the next highest total, 400 incidents, which represent approximately 26.7%, followed by 368 incidents on the first platoon, from 11:31 p.m. to 7:30 a.m., representing 24.6% of all the year's total discharge incidents.

A higher total of CEW discharge incidents characteristically occur in geographic boroughs that account for a higher amount of service calls, with Brooklyn, the Bronx, and Manhattan consistently among the top three boroughs in both CEW discharge incidents and the number of service calls annually.

The Bronx led the five boroughs in 2023's CEW discharge incidents, accounting for 31.6% of all discharge incidents, marking the sixth time since 2016 that this borough led the city in this category. Brooklyn came next with approximately 26.4% of the city's discharge incidents. Manhattan followed, accounting for 20.8%, Queens with 16.7%, and Staten Island responsible for 4.5% of the annual CEW discharge incidents. Since 2016, Brooklyn has led the city twice in annual CEW discharge incidents, first in 2018 and again in 2022. In every remaining year over that same period, the Bronx accounted for the highest total of CEW discharges by borough annually.

During 2023, Brooklyn and Manhattan, as has been consistent since the inception of this report, led New York City as the respective top two boroughs with regard to 911 calls for service.

CEW Discharge Incidents by Platoon, 2023




Figure 36



### CEW Discharges by Geographic Borough, 2023




Figure 37

### 911 Calls for Service by Borough, 2023




Figure 38


# GENERAL USES OF FORCE

Each and every member of the service is responsible and accountable for the proper use of force. Current New York State law allows that a member of law enforcement may use force to effect an arrest, prevent escape, and protect life and property. Any force utilized by a member of the service must be compliance with both state and federal law, as well as with NYPD policy. In every circumstance, the application or use of force by a member of the service must be the reasonable amount necessary to achieve compliance. When appropriate and consistent with personal safety, members of the service seek to gain voluntary compliance in order to reduce or eliminate the necessity of force. Such compliance, however, is not always attainable and some interactions may result in the use of force.

Historically prior to the inception of this report, instances in which members of the service used force were documented through various paperwork such as Arrest Reports, Medical Treatment of Prisoner Forms, Aided Reports, and Line-of-Duty Injury Reports. Though data regarding the use of force was captured, it lacked a centralized repository and did not sufficiently provide a comprehensive accounting of any such occurrence. Recognizing the inadequacy of this method, the department introduced the Threat, Resistance or Injury (TRI) Report in June of 2016. The TRI Report sought to enhance accountability, advance efforts towards distinguishing deficiencies in training, and improve oversight by recording additionally thorough data regarding the aspects of a force incident, including, but not limited to: the type(s) of force utilized, the demographic information of individuals subjected to force, the members of the service who used force and/or were subjected to force, any injuries inflicted and/or sustained, and other circumstances surrounding use of force incidents.

The TRI Report is the primary manner by which NYPD personnel document use of force incidents, whether force was used by, or against, a member of the service. Fully digitalized and highly intuitive, the TRI Report continues to advance the department's goals towards enhanced accountability and transparency.

Threat, Resistance, or Injury Reports, 2023



\* This figure does not include three separate discharge incidents, all categorized as unauthorized discharges, in which a non-member of the service discharged a member's firearm. Though not captured in the TRI data, all three incidents are included in the yearly discharge total and covered in the Unauthorized Discharge section of this report.

Figure 39

In 2023, 11,939 TRI Interaction Reports were completed, documenting 9,777 reportable use of force incidents. Among these completed TRI Reports, 2,162 were for incidents that, although reportable under the department’s force policy, did not involve the use of force by a member of the service. As an example, should a subject in department custody be assaulted by another subject also in custody, a TRI Report would be prepared though not be categorized as a use of force incident. Likewise, the suicide of a subject in police custody is reportable by a TRI Report, though it is not considered a use of force incident. Additionally, incidents in which a subject assaults a member of the service, without any force utilized by NYPD personnel, also generates a TRI Report. While incidents such as these do not involve any application of force by a member of the service, they do, however, activate an oversight mechanism governed by the department’s force investigation policy.

Under the department’s four level force classification rubric, force incidents in 2023 consisted of 95.2% Level 1 use of force, 3.0 % Level 2 use of force, 1.5% Level 3 use of force and 0.3% Level 4 use of force.

By comparison, force incidents in 2022 consisted of 93.6% Level 1 use of force, 4.4% Level 2 use of force, 1.4% Level 3 use of force and 0.6% Level 4 use of force. Within the history of this report, 2020 was the first full year to utilize the four level force classification rubric. Prior to that, department policy was comprised of just three levels of force classification. The revision of the TRI Report, as well as department policy, that occurred in October of 2019 created a more intuitive reporting process and included the bifurcation of the Level 3 category by creating the Level 4 category. This revision established the framework from which current policy continues to evolve.

Though this or any such revision in department policy may impact the historical comparison of force level data, since the creation of this report in 2016, the overwhelming majority of force incidents involved just the minimum amount of physical force by a member of the service.

Similarly, the majority of 2023’s 9,777 force incidents involved just the minimum amount of physical force by a member of the service. Physical force, consisting of actions that include forcible takedowns, hand strikes, and foot strikes, amounted to 8,006 incidents, a total that represents approximately 81.9% of all force incidents for that period. Representing the next highest percentage of force utilized, CEWs accounted for 15.3% of force incidents, of which 93.3% were intentional discharge incidents.

The remaining force incidents by equipment or force option included: 161 uses of OC spray (1.6%), 68 uses of impact weapons (0.7%), 45 firearms discharges (0.5%) and one canine bite (0.01%). There were no reported uses of mesh restraining blankets in 2023, the first time since this report began that no force incidents of this type occurred.

For the second consecutive year, the department experienced an annual increase in the cumulative amount of four specific less-lethal force incidents; impact weapons, mesh restraining blankets, OC spray, and canine bites. Combined, these incidents amounted to 230 of the all force incidents in 2023, a 25.0% increase from 2022’s 184 incidents of comparable force. Though there had never before been a cumulative increase in these less lethal categories over two consecutive years in the history of this report, the increase was largely driven by a rise in two categories, impact weapons and OC Spray incidents, categories which had experienced their lowest and second lowest annual totals, respectively, in the prior year. Additionally, CEW incidents increased for the third straight year. Only once in the history of this report did the annual total of CEW incidents decrease from the previous year, occurring in 2020 as compared to 2019.

Overall force incidents involving the use of less-lethal options, including CEWs, increased by approximately 15.7% from comparable incidents in 2022. Fueled by increases exceeding 14% and 25%, respectively, in CEW and OC Spray incidents, other less-lethal incidents remained relatively consistent with annual totals from the previous year.

Incidents involving mesh restraining blankets decreased from three to no occurrences, canine bites increased from zero to just a single incident, and impact weapon use increased by a total of 15 incidents from the year prior.

The majority, approximately 63.3%, or 6,191 of 2023’s total of 9,777 force incidents occurred during four arrest-related categories: crimes in progress, prisoner interactions, past crime/violation investigations, and wanted suspect investigations. When combined with 2023’s force incidents involving emotionally disturbed persons, these five incident types account for approximately 79.8% of all NYPD uses of force. In 2023, force was utilized in approximately

### Force Reporting Levels, 2023




Figure 40

3.4% of the total arrests (7,634 of 226,875) effected by members of the service. Though this equals, percentage-wise, the same amount of force used during arrests during the prior year, 2023 experienced a 19.6% increase in the total number of arrests as compared to 2022's total. Of 2023's remaining force incidents, the most significant categories involving the use of force included vehicular summons enforcement (VTL infractions) at 6.1% of incidents, crowd control at 2.4% of incidents, and suspicious activity at 2.0% of the total use of force occurrences during 2023.

### Type of Encounter in Which Police Used Force, 2023




Figure 41

### Force Used During Arrests by Subject Race, 2023




Figure 42

### Total Arrests by Subject Race, 2023




Figure 43

The race and ethnicity of the members of the service that utilized force in 2023 largely correlates with the racial and ethnic breakdown of the overall uniformed staffing of the department. Of the subjects of police force in 2023, the race and ethnicity of these subjects generally corresponds to the racial composition of the violent criminal population in the city, as measured by overall arrests, subjects who resist arrest, and information provided from crime victims that includes the description of assault suspects, robbery suspects, and shooting suspects.

### Uniformed Members Using Force, 2023




Figure 44

### Violent Crime and Force Used to Effect Arrest, 2023




Figure 45

As has been a constant during the history of this report, the highest percentage of individuals subjected to police force have been those between the ages of 16 and 35, accounting for nearly two-thirds of all individuals subjected to force on an annual basis. This trend continued in 2023, as this age group accounted for approximately 63.3% of all individuals that were the subject of force. Viewed further, of all individuals subjected to force between the ages of 16 and 25, 52.8% were Black, 33.5% were Hispanic, 4.6% were White, and the remaining 9.1% were Asian or other ethnicities. Of the subjects between the ages of 26 and 35, 53.3% were Black, 31.6% were Hispanic, 6.4% were White, and the remaining 8.7% were Asian or other ethnicities. Of the individuals subjected to force between the ages of 36 and 59, 52.4% were Black, 27.7% were Hispanic, 10.9% were White, and the remaining 9.0% were Asian or other ethnicities. Of subjects ages 60 and older, 52.7% were Black, 16.7% were Hispanic, 15.5% were White, and the remainder, 15.1%, were Asian or other ethnicities.

## Subjects of Force by Age/Race, 2023




Figure 46

## Force Reporting by Geographic Borough, 2023




Figure 47

## Force Reporting by Platoon, 2023




Figure 48

Geographically, the highest percentage of reported force in 2023 occurred in Brooklyn, accounting for 27.6% of all reported use of force citywide. The Bronx followed closely with 27.1% of reported force then Manhattan with 23.4% of the annual total. The remaining two boroughs, Queens and Staten Island, accounted for 17.4% and 4.5% respectively, and even when combined, these two fall significantly below any one of the other three boroughs. Citywide, 2023's use of force incidents occurred most often on the third platoon, 50.7%, from 3:31 p.m. to 11:30 p.m., followed by 25.3% on the second platoon, from 7:31 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., and 24.0% occurring on the first platoon, from 11:31 p.m. to 7:30 a.m. Use of force by borough and platoon has remained overwhelmingly consistent since this report began in 2016. During this time, Brooklyn has continuously reported the highest percentage of force by borough annually followed on five occasions by Manhattan, which ranked third in 2023. Additionally, Staten Island and Queens have accounted for the lowest and the second lowest reported force by borough, respectively, over that time. Furthermore, during all but one year since the creation of this report, the highest percentage of force reported by platoon occurred on the third platoon followed by the second platoon, which recorded the second highest percentage in 2023 as it has consistently done during the previous five years.






Figure 49




Figure 50

## CIVILIAN FORCE COMPLAINTS

For the second consecutive year, force complaints received by the Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) experienced an annual increase, rising by 54.1% in 2023 as compared to the total number of force complaints in 2022. While the 2,588 force complaints received by CCRB in 2023 represents the highest total on record during the history of this report, the 143 force allegations substantiated by CCRB in 2023 represents a 59.6% decrease in substantiated allegations as compared to the year prior.

It should be noted that the disposition of a complaint may, due to the investigative process, occur at a timeframe distinctive from when the complaint was reported, meaning a disposition in any given year may be for a complaint reported in a previous year.

Each day and on every tour, members of the service regularly interact with victims, witnesses, suspects, bystanders, and civilian members of the community. These public interactions and encounters, whether amid the public's request for assistance through the millions of 911 or 311 calls for service, while conducting enforcement or investigations, or simply during a member's daily activities, most often occur without any police use of force or any complaint of unnecessary force. During 2023, as members of the service responded to more than 6.8 million 911 calls for service, just a fraction of such calls and interactions resulted in force complaints against a uniformed member of the service. 2023's ratio of calls for service to force complaint cases is approximately 2,633 to 1. The ratio of calls for service to substantiated allegations is approximately 47,664 to 1. The ratio of force incidents to substantiated force allegations 68 to 1.

### CCRB Force Complaints vs. Substantiated Force Allegations, 2016-2023




Figure 51

## FORCE USED AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE SERVICE

Day in and day out, members of the service go about their duties with the understanding that the inherent danger in their work may, at any given moment, emerge and that any event, encounter, or interaction may ultimately become violent. In every situation, though the aim of a member is to achieve voluntary compliance, the reality is that, despite all efforts put forth by a member of the service, such an outcome is not always attainable. Due to their very nature, these encounters often maintain a potential for contention and hostility, which may ultimately induce violence and potentially result in injuries to subjects, members of the service, or both.

In 2023, the NYPD recorded 9,764 incidents during which subjects used force against members of the service. Although incidents of force against members often occur during instances in which members themselves utilize force, for statistical purposes, force used by members and force used against members are viewed independently of one another.

Of all incidents in which force was used against NYPD personnel, the majority, more than 63%, occurred during four categories of arrest-related circumstances: crime/violation in progress, wanted suspect investigations, prisoner interactions, and past crime investigations. Beyond these situations, 16.4% of 2023's incidents in which force was used against a member occurred during encounters with emotionally disturbed persons. Since this report's inception, arrest-related situations along with EDP encounters have consistently ranked among the highest percentages of incident types resulting in force used against a member of the service. VTL infractions (6.1%), crowd control (2.4%), and suspicious activity (2.0%) are among the other categories that represented significant percentages of force incidents against members in 2023. Similar to the year-end totals since this report began, the most prevalent type of force used against members of the service was physical force without weapons, which in 2023 represented 98.1% of force against members. The remaining 1.9% of incidents included either the use or display of a weapon by a subject.

**Force Used Against Members by Event Description, 2023**




Figure 52

## Type of Force Used Against Members, 2023




*Figure 53*

As has occurred in six of the last seven years, Brooklyn led the city in 2023 as the geographical borough responsible for the highest percentage of force incidents, 27.60%, against members of the service. The Bronx was a close second, representing 27.13% of incidents followed next by Manhattan at 23.32%, Queens at 17.42%, and lastly Staten Island, which accounted for 4.53% of force incidents against members.

More than half, 50.7%, of all incidents where force was used against members occurred on the first platoon, from 11:31 p.m. to 7:30 a.m. Since 2019, this platoon has, on an annual basis, been the time frame during which force incidents against members most often occur. The third platoon, from 3:31 p.m. to 11:30 p.m., followed next accounting for 25.4% of instances and the remaining 23.9% took place on the second platoon, from 7:31 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. Data regarding force incidents against members of the service, as previously stated, often correlates with that of the use of force by members of the service.

In 2023, there were 12,860 subjects of police force, of which 12,494 (approximately 97.2%) who sustained no injuries or minor injuries. A total of 366 subjects sustained substantial or serious physical injuries. During the 9,764 incidents in which force was used against members of the service, 5,383 members of the department sustained injuries, 347 of which were deemed substantial or serious. Substantial injuries are generally those that require treatment at a hospital. Serious injuries are generally those that require admission to a hospital.

## Force Used Against Members by Platoon, 2023



*Figure 54*

### Force Used Against Members by Geographic Borough, 2023




Figure 55

### Use of Force Related Injuries (Subject vs. Members), 2023\*




Figure 56

\* Members may be involved in multiple incidents. Additionally, incidents may involve more than one member.





# FORCE APPENDICES

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**Appendix A:  
NYPD Use of Force Documentation  
and Investigation Process**

In all use of force incidents, an immediate supervisor responds to the scene to assess the circumstances. The supervisor must determine the level of force and/or type of injury in order to clarify the appropriate reporting and investigative requirements. All reportable uses of force by members of the service are investigated, including those determined to be within department guidelines.



Figure 57



\*FID or IAB may respond to any force incident or subject injury and may assume responsibility of the investigation based on the circumstances of the incident.



Figure 57

## **Appendix B: Subjects Killed During Intentional Discharge- Adversarial Conflict Incidents**

Disclaimer: In some cases, factual information is based on preliminary findings of ongoing investigations. Additional information may develop as the department's investigation progresses and/or related court or grand jury proceedings are conducted.

**Incident 1 – 81st Precinct (Male/Black/78) – 04/13/2023**

On April 13, 2023, officers responded to a 911 call of a burglary. Upon arrival, they entered the location and in conducting their investigation, knocked on the apartment door of the reported burglary. The subject opened the door armed with a firearm in his hand and pointed it at the officers. In response, the officers discharged their service weapons, striking the subject. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. A Smith & Wesson .38 caliber revolver was recovered on scene. The toxicology report indicated the presence of ethanol, cocaine, ethylbenzoyllecgonine, benzoyllecgonine, TCH, and TCH-COOH in the subject's system at the time of death.

**Incident 2 – 114th Precinct (Male/White/21) – 08/04/2023**

On August 4, 2023, officers responded to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person armed with a knife. Upon arrival, several officers entered the location and attempted to take the elevator when the subject, armed with a knife, exited an adjoining elevator, advanced at officers in the lobby and attempted to stab them. The subject then, while still brandishing the knife, entered the elevator occupied by the other officers. In response, officers discharged their service weapons, striking the subject. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. A knife was recovered at the scene. The toxicology report indicated the presence of THC, 11-OH-THC, THC-COOH, and CBN in the subject's system at the time of death.

**Incident 3 – 45th Precinct (Male/Black/22) – 09/09/2023**

On September 9, 2023, officers in the precinct responded to a walk-in report of a suspicious male and encountered the subject inside a nearby location. Ignoring the officer's verbal commands to remove his hands from his pockets, the subject advanced at the officer while simultaneously producing a knife. In response, an officer discharged his service weapon, striking the subject. The subject was removed to the hospital from the scene where he was pronounced deceased. A knife was recovered at the scene. The toxicology report indicated the presence of ethanol, THC, 11-OH-THC, and THC-COOH in the subject's system at the time of death.

**Incident 4 – 60th Precinct (Male/Black/47) – 11/01/2023**

On November 1, 2023, officers confronted the subject who was wanted in connection with a double homicide. The subject fled on foot at which time he turned towards the pursuing officers while brandishing a knife. The officers continued to pursue the subject and, as additional officers arrived, formed a semi-circle around the subject. At this time they established a dialogue with the subject for 28 minutes and repeatedly asked the subject to disarm himself and surrender. The subject refused and advanced towards the officers while brandishing the knife. In response, officers discharged their service weapons, striking the subject. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. A knife was recovered on scene. The toxicology report indicated that there was neither alcohol nor controlled substances in the subject's system at the time of death.

**Incident 5 – 101st Precinct (Male/Black/38) – 12/03/2023**

On December 3, 2023, officers responded to a 911 call of an assault with a report of multiple victims stabbed. Upon arrival, the officers encountered the subject and proceeded to question him when the subject produced a knife and began to stab both officers, causing injuries to both. In response, an officer discharged their firearm, striking the subject. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. A knife was recovered at the scene.

**Incident 6 – 5th Precinct (Male/Black/43) – 12/14/2023**

On December 14, 2023, officers were attempting to apprehend the subject who was wanted in connection with a shooting. The subject, in an effort to evade apprehension, barricaded himself inside the location. Additional officers arrived and established a dialogue with the subject for approximately one hour and fifty-four minutes. The subject refused requests to surrender and discharged a firearm at the officers. In response, officers discharged their service weapons, striking the subject. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. A Hi-Point CF380 .38 caliber handgun was recovered at the scene. The toxicology report indicated that there was neither alcohol nor controlled substances in the subject's system at the time of death.

**Incident 7 – 52nd Precinct (Male/Hispanic/30) – 12/23/2023**

On December 23, 2023, officers responded to a 911 call of a violent emotionally disturbed person in possession of a knife. Upon arrival, officers were led into the location by the caller when they encountered the subject holding another individual, who was visibly bleeding about the head, in a chokehold. Stating that he had a knife, the subject refused the officers commands to drop the knife, and continued to apply pressure to the bleeding individual in the chokehold. As the individual in the chokehold began losing consciousness, one officer discharged their firearm, striking the subject. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased.

## **Appendix C: Other Death Investigations Conducted by the Force Investigation Division**

Disclaimer: In some cases, factual information is based on preliminary findings of ongoing investigations. Additional information may develop as the department's investigation progresses and/or related court or grand jury proceedings are conducted.

# ***Death in Custody***

Death in custody incidents typically occur after the restraint of a particular subject. The term “in-custody” refers to a subject whom officers have either decided that there was probable cause to arrest or that restraint was necessary for the safety of the subject or other persons present. During death in custody situations, subjects may be located anywhere (e.g., at the scene of an incident, at a hospital, at a police facility, or in a courthouse awaiting arraignment), and death may occur due to intervening circumstances beyond police control. Such intervening circumstances include: medical crises such as heart attack or stroke; suicides; drug-related deaths from substances taken or ingested prior to custody; and injuries inflicted prior to custody during accidents or assaults by persons other than the involved parties. In 2023, there were 18 death in custody incidents.

## **Incident 1 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 105th Precinct (Male/Black/44) – 01/19/2023**

On January 1, 2023, officers responded to a report of a possible overdose. Upon arrival, officers observed the subject slumped over the steering wheel of a vehicle and requested the response of emergency medical service (EMS). Upon the arrival of EMS, the officers were assisting in the placement of the subject onto a stretcher when they observed a .22 caliber Smith & Wesson Model 22A-1 handgun in the small of the subject’s back. The subject was placed into custody and removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased on January 19, 2023. According to the subject’s death certificate, the cause of death was complications of acute cocaine intoxication, including methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus pneumonia.

## **Incident 2 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 10th Precinct (Male/Hispanic/27) – 02/03/2023**

On February 3, 2023, officers responded to a 911 call of a vehicle accident with a person pinned. Upon arrival, officers observed a vehicle with heavy front end damage and deployed airbags. Officers determined that no individual was pinned and located the driver who strongly smelled of alcohol. The subject was placed under arrest and while being transported to the hospital, became unresponsive and was pronounced deceased upon arrival. According to the subject’s death certificate, the cause of death was blunt trauma of the torso with liver lacerations and hemoperitoneum.

## **Incident 3 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 102nd Precinct (Male/Hispanic/30) – 02/04/2023**

On January 27, 2023, officers responded to a 911 call regarding an assault with a knife when the officers encountered the subject walking on the sidewalk with a stab wound to the right side of his chest. The subject was removed to the hospital and, upon further investigation, was identified as the subject of the assault and placed under arrest. The subject remained in the hospital where his condition deteriorated and he was pronounced deceased on February 4, 2023. According to the subject’s death certificate, the cause of death was complications following stab wounds of the torso.

## **Incident 4 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 19th Precinct (Male/White/47) – 02/09/2023**

On January 20, 2023, while awaiting arraignment inside Manhattan Central Booking, the subject suffered a medical episode. EMS responded and removed the subject to the hospital. The subject was subsequently transferred to another hospital where his condition deteriorated and he was pronounced deceased on February 9, 2023. The subject’s death certificate was not available at the time of report.

## **Incident 5 – Suicide/Police Force Used – 66th Precinct (Male/Hispanic/43) – 02/14/2023**

On February 13, 2023 officers responded to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person. Upon arrival, officers encountered the subject who was armed with two knives. Officers, after establishing a dialogue with the subject for approximately two hours and fourteen minutes, utilized a CEW and an impact weapon in an attempt to take the subject into custody, when the subject cut his throat with the knife. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased on February 14, 2023. According to the subject’s death certificate, the cause of death was an incised wound of the neck.

## **Incident 6 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 47th Precinct (Male/Hispanic/39) – 02/17/2023**

On February 16, 2023, while lodged within the precinct holding cell, the subject was found unconscious. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased on February 17, 2023. According to the subject’s death certificate, the cause of death was acute bronchopneumonia complicating diabetes mellitus.

**Incident 7 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 107th Precinct (Male/White/27) – 03/22/2023**

On March 21, 2023, the subject was placed into custody as the result of a vehicle collision. The subject was removed to the hospital, treated, and subsequently released. While awaiting arraignment at Queens Central Booking, the subject suffered a medical episode and was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased on March 22, 2023. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was acute intoxication due to the combined effects of phencyclidine and fentanyl.

**Incident 8 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 18th Precinct (Male/Black/38) – 04/01/2023**

On April 1, 2023, the subject, while lodged within the precinct holding cell, was found unresponsive. Officers and EMS both administered aid to the subject who was then removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was dilated cardiomyopathy and chronic alcohol use.

**Incident 9 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 49th Precinct (Male/White/72) – 05/25/2023**

On May 12, 2023, the subject was removed to the hospital as the result of injuries sustained in a multi-dwelling fire. Responding fire marshals investigated the scene and observed 9mm ammunition in the subject's residence and upon interviewing the subject, were informed there was also a firearm within the subject's residence. The fire marshals requested the response of the NYPD who obtained a search warrant and recovered a 9mm Beretta handgun and several boxes of 9mm ammunition. The subject was placed under arrest and remained in the hospital where his condition deteriorated and he was pronounced deceased on May 25, 2023. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was from complications of smoke inhalation and thermal injuries.

**Incident 10 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 66th Precinct (Male/Hispanic/31) – 05/28/2023**

On May 16, 2023, officers placed the subject under arrest in connection with an assault. The subject was removed to the hospital for stab wounds to the chest and stomach that he sustained during the course of the assault. While at the hospital, the subject's condition deteriorated and he was pronounced deceased on May 28, 2023. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was complications of stab wounds of the torso.

**Incident 11 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 52nd Precinct (Male/Black/36) – 05/29/2023**

On May 28, 2023 officers attempted to stop a group of dirt bikes when the subject, operating one of the dirt bikes, struck a department vehicle. The subject was removed to the hospital where his condition deteriorated and he was pronounced deceased on May 29, 2023. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was from complications following blunt injuries to bilateral legs with fractures of the right tibia and fibula and injuries to the popliteal blood vessel.

**Incident 12 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 88th Precinct (Male/Black/50) – 06/18/2023**

On June 18, 2023, while awaiting arraignment and lodged inside of the Brooklyn Central Booking facility, the subject was found unresponsive. On-site medical personnel rendered aid before the subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was hypertensive and atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease.

**Incident 13 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 40th Precinct (Male/White/36) – 07/11/2023**

On July 6, 2023, while awaiting arraignment and lodged within the Bronx Central Booking facility, the subject suffered a medical episode and struck his head. The subject was conscious and was removed to the hospital where his condition deteriorated and he was subsequently pronounced deceased on July 11, 2023. The subject's death certificate was not available at the time of report.

**Incident 14 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 105th Precinct (Male/Black/68) – 09/19/2023**

On September 1, 2023, while admitted as a patient in a hospital, the subject assaulted a member of the hospital staff and was subsequently placed under arrest. The subject remained admitted to the hospital where his condition deteriorated and he was subsequently pronounced deceased on September 19, 2023. The subject's death certificate was not available at the time of report.

**Incident 15 – Medical/Police Force Used – 49th Precinct (Male/White/40) – 11/04/2023**

On November 3, 2023, officers responded to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person. Upon arrival, officers encountered the subject and engaged in dialogue for approximately 24 minutes. The subject then proceeded to the rooftop of the location. Additional officers responded and continued a dialogue with the subject for approximately two hours and nine minutes when, as the officers were attempting to secure the subject to bring them into custody, the subject physically resisted and fell to the ground. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was subsequently pronounced deceased on November 4, 2023. According to the subject's death certification, the cause of death was blunt trauma of the head.

**Incident 16 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 40th Precinct (Male/Hispanic/49) – 12/01/2023**

On December 1, 2023, the subject, while being treated by EMS for injuries sustained in a scooter accident, assaulted an emergency medical technician (EMT). The subject was removed to the hospital where officers responded and subsequently placed him under arrest. While remaining at the hospital, the subject's condition deteriorated and he was pronounced deceased. The subject's death certificate was not available at the time of report.

**Incident 17 – Suicide/No Police Force Used – 88th Precinct (Male/Black/43) – 12/05/2023**

On December 5, 2023 while lodged within the precinct holding cell awaiting arrest processing, CCTV video revealed that the subject fashioned a shirt into a noose and was subsequently found unconscious and unresponsive within the holding cell. The subject was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was hanging.

**Incident 18 – Suicide/No Police Force Used – 120th Precinct (Male/Black/33) – 12/26/2023**

On December 26, 2023, officers responded to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person armed with a weapon. Prior to officers gaining access into the location of the subject, the subject exited a window and fell approximately seven stories to the ground below. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death were complications of blunt force trauma of the torso and left lower extremity.

# Death Preceding Custody

Death preceding custody incidents typically occur immediately before the intended restraint of a particular subject, after officers have either decided that there was probable cause to arrest or that restraint was necessary for the safety of the subject or other persons present, but had not, in fact, established control of the person. In 2023, the Force Investigation Division investigated eight cases categorized as death preceding custody.

## **Incident 1 – Fleeing Subject – 45th Precinct (Male/Black/20) – 03/25/2023**

On March 25, 2023, on an elevated highway, an officer attempted to conduct a vehicle stop for a traffic infraction. The subject vehicle fled at a high rate of speed and the officer, after having lost sight of the vehicle, ceased efforts to conduct the stop. As the subject vehicle continued to flee, it collided with another civilian vehicle. The operator of the subject vehicle immediately fled the scene of the collision on foot and was later discovered on the shoulder of the roadway located approximately 30 feet below the site of the collision. The subject was pronounced deceased on the scene. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt impact of the head.

## **Incident 2 – Suicide – 103rd Precinct (Male/Asian/48) – 06/05/2023**

On June 5, 2023, officers responded to a 911 call of a family assault in progress. Upon arrival, officers were met by the subject's family member who proceeded to inform them of the circumstances of the incident. The officers then entered the location and observed the subject on the fire escape. As the officers entered the fire escape and began to establish a dialogue, the subject ascended to the next level of the fire escape then let go, falling to the ground below. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt impact to the head.

## **Incident 3 – Fleeing Subject – 43rd Precinct (Male/Black/69) – 08/10/2023**

On August 10, 2023, officers were conducting a domestic violence home visit when they encountered the subject at the location. After opening the front door and greeting the officers, the subject closed the door, locked it, and, in an attempt to evade the officers, exited to the balcony of the location. The subject then attempted to climb onto the balcony of the adjacent apartment when he fell to the ground below. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, cause of death was blunt force trauma to the neck and torso .

## **Incident 4 – Suicide – 9th Precinct (Male/White/50) – 08/15/2023**

On August 15, 2023, officers responded to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person on a rooftop. Upon arrival, the officers encountered the subject pacing back and forth on the rooftop and attempted to establish a dialogue with the subject. After approximately one hour and thirty minutes of dialogue, the subject leapt from the roof ledge, falling to the ground below. The subject was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. The subject's death certificate was not available at the time of report.

## **Incident 5 – Fleeing Subject – 52nd Precinct (Male/Hispanic/30) – 08/23/2023**

On August 23, 2023, officers were conducting a narcotics operation when the subject, in an attempt to evade arrest, began to flee on a motorized scooter and was struck by a cooler thrown by an officer on scene. The subject subsequently lost control of the scooter, struck a tree, and was ejected from the scooter into a parked vehicle. The subject was pronounced deceased on the scene. The subject's death certificate was not available at the time of report.

## **Incident 6 – Fleeing Subject – 19th Precinct (Male/Hispanic/47) – 10/04/2023**

On October 4, 2023, officers were following two motorized scooters, each occupied by two individuals, when the scooters fled at a high rate of speed. As the scooters continued to flee, one scooter collided with a commercial truck. The operator and the passenger of the subject scooter were both removed to the hospital where the operator was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt force injuries of the head and torso including intracranial hemorrhages and lacerations of the right lung and left kidney.

## **Incident 7 – Fleeing Subject – 47th Precinct (Male/Hispanic/27) – 10/19/2023**

On October 19, 2023, officers attempted to stop a motorized scooter for a traffic infraction when the scooter fled at a high rate of speed. As the scooter continued to flee, it collided with a box truck. The operator of the subject scooter was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt force trauma to the torso.



**Incident 8 – Fleeing Subject – 113th Precinct (Male/Black/46) – 11/02/2023**

On November 2, 2023, officers were conducting a search warrant when the subject attempted to flee apprehension via the balcony. An officer outside the location observed the subject hanging from the balcony when the subject's grip released from the railing and the subject to fell to the ground below. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, cause of death was blunt impact injury of the neck and torso.

## ***Death No Custody Contemplated***

Death no custody contemplated occurs when a person becomes deceased during a police interaction, and that person was not taken into police custody, nor did the police contemplate taking them into custody. In 2023, the Force Investigation Division investigated seven cases categorized as death no custody contemplated.

### ***Incident 1 – Collision – 101st Precinct (Female/Asian/52) – 02/17/2023***

On February 17, 2023, officers were responding to another officer's request for assistance when their marked police vehicle, with its emergency lights activated, collided with another vehicle and then subsequently struck a pedestrian who was standing in the bike lane. The pedestrian was removed to the hospital where she was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was multiple blunt impact injuries.

### ***Incident 2 – Fleeing Subject – 71st Precinct (Male/Black/56) – 03/17/2023***

On March 13, 2023, officers attempted to conduct a vehicle stop for a traffic infraction. The subject vehicle initially stopped, then fled the stop at a high rate of speed. The officers attempted to follow but, after losing sight of the vehicle, ceased efforts to conduct the stop, and broadcast a description of the subject vehicle. Shortly thereafter, additional officers in the vicinity observed the subject vehicle, following it when it disobeyed a steady red light, entered an intersection, and collided with another vehicle. The operator of the other vehicle was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased on March 17, 2023. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was complications of blunt force torso injuries.

### ***Incident 3 – Fleeing Subject – 49th Precinct (Male/Asian/64) – 04/05/2023***

On April 5, 2023, officers attempted to conduct a vehicle stop for a traffic infraction. The subject vehicle fled at a high rate of speed, disobeyed a steady red light and entered an intersection where it collided with a cyclist operating an electric bicycle. The cyclist was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt impacts of the head and torso.

### ***Incident 4 – Fleeing Subject – 41st Precinct (Male/Hispanic/31) – 05/10/2023***

On May 10, 2023, officers attempted to conduct a vehicle stop for a traffic infraction. The subject vehicle fled at a high rate of speed and was shortly thereafter discovered to have collided into the rear of a parked, unoccupied tractor-trailer. Two passengers of the subject vehicle were removed to the hospital, one of whom was pronounced deceased. The subject's death certificate was not available at the time of report.

### ***Incident 5 – Fleeing Subject – 105th Precinct (Male/Black/60) – 06/08/2023***

On June 8, 2023, officers responded to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person and, upon arrival, were met at the front door by the subject who was holding a knife. After the subject ignored the officer's verbal commands to drop the knife, an officer deployed a CEW, striking the subject and causing him to fall backwards while simultaneously closing, and locking, the door. As officers attempted to gain entry, the subject retreated further inside the location and proceeded to attack another individual located within. Officers gained entry, encountered the subject and again deployed a CEW, striking the subject who was subsequently taken into custody. Officers then began life saving measures on the other individual who was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. The subject's death certificate was not available at the time of report.

### ***Incident 6 – Fleeing Subject – 52nd Precinct (Male/White/74) – 06/29/2023***

On June 29, 2023, officers attempted to stop a stolen vehicle. The subject vehicle fled, subsequently striking another vehicle and then a pedestrian. The pedestrian was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was multiple blunt impact injuries.

### ***Incident 7 – Fleeing Subject – 34th Precinct (Female/Hispanic/21) – 12/04/2023***

On December 4, 2023, officers attempted to conduct a vehicle stop for a traffic infraction. The subject vehicle reversed direction then fled at a high rate of speed. During its flight, the subject vehicle collided with another vehicle and subsequently caught fire. The passenger of the subject vehicle was pronounced deceased at the scene. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt force trauma of the head and thermal injuries.



**Appendix D:  
2023 Firearm Discharge Incidents  
by Precinct/Location of Occurrence**

Precinct/Location	Adversarial Conflict	Animal Attack	Unintentional	Unauthorized/ Suicide	Total
005	1	0	0	0	1
009	1	0	0	0	1
033	1	0	0	0	1
042	2	0	1	0	3
043	0	0	0	1	1
044	3	0	0	0	3
045	1	0	0	0	1
047	1	0	1	1	3
048	1	0	0	0	1
050	2	0	0	0	2
052	2	0	1	0	3
060	1	0	0	0	1
061	0	0	1	0	1
067	2	0	0	0	2
075	1	0	0	1	2
079	0	0	0	1	1
081	1	0	0	0	1
083	0	1	0	0	1
100	0	0	1	0	1
101	1	0	0	0	1
103	2	0	1	0	3
105	0	0	0	1	1
108	1	0	0	0	1
113	1	0	0	0	1
114	2	0	0	0	2
120	1	0	0	0	1
121	1	1	1	0	3
123	0	0	1	1	2
Orange County	1	0	0	1	2
Rockland County	0	0	0	1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>48</b>

Figure 58

## **Appendix E: Historical Data on Police Firearm Discharges**

### Members of the Service Shot and Killed by Subjects, 1971-2023




Figure 59

### Members of the Service Shot and Injured by Subjects, 1971-2023




Figure 60

### Subjects Shot and Killed by Members of the Service, 1971-2023




Figure 61

### Subjects Shot and Injured by Members of the Service, 1971-2023




Figure 62



## Total Rounds Discharged, 1971-2023




Figure 63



## **Appendix F: Use of Force Incidents by Members' Command**

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
001 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
001 PRECINCT	0	4	0	0	1	0	49	54
005 PRECINCT	0	2	0	0	1	0	28	31
006 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
006 PRECINCT	0	4	1	0	1	0	67	73
007 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
007 PRECINCT	0	13	1	0	0	0	47	61
009 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
009 PRECINCT	1	14	2	0	0	0	60	77
010 PRECINCT	0	6	0	0	0	0	39	45
013 PRECINCT	0	12	0	0	5	0	50	67
014 PCT-MIDTOWN SO. PCT	0	9	2	0	1	0	101	113
017 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
017 PRECINCT	0	4	0	0	3	0	26	33
018 PCT-MIDTOWN NO. PCT	0	6	0	0	1	0	50	57
019 PRECINCT	0	6	3	0	0	0	60	69
020 PRECINCT	0	6	0	0	1	0	28	35
023 PRECINCT	0	3	0	0	0	0	68	71
024 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
024 PRECINCT	0	13	0	0	1	0	61	75
025 PRECINCT	0	11	0	0	1	0	54	66
026 PRECINCT	0	6	2	0	0	0	26	34
028 PRECINCT	0	21	1	0	1	0	100	123
030 PRECINCT	0	24	0	0	1	0	40	65
032 PRECINCT	0	13	0	0	1	0	71	85
033 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
033 PRECINCT	1	29	0	0	0	0	58	88
034 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
034 PRECINCT	0	22	0	0	2	0	83	107
040 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
040 PRECINCT	1	53	1	0	3	0	244	302
041 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
041 PRECINCT	0	13	1	0	0	0	105	119
042 PRECINCT	2	38	1	0	4	0	166	211
043 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
043 PRECINCT	0	34	0	0	2	0	132	168
044 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
044 PRECINCT	2	81	2	0	2	0	178	265
045 PRECINCT	2	14	3	0	4	0	76	99
046 PRECINCT	0	54	0	0	1	0	351	406

Figure 64

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
047 PRECINCT	1	48	1	0	5	0	158	213
048 PRECINCT	2	21	0	0	1	0	92	116
049 PRECINCT	0	12	2	0	1	0	41	56
050 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
050 PRECINCT	3	13	0	0	1	0	33	50
052 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
052 PRECINCT	2	33	2	0	2	0	97	136
060 PRECINCT	2	12	2	0	0	0	96	112
061 DETECTIVE SQUAD	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
061 PRECINCT	0	15	0	0	0	0	47	62
062 PRECINCT	0	5	0	0	0	0	57	62
063 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
063 PRECINCT	0	15	1	0	0	0	56	72
066 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
066 PRECINCT	0	2	0	0	1	0	30	33
067 PRECINCT	1	30	0	0	1	0	146	178
068 PRECINCT	1	5	1	0	2	0	47	56
069 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
069 PRECINCT	0	12	1	0	4	0	53	70
070 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
070 PRECINCT	0	21	2	0	2	0	107	132
071 PRECINCT	0	13	2	0	2	0	50	67
072 PRECINCT	0	11	0	0	0	0	55	66
073 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
073 PRECINCT	0	29	2	0	9	0	144	184
075 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
075 PRECINCT	1	30	1	0	2	0	256	290
076 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
076 PRECINCT	0	1	0	0	0	0	41	42
077 PRECINCT	0	12	2	0	1	0	66	81
078 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
078 PRECINCT	0	4	0	0	1	0	36	41
079 PRECINCT	0	17	4	0	2	0	71	94
081 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
081 PRECINCT	2	9	0	0	0	0	45	56
083 PRECINCT	1	15	0	0	0	0	82	98
084 PRECINCT	0	14	1	0	0	0	65	80
088 PRECINCT	0	10	1	0	0	0	55	66
090 PRECINCT	0	14	0	0	2	0	89	105
094 PRECINCT	0	11	0	0	0	0	31	42

Figure 64 (continued)

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
100 PRECINCT	0	11	0	0	0	0	30	41
101 PRECINCT	1	5	0	0	0	0	71	77
101 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
102 PRECINCT	0	11	1	0	0	0	59	71
103 PRECINCT	2	35	0	0	2	0	149	188
104 PRECINCT	0	22	0	0	3	0	49	74
105 PRECINCT	0	25	0	0	1	0	101	127
105 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
106 PRECINCT	0	9	0	0	0	0	75	84
106 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
107 PRECINCT	0	8	0	0	0	0	67	75
107 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
108 PRECINCT	0	8	1	0	0	0	48	57
109 PRECINCT	0	8	0	0	1	0	73	82
110 PRECINCT	0	14	0	0	0	0	80	94
111 PRECINCT	0	3	0	0	0	0	16	19
112 PRECINCT	0	3	0	0	0	0	41	44
113 PRECINCT	1	30	0	0	1	0	111	143
113 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
114 PRECINCT	2	15	0	0	0	0	88	105
115 PRECINCT	0	6	0	0	0	0	44	50
120 PRECINCT	0	21	0	0	0	0	153	174
121 PRECINCT	2	18	1	0	0	0	69	90
122 PRECINCT	0	14	0	0	0	0	48	62
123 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
123 PRECINCT	1	6	0	0	0	0	19	26
AUTO CRIME	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
AVIATION UNIT	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
BROOKLYN SPECIAL VICTIMS SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
BRONX COURT SECT	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6
BRONX EAST SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	26	26
BRONX WEST SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	15
BROOKLYN COURT SECTION	0	4	0	0	0	0	16	20
BUILDING MAINTENANCE SECT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
CAB COMMUNITY OUTREACH DIV	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
CANDIDATE ASSESSMENT DIVISION	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
CANINE TEAM	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1

Figure 64 (continued)

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
CENTRAL INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
CENTRAL PARK PRECINCT	0	1	0	0	0	0	5	6
CENTRAL ROBBERY DIVISION	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT OFFICE	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	4
COMMUNITY AFFAIRS BUREAU	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE DIVISION	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE INVEST SEC	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
CRIMINAL JUSTICE BUREAU	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
CRITICAL RESPONSE COMMAND	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
DEPT OF INVESTIGATION SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
DETECTIVE BORO BRONX OPER	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
DETECTIVE BORO BROOKLYN NORTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
DETECTIVE BORO MAN SOUTH OPER	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
DETECTIVE BUREAU	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
DISORDER CONTROL UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
DRUG ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
EMERGENCY SERVICE SQUAD 01	1	2	0	0	0	0	4	7
EMERGENCY SERVICE SQUAD 02	0	2	0	0	0	0	4	6
EMERGENCY SERVICE SQUAD 03	0	3	0	0	0	0	4	7
EMERGENCY SERVICE SQUAD 04	0	3	0	0	0	0	3	6
EMERGENCY SERVICE SQUAD 05	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
EMERGENCY SERVICE SQUAD 06	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	6
EMERGENCY SERVICE SQUAD 07	0	7	0	0	0	0	6	13
EMERGENCY SERVICE SQUAD 08	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	3
EMERGENCY SERVICE SQUAD 09	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	4
EMERGENCY SERVICE SQUAD 10	0	2	0	0	0	0	4	6
EMERGENCY SERVICE UNIT	0	3	1	0	0	0	12	16

Figure 64 (continued)

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
EQUIPMENT SECTION	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
FINANCIAL CRIMES TASK FORCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
FIREARMS & TACTICS SECTION	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
FIREARMS SUPPRESSION SECTION	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
FORCE INVESTIGATION DIVISION	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
GUN VIOL SUPP DIV Z1 (BK,Q,SI)	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	7
GUN VIOL SUPP DIV Z2 (MAN,BX)	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
HATE CRIME TASK FORCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
HB BRONX/QUEENS RESPONSE TEAM	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	3
HB BROOKLYN RESPONSE TEAM	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
HIGHWAY UNIT NO.1	0	2	0	0	0	0	4	6
HIGHWAY UNIT NO.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
HIGHWAY UNIT NO.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
HIGHWAY UNIT NO.5	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
HOUSING PSA 1	0	8	0	0	0	0	43	51
HOUSING PSA 2	0	10	1	0	1	0	61	73
HOUSING PSA 3	0	18	1	0	1	0	88	108
HOUSING PSA 4	0	6	1	0	0	0	18	25
HOUSING PSA 5	0	5	1	0	0	0	42	48
HOUSING PSA 6	0	7	0	0	0	0	22	29
HOUSING PSA 7	0	14	0	0	2	0	65	81
HOUSING PSA 8	1	11	0	0	2	0	37	51
HOUSING PSA 9	0	1	0	0	0	0	29	30
HUMAN RESOURCES DIVISION	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
INTEL-CRIMINAL INTEL SECTION	1	1	1	0	1	0	42	46
INTEL-PUBLIC SECURITY SECTION	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
INTERNAL AFFAIRS BUREAU	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	3
ITB ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
JOINT BANK ROB TASK FORCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
LEGAL BUREAU	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
LICENSE DIVISION	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
MAJOR CASE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
MAN COURT SECTION	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	14
MAN SPECIAL VICTIMS SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
NARC BORO BRONX	0	0	1	0	0	0	22	23

Figure 64 (continued)

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
NARC BORO BROOKLYN NORTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6
NARC BORO BROOKLYN SOUTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
NARC BORO MANHATTAN NORTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	44	44
NARC BORO MANHATTAN SOUTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	13	13
NARC BORO QUEENS NORTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6
NARC BORO QUEENS SOUTH	0	3	1	0	0	0	24	28
NARC BORO STATEN ISLAND	0	0	0	0	0	0	13	13
OTHER	1	0	0	0	0	0	12	13
PATROL BORO BROOKLYN NORTH	0	1	0	0	1	0	3	5
PATROL BORO BRONX	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	5
PATROL BORO MANHATTAN SOUTH	0	6	0	0	1	0	78	85
PATROL BORO QUEENS NORTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	9
PATROL BORO QUEENS SOUTH	0	0	0	0	1	0	49	50
PATROL BORO STATEN ISLAND	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
PATROL SERVICES BUREAU	0	2	0	0	0	0	18	20
PBBN SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
PBBN SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	0	1	0	2	0	15	18
PBBS SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
PBBS SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	3	0	0	1	0	8	12
PBBX SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	2	0	0	1	0	37	40
PBMN SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
PBMN SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	2	1	0	0	0	19	22
PBMS SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	15
PBMS SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	7	0	0	0	0	58	65
PBQN SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	7
PBQN SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	6	0	0	0	0	30	36
PBQS SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	11
PBQS SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	8	1	0	0	0	25	34
PBSI SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	16
PBSI SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	8	0	0	2	0	34	44
PERSONNEL BUREAU	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
POLICE ACADEMY	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
PSB MOVIE AND T.V. UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
QUEENS COURT SECTION	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
QUEENS ROBBERY SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
QUEENS SPECIAL VICTIMS SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1

Figure 64 (continued)



Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
RISK MITIGATION DIVISION	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
RMB QUALITY ASSURANCE DIVISION	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
SCHOOL SAFETY DIVISION	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
SPECIAL VICTIMS DIV ZONE 1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
STATEN ISLAND COURT SECTION	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
STRATEGIC RESP GRP 1 MANHATTAN	0	2	0	0	0	0	28	30
STRATEGIC RESP GRP 2 BRONX	0	1	0	0	1	0	18	20
STRATEGIC RESP GRP 3 BROOKLYN	0	2	0	0	0	0	22	24
STRATEGIC RESP GRP 4 QUEENS	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	7
STRATEGIC RESP GRP 5 STATEN ISLAND	0	1	0	0	0	0	9	10
STRATEGIC RESPONSE GROUP	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
STRIKE FORCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TB ANTI TERRORISM UNIT	0	1	0	0	4	0	44	49
TB CITYWIDE VANDALS TASK FORCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6
TB SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION	0	1	0	0	1	0	20	22
TECH. ASSIST. & RESPONSE UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
TRAINING BUREAU	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
TRANSIT BORO BRONX/QUEENS	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TRANSIT BORO MANH TASK FORCE	0	0	0	0	2	0	9	11
TRANSIT BUREAU	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TRANSIT BUREAU CANINE UNIT	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 1	0	3	0	0	1	0	57	61
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 11	0	10	3	0	2	0	53	68
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 12	0	13	0	0	0	0	66	79
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 2	0	11	0	0	5	0	45	61
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 20	0	4	1	0	5	0	41	51
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 23	0	0	0	0	2	0	6	8
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 3	0	4	0	0	3	0	53	60
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 30	0	11	0	0	6	0	24	41
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 32	0	4	0	0	1	0	45	50
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 33	0	6	0	0	9	0	59	74
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 34	0	0	1	0	3	0	15	19
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 4	0	9	0	0	12	0	30	51

Figure 64 (continued)

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
TRANSIT BUREAU RESPONSE TEAM	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	14
TRB BRONX TRAFFIC ENF UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
TRB BROOKLYN TRAFFIC ENF UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
TRB BX/BKYN/QNS TOW POUND UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TRB CITYWIDE TRAFFIC TASK FORCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
TRB MANHATTAN SUMMONS ENF SEC	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
TRB QUEENS TRAFFIC ENF UNIT	0	0	2	0	0	0	3	5
TRB SOUTH INTERSECTION CONTROL	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
TRB TRAFF SPECIAL OPS SECTION	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TRB TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT DISTRICT	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
TRB TRAFFIC OPERATIONS DISTRICT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
VICE ENFORCEMENT DIVISION ZONE 2	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	7
WARRANT SECTION	2	16	0	0	1	0	59	78
WORLD TRADE CENTER COMMAND	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>45*</b>	<b>1,496</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>161</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>8,006</b>	<b>9,777</b>

Figure 64 (continued)

\*This figure does not include three separate discharge incidents, all categorized as unauthorized discharges, in which a non-member of the service discharged a member's firearm. Though not captured in the TRI data, all three incidents are included in the yearly discharge total and covered in the Unauthorized Discharge section of this report.



