



USE OF FORCE REPORT 2018



NYPD
New York City Police Department

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Executive Summary

In 2018, the New York City Police Department recorded the lowest number of police firearms discharges since discharge recordkeeping began in 1971. Additionally, in 2018 the NYPD recorded a decrease in the use of impact weapons, mesh blankets, and oleoresin capsicum spray by members of the service. There was an increase for the year in the use of less-lethal Conducted Electric Weapons (CEWs) and minimally reportable force. This report contains a detailed accounting of the use of force by members of the service, from minimally reportable hand and foot strikes up to and including the intentional discharge of a firearm in adversarial conflicts.

The NYPD has long been a leader in reporting and investigating deadly force and firearms discharges. The department accounts for every shot fired by its members, whether intentionally or unintentionally, except for discharges during firearms training. Beginning in 2007, the NYPD issued an annual report that fully catalogued all shooting incidents, including the number of subjects killed and wounded, the number of innocent bystanders killed and wounded, animal shootings, accidental discharges, unauthorized uses of department firearms, and police suicides with firearms. The collected firearms discharge data is continually analyzed and assessed to evaluate and improve NYPD policies and practices.

In 2016, the department replaced the Annual Firearms Discharge Report with a Use of Force Report, in conjunction with an overhaul of the NYPD's force polices and incident reporting structure. The new reporting structure encompasses all data captured by the firearms discharge reports and also contains an accounting of all other reportable uses of force by members of the service for the entire year of 2018, allowing for a deeper analysis of use of force in the NYPD than was previously possible. Tracking how, when, where, and why NYPD personnel use force helps inform the department and the public, and is an invaluable tool for working towards the NYPD's goal of minimizing force incidents and injuries while maximizing transparency in those situations where force is unavoidable.

All of the department's use of force policies and procedures are found in the Department Manual, and the types of force members of the NYPD use are separated into three categories. Level 1 consists of hand strikes, foot strikes, forcible takedowns, discharging oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray, discharging conducted electrical weapons (CEWs) in "cartridge mode," and using mesh restraining blankets to secure subjects. Level 2 is the intentional striking of a person with any object (including a baton, other equipment, etc.), police canine bites, or using CEWs in "drive stun" mode. Level 3 is the use of physical force that is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury (e.g., discharging a firearm).

Thorough oversight and investigation are built into the NYPD force policy. All three levels of force must be reported on Threat, Resistance or Injury (TRI) Reports. All Level 1 force incidents are investigated by the member's immediate supervisor. Level 2 incidents are investigated by department executives in the rank of captain or above. The NYPD Force Investigation Division (FID) investigates all cases that involve firearms discharges, and cases in which a subject dies or is seriously injured and likely to die. The NYPD Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) investigates all other Level 3 incidents (i.e., cases where deadly physical force was used, but the subject's injuries are not life-threatening).

The NYPD is currently undertaking further modifications to policy and the TRI Reports, as the department joins a national effort to standardize submission of use of force data to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In keeping with the department's commitment to increase transparency and build trust with the communities it serves, the NYPD continues to improve its force policies and reporting practices.

Firearms Discharges

The data continues to show a consistent decrease in firearms discharges dating back to when the department's official recording began. In 1971, there were: 810 firearms discharge incidents, 221 subjects shot and injured, 93 subjects shot and killed, and 2,113 total rounds fired. For 2018, the NYPD recorded the lowest number ever of firearms discharge incidents, 35, the fewest number of subjects shot and killed, 5, and the fewest ever recorded number of total rounds fired, 136.

The 35 firearms discharge incidents of 2018 is a 32.7% decrease compared to the 52 firearms discharge incidents recorded in 2017. Approximately half of the 2018 discharges (17) were intentional discharges by members of the service in the course of adversarial conflicts with criminal subjects. Fifteen subjects were struck by police gunfire in 2018; five sustained fatal injuries and 10 sustained non-fatal injuries. Three subjects fired shots at members of the service. One member was shot and injured by gunfire in an adversarial conflict-intentional discharge incident in 2018.

Four intentional firearms discharge incidents in 2018 were animal attacks, down from nine in 2017. There were eight unintentional discharges in 2018, down from 12 in 2017. There were six unauthorized uses of NYPD firearms in 2018, of which four were member suicides and one was an attempted suicide.

Conducted Electrical Weapons (CEWs)

There were 998 CEW discharge incidents in 2018, an increase from the 728 incidents in 2017. The increase in discharges is in alignment with the expanded availability of CEWs to more members of the service on patrol. Of the 998 CEW discharge incidents, 774 were intentional discharges, 415 occurred in arrest situations, 256 in situations in which members were seeking to control an emotionally disturbed person, and five in animal attacks. There were no fatalities from the use of CEWs. The remaining discharges were in situations including violent prisoners, car stops, suspicious person stops, and unintentional discharges.

The CEW was deemed effective in 580, or 74.9%, of the 774 intentional CEW discharge incidents. The number of ineffective discharges were attributed to different causes including probes missing the subject, probes falling out or being removed by the subject, or probe wires breaking.

Observations in NYPD Uses of Force

There were 7,879 total reportable police force incidents in 2018—94% were classified as Level 1, 4% as Level 2, and 2% as Level 3 uses of force. Of the 2018 total force incidents, 82.7%—6,513 incidents—involved the minimal amount of reportable force: hand strikes, foot strikes, and forcible takedowns of subjects. There were also 211 discharges of OC spray, 76 uses of impact weapons, 34 uses of mesh blankets to control subjects, and 12 canine bites.

Arrest situations were the most commonly recorded type of encounter in which members used force, however, arrests where force was used represents approximately only 2.0% of the total amount of arrests made by members of the NYPD in 2018. The second most commonly recorded type of force encounter were situations involving emotionally disturbed persons. In 2018, there were 1,432 uses of force reported among the 179,569 radio runs concerning emotionally disturbed persons. Differently stated, members of the NYPD used force in approximately only 0.8% of all encounters with emotionally disturbed persons for that year.

Substantial injuries are generally those that require *treatment* at a hospital. Serious injuries are generally those that require *admission* to a hospital. There was a total of 10,507 individuals subjected to police use of force in 2018. Of those subjects, 97.3% sustained no injuries or minor injuries. One hundred and sixty-three subjects, or 1.6%, were substantially injured, and 116, or 1.1%, were seriously injured. A total of 4,073 members of the service were injured in 2018's force incidents. Of that number, 323 NYPD personnel were substantially or seriously injured.

NYPD Use of Force Policy

STATUTORY AUTHORITY AND CASE LAW

Under New York State law, police officers may use force to protect life and property, to effect arrests, and to prevent escapes. Private persons, except in certain limited circumstances, may only use force in self-defense or in defense of others, and must exhaust all attempts at retreat before using deadly physical force, except in their own dwellings. In contrast, police officers are obligated to take action, and are required to pursue fleeing perpetrators and use force, if necessary, to stop that flight.

The use of force by a police officer is often the result of a subject resisting arrest. Resisting arrest is a crime under New York State law.

Although police achieve compliance in the vast majority of encounters with verbal commands alone, when those commands are insufficient, and subjects choose to ignore instructions or resist, officers may use an array of force options to compel others to submit to their lawful authority. These options range from physical force, to less-lethal options (e.g., OC spray, CEWs, or impact weapons), or only when appropriate, to deadly physical force. Officers are not required to move sequentially from one level of force to the next. Officers may escalate from verbal commands to pointing a CEW, for instance, or may de-escalate from a threatened use of force or a use of force to verbal commands, as situations evolve.

Two Supreme Court cases, *Tennessee v. Garner*, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) and *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), established the constitutional standards for police uses of force. *Graham* established a standard of “objective reasonableness” that restricts an officer’s authority to compel or constrain an individual. *Garner* sets forth the standard governing use of deadly force, namely that officers may use deadly force when there is probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm.

In *Graham*, the Supreme Court wrote that “the ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” In *People v. Benjamin*, 51 NY2d 267 (1980), the New York State Court of Appeals observed that “it would, indeed, be absurd to suggest that a police officer has to await the glint of steel before he can act to preserve his safety.” *Graham* and *Benjamin* both explicitly acknowledge the strain under which officers make life or death use of force decisions.

New York State law authorizes officers to use physical force only when they “reasonably believe such to be necessary” to effect arrest, prevent escape, or defend a person or property from harm.

NYPD POLICY

NYPD policy on the use of force is more restrictive than New York State and federal laws, and holds members of the NYPD to an even higher standard of restraint. New York State law, for example, allows the use of deadly physical force to protect property, but department policy does not. Under NYPD policy, deadly force may only be used against a person to “protect members of the service and/or the public from imminent serious physical injury or death” (Patrol Guide 221-01). Thus, there may be instances of force that may be permissible under New York State and/or federal law, but still violate department policy.

Under NYPD policy, “force may be used when it is reasonable to ensure the safety of a member of the service or a third person, or otherwise protect life, or when it is reasonable to place a person in custody or to prevent escape from custody” (Patrol Guide 221-01). In accordance with this standard of reasonableness, any application of force that is judged to be “unreasonable under the circumstances...will be deemed excessive and in violation of department policy” (Patrol Guide 221-01). Use of force, in this context, is broadly defined to encompass a wide range of force options that may be employed to gain compliance or ensure the control of a subject.

The NYPD has long had progressive and effective firearms discharge policies, including clear rules on when firearms can be used and recurring semi-annual firearms training. These policies have had a highly positive impact over the past 47 years. The data shows a record of increasing firearms restraint dating back to 1971, when there were 810 discharge incidents, compared with 35 discharge incidents in 2018. In 1971, 314 subjects were shot by police, of which 93 were killed. In comparison, in 2018, 15 subjects were shot, of which five were killed. Also, 2018 saw the lowest number of total discharge incidents in NYPD history. The 35 firearms discharges by members of the service in 2018, reflect a 32.7% decrease from the previous lowest year on record (52 incidents occurred in 2017). Members of the NYPD have become increasingly restrained in the use of firearms because there are clearer rules, more vigorous oversight, and more training than in years past.

In June 2016, the NYPD established a unified force reporting structure that reflected national best practices. This policy overhaul was the product of a collaborative effort among NYPD leadership, New York City stakeholders, and external subject matter experts. The goal of this policy overhaul was to improve oversight, enhance training, generate comprehensive reporting, and thoroughly investigate all uses of force.

The department categorizes reportable force incidents into three levels. The three levels of reportable force are:

Level 1 (Physical Force/Less-Lethal Device)

Level 1 includes the use of hand strikes, foot strikes, forcible take-downs, the discharge of OC pepper spray, the discharge of CEWs in “cartridge mode,” or the use of mesh restraining blankets to secure subjects.

Level 2 (Use of Impact Weapon/Canine/Less-Lethal Device)

Level 2 includes the intentional striking of a person with any object, (including a baton, other equipment, etc.), a police canine bite, or the use of CEWs in “drive stun” mode.

Level 3 (Use of Deadly Physical Force)


Level 3 is defined as the use of physical force that is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury, including the discharge of a firearm.

Ordering a person to lie on the ground, guiding them to the ground in a controlled manner, and the use of Velcro straps or polycarbonate shields to restrain subjects are not, by themselves, reportable uses of force.

The degree of injury to the subject can alter the categorization of an incident and whether it is treated as a Level 1, Level 2, or Level 3 use of force. A substantial injury to the subject results in a Level 2 classification, and a serious physical injury results in a Level 3 classification, regardless of the type of force used. Substantial physical injuries are generally those that require treatment at a hospital. Serious physical injuries are generally those that require admission to a hospital. Suspicion that excessive force was used or an attempted suicide by a subject also elevate an incident to a Level 2 classification. Alleged or suspected excessive force accompanied by serious physical injury or attempted suicide that causes a serious injury elevate an incident to a Level 3 classification.

While the NYPD’s use of force policy incorporates national best practices and serves as a benchmark for law enforcement agencies worldwide, the department is presently in the process of further refinement to its use of force protocols. Numerous focus groups were held in coordination with a thorough evaluation of the department’s force policies, and although it was

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determined that a strong framework exists in both policy and data collection, several opportunities for improvement were identified.

The NYPD will voluntarily submit use of force data to the national collection effort supported by the FBI. Motivated by a proactive commitment to improving its own policies and data collection processes—and a desire to comport with the FBI’s national data collection standards—the NYPD is further modifying its data collection processes. The NYPD is redesigning its mechanisms for data collection to improve user interface. Department reports are being revised to create a more intuitive data entry process, and a redesigned database is being developed with field dependencies and conditional captions that will protect against data entry errors that were identified in the first iteration of the data collection model.

While modifications to the NYPD’s use of force policies and data collection model will make comparisons of certain historical force data difficult, the NYPD is establishing policy improvements and a sustainable data collection process that will be in alignment with a national model for many years to come.

FORCE INVESTIGATION AND REVIEW

The First Deputy Commissioner oversees the Force Investigation Division, which investigates all firearms discharges, fatalities related to police action, and cases where a subject of police action is seriously injured and likely to die and the Risk Management Bureau, which performs a number of roles with respect to use of force, including monitoring use of force data and the quality of force investigations. The Department Advocate’s Office, which prosecutes administrative discipline cases, and the Deputy Commissioner, Trials, which presides over the NYPD’s internal discipline trials, also directly report to the First Deputy Commissioner.

The First Deputy Commissioner chairs the Use of Force Review Board, which reviews all Level 3 uses of force, determines whether police actions were within policy, and makes disciplinary recommendations to the Police Commissioner when uses of force fall outside policy.

The NYPD’s use of force oversight and management controls are described here:

Immediate Supervisor

Sergeants and/or patrol supervisors supervise all police field operations within a command, (precinct, police service area, or transit district). These supervisors are the principal reviewers of Level 1 uses of force.

Duty Captain

The duty captain is the front-line executive supervisor, overseeing all personnel performing duty within a patrol borough, during hours when commanding officers/executive officers are not present. Duty captains investigate Level 2 uses of force in the absence of the commanding officer/executive officer.

Duty Chief

The duty chief is the principal operations commander of the NYPD when other department executives are not present, acting as a representative of the Chief of Department and responding to all serious incidents within New York City, including police-involved shootings and deaths in police custody. The duty chief may assist in investigations of use of force incidents during hours when precinct and borough executives are not present.

Borough/Bureau Investigations Units

Investigations units, assigned to bureau and borough commands, investigate instances of non-criminal violations of department regulations and lesser misconduct, as well as domestic incidents and certain criminal incidents involving members of the NYPD. The investigations units may be called to assist in investigations of Level 2 force incidents.

Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB)

IAB combats police corruption by analyzing corruption allegations and trends and conducts comprehensive investigations that ensure the highest standards of integrity. IAB investigates all Level 3 use of force incidents, except incidents involving firearms discharges by members of the service, incidents in which subjects have died, and incidents in which subjects are seriously injured and likely to die.

Force Investigation Division (FID)

FID investigates Level 3 incidents that involve firearms discharges by members of the NYPD, cases in which the subject is seriously injured and likely to die, and cases in which a subject dies in events related to police activity. FID reviews the tactics employed in each incident to derive tactical lessons learned and to make both general training recommendations and training recommendations specifically for the individual members of the service involved in discharge incidents.

Risk Management Bureau (RMB)

RMB acts as a liaison to the Office of the Inspector General and the court-appointed Federal Monitor. RMB is responsible for ensuring the complete and proper implementation of court-

ordered reforms. RMB also assesses compliance with NYPD policies, identifies and develops programs to minimize risk to the department, and provides oversight of the NYPD's performance monitoring programs. RMB sub-units include the Quality Assurance Division, the Risk Mitigation Division, and the Compliance Division. RMB and the First Deputy Commissioner's Office lead force review meetings every month with borough and bureau personnel. The purpose of these meetings is to assess compliance with use of force policy.

Deputy Commissioner, Department Advocate

The Department Advocate is the prosecutorial entity at department trials, provides assistance in command discipline procedures, and prepares charges and specifications. The Department Advocate makes recommendations to the First Deputy Commissioner concerning suspension and restoration to duty of NYPD personnel.

Deputy Commissioner, Trials

The Deputy Commissioner, Trials presides over the administrative trials of department disciplinary cases, and renders written findings of fact and recommendations to the Police Commissioner consistent with department rules, policies, and applicable statutes and case law.

Use of Force Review Board

The Use of Force Review Board is an oversight mechanism for maintaining the integrity of the department's force policy. Composed of executive staff members, the board reviews the most serious force cases and renders determinations regarding the actions of members of the department during force encounters.

TRAINING

A member's training serves as the foundation and framework for deciding whether and how to use force. Revisions to the NYPD's use of force policy and reporting structure has led to changes in training. As use of force data is collected and analyzed, department policy is revised, training is evaluated, and new instructional scenarios are employed.

Training Bureau

The Training Bureau oversees NYPD training and educational programs, providing recruits, uniformed officers, and civilians with the most up-to-date academic, tactical, and technological training available. In-service training for members of the service include sessions on the latest tactics, de-escalation strategies, Crisis Intervention Team training, and changes in the law and police procedures, as well as ways to positively interact and collaborate with community members. Additionally, all uniformed members of the service complete rigorous firearms training

as recruits, and must re-qualify for the use of their service and off-duty weapons twice a year for the entirety of their careers. Members also receive specialized training when they are assigned to certain units, such as the Emergency Service Unit.

Department firearms training emphasizes that the principal goal of every member of the NYPD is to protect life, including the lives of bystanders, victims, subjects, and other members of the service. Yet, it is sometimes necessary to protect life by using deadly physical force. To make the right decision about whether and how to use deadly force, members of the service rely on judgment, skill, and most importantly, training. Members of the NYPD are trained to use deadly physical force to “stop the threat,” which means ending a subject’s ability to threaten imminent death or serious physical injury. To accomplish this purpose in dynamic shooting situations, members are trained to shoot at the center mass of the subject, the largest target available. There are times when using force results in a subject’s demise. Arms and legs are smaller and less static, and therefore, less certain targets. Hitting a subject in these extremities is also far less likely to stop an assailant.

Firearms Discharges

Overview

Since official recordkeeping began in 1971, the New York City Police Department has experienced a dramatic decline in the number of firearms discharge incidents. For 2018, not only did the department experience a 32.7% decline in firearms discharges compared to the previous year, the NYPD recorded the lowest number of police firearms discharges ever. Since 2007, when the department introduced its annual Firearms Discharge Report, discharges have decreased by 68.5%. The decline in police firearms discharges underscores the diligence and restraint displayed by NYPD members in their interactions with the public at large, as well as changes and improvements in firearms policy and training.

The department analyzes each firearms discharge category to improve understanding of the various types of incidents and adjusts training and policy, when necessary. The discharge data in this report has been compiled from Preliminary Investigation Worksheets, medical examiner's reports, arrest and complaint reports, Force Investigation Division reports, Use of Force Review Board findings and recommendations, quarterly and annual Use of Force data tables, and previous Annual Firearms Discharge Reports. While there is undeniable value in an analysis and discussion of police firearms discharges, the relatively small number of discharges in 2018 (35 overall discharge incidents, including 17 adversarial conflict discharges) limits the scope of conclusions that can be drawn, as well as any basis on which to forecast future trends.

Even when intentional firearms discharges by police are deemed justifiable in a court of law, they nevertheless are reviewed by the NYPD for tactical deviations and violations of procedure, as well as any other factors that suggest modifications to policy and procedure are needed. Discipline in these cases does not always result from the actual discharge of the firearm, but may result from a violation of other department procedures. All members who discharge their firearms are sent to a firearms tactical review course, regardless of the circumstances of the discharge.

Historical Snapshot, 2009 – 2018										
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Adversarial Conflicts	47	33	36	45	40	35	33	37	23	17
Animal Attacks	28	30	36	24	19	18	15	11	9	4
Unintentional Discharges	23	21	15	21	12	18	15	14	12	8
Mistaken Identity	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unauthorized Uses	4	6	2	6	2	4	2	6	3	1
MOS Suicides & Attempts	3	2	3	9	8	4	2	4	5	5
Total	106	92	92	105	81	79	67	72	52	35

Figure 1

Firearms discharges are divided into six categories:

Intentional Discharge–Adversarial Conflict (ID-AC): when a member of the service intentionally discharges a firearm during a confrontation with a subject. There were 17 intentional discharges in adversarial conflict incidents in 2018.

Intentional Discharge–Animal Attack (ID-AA): when a member of the service intentionally discharges a firearm to defend against an animal attack. There were four intentional discharge incidents in the course of animal attacks in 2018.

Unintentional Discharge: when a member of the service unintentionally discharges a firearm. There were eight unintentional discharge incidents in 2018.

Unauthorized Use of a Firearm: when a member of the service intentionally discharges a firearm outside the scope of his or her employment, or when another person illegally discharges a member’s firearm. There were six total unauthorized discharge incidents involving NYPD firearms in 2018, four of which were member suicides and one was an attempted suicide.

Mistaken Identity: when a member of the service intentionally fires on another member of the service in the mistaken belief that the other member is a criminal subject. Mistaken identity cases do not include crossfires, when a member of the service accidentally strikes a fellow member of the service while firing at another target. There were no cases of mistaken identity in 2018 (there was one instance of crossfire during an intentional discharge–adversarial conflict in 2018).

Intentional Discharge–No Conflict: when a member of the service discharges a firearm to summon assistance. Due to the rarity of discharges to summon assistance, this category is usually excluded from the report. There were no discharges classified as Intentional Discharge–No Conflict in 2018. The NYPD did experience one Intentional Discharge–No Conflict in 2016, the only one of its kind in a decade.

Adversarial Conflicts, 2009 - 2018




Figure 2

Animal Attacks, 2009 - 2018




Figure 3

Unintentional Discharges, 2009 - 2018




Figure 5

Total Discharges, 2009 - 2018




Figure 4

Total NYPD Firearms Discharges, 1971 - 2018




Figure 6

Intentional Discharges – Adversarial Conflicts

In 2018, there was an average of 36,484 uniformed members employed by the NYPD. Of them, 26 (less than 0.1%) intentionally discharged a firearm at a subject. In 2018, members responded to more than 6.1 million calls for police service, of which 61,769 involved weapons.

Of the thousands of weapons arrests that resulted from these encounters, 2,952 were gun arrests. Uniformed members of the service also had thousands of additional interactions with the public, including investigative encounters, car stops, and violation stops, and escorted thousands of emotionally disturbed persons to hospitals and care facilities. In the overwhelming majority of incidents in which uniformed members took armed subjects or emotionally disturbed persons into custody, they did not fire their weapons.

In 2018, there were 17 intentional firearm discharge-adversarial conflict incidents (ID-AC), involving 26 uniformed members of the service who discharged their firearms. These conflicts involved 17 known subjects and one unknown and unapprehended subject. In three different ID-AC incidents, a subject discharged a firearm directly at members of the service, with one police officer shot and injured. Fifteen subjects were shot during ID-AC incidents in 2018, five of whom died.

The total number of uniformed members injured by gunfire in ID-AC exchanges has varied over the years. In 2018, as in 2017, there was only one incident in which a police officer was shot and injured by subject gunfire; this is fewer than the four members shot and injured in 2016, and far fewer than the 13 uniformed members of the service shot in 2012. No members of the service were shot and killed in the line of duty in 2018 –the first time this has occurred since 2013.

Subject Death and Injuries

In 2018, five subjects were killed by police firearms discharges in ID-AC incidents. The total number of subjects killed during adversarial exchanges has remained fairly level over the last decade, with an average of nine subjects shot and killed by uniformed members of the service from 2009 to 2018.



Figure 7

Of the five subjects killed by police gunfire in 2018, each possessed some form of weapon or dangerous instrument that appeared to be capable of causing death or serious physical injury. One subject possessed a loaded revolver, three possessed and menaced members with knives, and one simulated the possession of a firearm. The subject armed with a loaded revolver was shot and killed during an armed robbery of a gas station when he was confronted by an off-duty police officer. Another subject was confronted by on-duty members after they received numerous calls of an individual menacing pedestrians with a gun. That subject pointed what appeared to be a firearm at officers, and was shot. A fuel soldering torch was recovered. The remaining three subjects all either approached, lunged, or charged at on-duty members of the service with knives. (The five ID-AC incidents in which subjects were killed are described in Appendix B).

ID-AC Incidents, Subject Injuries, and Subject Deaths, 2009 - 2018




Figure 8

Over the past 10 years, an average of 16 subjects were shot and injured during ID-AC incidents. In 2018, 10 subjects were shot and injured by police gunfire, one more than the nine shot and injured in 2017, and thirteen fewer than 2016. Of the 10 subjects shot and injured in 2018, six were armed with firearms, one with a starter pistol, and one with a knife. Two subjects presented perceived threats to the discharging members of the service. In one instance of perceived threat, an on-duty police officer discharged his firearm at an individual concealing his hands during a car stop. The individuals were suspected of being involved in a criminal shooting. The other incident involved a subject aggressively approaching an off-duty sergeant, while stating that he “got the strap” and concealing his left hand in his pocket. Of the six subjects armed with firearms, three

discharged their firearms at members of the service, one discharged at other individuals, and two were shot before they were able to discharge their firearms.

Bystander Injuries

Unfortunately, bystanders may be injured during ID-AC incidents –either as a direct result of, or incidental to, police action. In 2018, three bystanders were injured in two separate ID-AC incidents. In one incident, a bystander was shot by the subject during an exchange of gunfire with police. In the other incident, two bystanders were shot by an on-duty police officer during an exchange of gunfire with a fleeing perpetrator. All injuries to bystanders sustained during ID-AC incidents in 2018 were nonfatal.

Injuries to Members of the Service

Two members of the service sustained nonfatal injuries during two separate ID-AC incidents. In one discharge incident, a detective was shot by a wanted subject in an exchange of gunfire. In the other, a police officer was injured as a result of “friendly fire.” Officers were responding to a domestic incident and confronted the subject in a fenced-in yard. The subject charged at the officers with a knife, and both officers discharged their firearms. One of the officers was shot as a result of this discharge incident. No members of the service were shot and killed in 2018.

Other Considerations

In 2018, nine of the 17 known subjects in ID-AC incidents possessed firearms at the time of discharge: three had revolvers, five had semi-automatic pistols, and one had a starter pistol. Every firearm was loaded, and all but the starter pistol were able to discharge live rounds. Five subjects were armed with knives, two subjects were perceived by members of the service as presenting imminent threats of serious physical injury, and one subject possessed a simulated firearm.






Figure 9



There were 17 known subjects involved in ID-AC incidents in 2018, and all but two of them were male. One unknown and unapprehended subject is not included in the data. Known subject ages ranged from 15 to 52, with a median age of 30. Thirteen of the known subjects were under 40 years old, and only 3 were 50 years of age or older.


The race and ethnicity of the subjects was determined by eyewitness reports, the subjects’ self-identification, existing government-issued documentation, racial/ethnic physical characteristics, medical examiner reports, and other sources. Ten of the known subjects involved in ID-AC incidents were black, 4 were Hispanic, and 3 were white. The racial and ethnic composition of subjects involved in the ID-AC incidents is largely similar to that of both known criminal shooting suspects and victims in the 754 criminal shooting incidents in New York City in 2018. Among the 464 known criminal shooting *suspects* in New York City in 2018, approximately 72.6% were black, 24.1% Hispanic, 2.8% white, and 0.4% Asian. Among the 884 criminal shooting *victims* in 2018, approximately 73.3% were black, 22.4% Hispanic, 2.6% white, and 1.7% Asian.

2018 Racial and Ethnic Composition of Known Criminal Shooting Suspects, Known Victims, and Known ID-AC Subjects



Of the 26 uniformed members of the service who intentionally discharged their firearms during ID-AC incidents in 2018, one was female (3.8%) and 25 were male (96.2%). The NYPD’s uniformed staff, taken as an average over the course of 2018, was composed of 17.9% female members and 82.1% male members. Based on current and past data, no discernible pattern or trend emerges with regard to the likelihood that a member of the service of any particular race or ethnicity will become involved in an ID-AC incident.


2018 Race/Ethnicity of Members in ID-AC



While the race and ethnicity of uniformed members involved in adversarial conflicts do not exactly mirror the racial and ethnic composition of the NYPD’s uniformed staff as a whole, there is no significant disparity. Of the 26 members involved in 2018’s ID-AC incidents, 50.0% were white, 19.2% were Hispanic, 26.9% were black, and 3.8% were Asian. In 2018, the department’s uniformed staff were 49.0% white, 27.9% Hispanic, 15.1% black, and 8.0% Asian/other. This has been fairly consistent over the last 10 years.

Historically, police officers with fewer years of service are significantly more likely to be involved in ID-AC incidents compared with other members with more years of service and those of higher ranks. These members are more likely to be serving in patrol capacities, and thus, are more likely to encounter situations that may lead to adversarial conflicts. Approximately 73.1% of members involved in ID-AC incidents in 2018 had fewer than ten years of service at the time of their discharge.

2018 Rank of Members in ID-AC vs. Department Staffing



Members of the service in the rank of police officer comprised 80.8% of those involved in ID-AC incidents in 2018, which is larger than their two-thirds representation among the department’s total uniformed staff. Over the last decade, members in the rank of police officer consistently represented approximately 65% of total uniformed staff and comprised between 55% and 86% of members that discharged their firearms in ID-AC incidents. As in 2018, in years in which police officers made up a higher percentage of ID-AC members, the percentage of ID-AC members in the rank of detective was lower. In years where the percentage of ID-AC members of the service in the rank of police officer is lower, the percentage of detectives typically increase. In 2015, 56% of ID-AC members were in the rank of police officer, and 29% were in the rank of detective. In 2014, 88% were police officers and 3% were detectives. In 2018, 80.5% of ID-AC members in the rank of police officer, and 11.6% in the rank of detective. This may be due to the sharp decrease in sergeants involved in ID-AC incidents in 2018. Sergeants consistently represented approximately 13% of total uniformed staff over the past 10 years, and comprised between 7% and 21.9% of ID-AC members. The percentage of sergeants discharging their firearms in 2018 fell outside that range, with sergeants comprising only 3.8% of ID-AC involved members of the service.

Rank of Members in ID-AC, 2009 - 2018




Figure 14

In 2018, all but two of the uniformed members of the service involved in adversarial conflicts were on-duty. One off-duty police officer was refueling a vehicle when an armed robbery occurred at the location. The other incident involved an off-duty sergeant who was threatened/menaced on his way to work. Slightly more than half the members (53.8%) involved in adversarial conflict incidents were in plainclothes. In prior years, the number of discharging personnel in plainclothes assignments has generally been higher.

Nineteen of the 26 ID-AC members were assigned to the Patrol Services Bureau, five were assigned to investigative assignments in the Detective Bureau, one was assigned to the Intelligence Bureau, and one was assigned to the Special Operations Division. The majority of members involved in ID-AC incidents were assigned primarily to patrol functions who generally have more interactions with the public than members in other assignments.




Figure 15

Approximately 58.8% of ID-AC incidents in 2018 occurred during the third shift (between 1531 hours and 2330 hours) and 35.3% occurred during the first shift (2331-0730). This is consistent with historical trends of ID-AC incidents.




Figure 16

All of the NYPD adversarial firearms discharges in 2018 occurred within the five counties of New York City. Of the 17 incidents, six occurred in Brooklyn, four in the Bronx, three in Queens, and two each in Manhattan and Staten Island. Each geographic borough, had at least two ID-AC incidents, and Brooklyn, with 6 incidents, accounted for 35.3% of all ID-AC incidents in 2018. ID-AC incidents occurred in the confines of 16 separate precincts throughout New York City, and only one precinct had more than one incident. The 120th Precinct had two separate ID-AC incidents in 2018.

ID-AC incidents typically correspond with geographic crime patterns; boroughs and precincts with more criminal shootings tend to be where ID-AC incidents occur. As shown on a map of *Criminal Shooting Incidents vs. Police Adversarial Discharges* (page 23), intentional police firearms discharges tend to occur in areas of New York City where there are higher levels of gun violence. Since the *2007 Annual Firearms Discharge Report* first mapped police and criminal

shootings, the maps have demonstrated a generally consistent geographical correlation between police shootings and criminal gun violence. The frequency and locations of police-involved shootings are directly and proportionally related to criminal gun activity and criminal shootings in New York City.

2018 ID-AC and Criminal Shooting Incidents by Geographic Borough




Figure 17



Criminal Shooting Incidents vs. Police Adversarial Discharges, 2018



Legend


- Police Firearm Discharge - Adversarial (17)
- Criminal Shooting Incidents (754)
- ▭ NYPD Precinct Boundary




Figure 18

Uniformed members of the service discharged a total of 107 rounds during ID-AC incidents in 2018, a 37.1% decrease from 2017 when 170 rounds were fired, and a 47.5% decrease compared to the 204 rounds discharged in 2016. Of the 26 members of the service who discharged their firearms during ID-AC incidents in 2018, all but two members discharged six rounds or fewer. The other two police officers both discharged more than 10 rounds each, and both were involved in exchanges of gunfire with armed subjects. However, the number of rounds discharged during any given adversarial encounter is not, by itself, dispositive on whether a member’s use of force was justified.

2018 Rounds Fired per ID-AC Incident



2018 Rounds Fired per ID-AC MOS



Objective Completion Rate

The NYPD uses what it calls “the objective completion rate per incident” to determine the effectiveness of police firearms discharges because it is considered both more accurate and more informative. When a uniformed member properly and lawfully perceives a threat severe enough to require the use of a firearm and fires at a specific threat, the most relevant measure of success is whether the member ultimately stops the threat. This is the objective completion rate, and it is determined irrespective of the number of shots fired at the subject. The objective completion rate is used for statistical purposes and is not a factor in investigations of individual incidents. The department does not calculate hit percentage when describing ID-AC incidents, in part because the percentages are sometimes unknown (for example, in cases when a subject flees) and also because of the widely differing circumstances in individual incidents. In 2018, uniformed members of the service hit at least one subject in 15 of the 17 ID-AC incidents, for an objective completion rate of 88%, up 5% from 2017 (83%).

Objective Completion Rate, 2009 - 2018




Figure 21

Shooting Technique

Using a two-handed grip, standing, and carefully aligning a firearm’s sights with the target are not always practical during an adversarial conflict incident. There are also occasions when follow-up investigations are unable to determine the grip that was used by involved members of the service. Of the 26 members involved in adversarial conflicts in 2018, 11 reported how they held their firearms. Of those, approximately 45.5% utilized a two-handed, supported position, and the remaining members reported a one-handed, un-supported position. Post-shooting investigations determined the shooting stance of 13 of the 26 ID-AC members: all were in standing position at the time of their firearms discharges. The investigations also determined the distance all 26 discharging members were from their targets during ID-AC incidents. Although all uniformed members of the service are trained to fire on a target from as far away as 75 feet, 50.0% of ID-AC members were at a distance of 15 feet or less from the target subject at the time of firearms discharge. These close-contact situations require split-second, life-and-death decisions by members of the service in adversarial conflicts.

2018 ID-AC Distance to Target




Figure 22

Intentional Discharges – Animal Attacks

Department policy authorizes uniformed members of the service to discharge their firearms intentionally during animal attacks only to defend themselves or others from physical injury, and only as a last resort to stop an animal attack. Members are equipped with less-lethal tools that can counter animal attacks, including batons and OC spray, but these options may not always be feasible or effective. There were four instances of intentional firearms discharges during animal attacks (ID-AA) in 2018, representing a 55.5% decrease from 2017. Three of the four were on-duty incidents, and the remaining incident involved an off-duty member in Brooklyn.

2018 Rounds Fired per MOS in ID-AA




Figure 23

2018 Rounds Fired per Incident in ID-AA




Figure 24

All four incidents stemmed from aggressive dogs advancing/attacking members of the service or others. All but one incident involved a single aggressive dog, whereas the last one involved two dogs. In total, four members discharged their firearms during these ID-AA incidents in 2018. A total of 14 rounds were fired by members of the service, 28 less than in 2017, representing a decrease of 66.7%. Two of the members fired only one round, one fired four rounds, and one fired eight rounds. As a result of these discharges, two dogs were killed, one was injured, and two were unharmed. While no members of the


service were injured during these ID-AA incidents, one bystander was struck by police gunfire and sustained a non-fatal injury.

In 2018, police responded to thousands of calls for service involving dogs and other animals. This analysis does not encompass all animal attacks on members of the service and others, as they encountered many more while on patrol, executing search warrants, or investigating complaints


that were not processed through the 911 or 311 dispatch systems. Only incidents involving firearms discharges by police are included here.

Two of the four 2018 ID-AA incidents occurred during the third shift, between 1531 and 2330 hours. The first shift, between 2331 and 0730 hours, also recorded two incidents. There were no ID-AA incidents on the second shift, between 0731 and 1530 hours.

2018 ID-AA Incidents by Shift



2018 ID-AA Incidents by Location



Neither Manhattan nor Staten Island recorded an ID-AA incident in 2018. Brooklyn recorded two incidents, followed by one incident each in the Bronx and Queens. There were no ID-AA incidents outside New York City in 2018, unlike 2017 which had two, and 2016 which had one outside the city.

Unintentional Discharges

There were eight unintentional firearms discharge incidents in 2018, a 33.4% decrease from 2017. Each of the eight incidents involved a single member of the service, and all but one incident consisted of a single discharge. The remaining incident consisted of the discharge of two rounds. No bystanders or perpetrators were injured during the unintentional discharge incidents that occurred in 2018.

Of the eight unintentional firearms discharges, five occurred while members were on-duty. One incident occurred during a car stop, one during the apprehension of a robbery suspect, and one while executing a search warrant. The other two on-duty unintentional discharge incidents occurred inside department facilities. The three off-duty incidents occurred while the members were at home, unloading or otherwise handling their weapons. All eight incidents involved pistols except one, in which a detective assigned to the Emergency Service Unit (ESU) unintentionally discharged two rounds from his MP5 submachine gun during the execution of a search warrant.

In 2018, only members of the service in the ranks of police officer (five) and detective (three) unintentionally discharged their firearms. Members with 10 years of service or less were responsible for five of the eight unintentional discharge incidents. One detective had over 25 years of service at the time of his unintentional discharge.

2018 Years of Service, Unintentional Discharges vs. Department Staffing




Figure 27

2018 Rank, Unintentional Discharges vs. Department Staffing




Figure 28

Loading/Unloading

There were four unintentional discharges in 2018 caused by members loading or unloading their weapons. Two of these incidents involved on-duty officers within department facilities, and one of these incidents resulted in a nonfatal injury to a member of the service. The two off-duty incidents occurred at the discharging members' residences.

Handling

Four unintentional discharges in 2018 resulted from the handling of a firearm unrelated to loading/unloading. Three of these discharge incidents occurred when members of the service mishandled their firearms while taking police action, and one occurred while an off-duty officer was at home. Three of the incidents involved the discharge of the members' service 9mm semi-automatic pistols, and the other incident was the unintentional discharge of an ESU detective's 9mm submachine gun. No injuries resulted to members of the service or others during these incidents.

Unauthorized Discharges

There were six firearms discharges in 2018 that were classified as unauthorized use of firearms, a 25% decrease compared to 2017. Four of these incidents were completed suicides by members of the service, and one was an attempted suicide. The remaining unauthorized use of a firearm incident was a discharge of a member’s firearm by another individual. The off-duty member of the service was staying at a house, out-of-state, and had placed his firearm in a dresser drawer. Another individual staying in the house retrieved the firearm and discharged one round. Although no one was injured as a result of this unauthorized discharge incident, the member of the service violated department protocol by failing to properly secure his firearm.

UMOS Suicides by Firearm, 2009 - 2018




Figure 29

Three of the four members of the service who committed suicide by firearm in 2018 were male, and one was female. One of these members was a police officer, two were detectives, and one was a sergeant. The members of the service had between two to fourteen years of service at the time of their discharges, but a majority of them had over 10 years of service. All but one incident occurred off duty.

The NYPD and several external organizations provide mental health resources specifically designed for members of the service. Department resources include the Employee Assistance Unit, the Counseling Services Unit, the Chaplain’s Unit, the NYPD Helpline, and the Psychological Evaluation Unit. External resources include Police Officers Providing Peer Assistance (POPPA) and the Police Self Support Group. The department actively promotes seeking assistance with either internal or external resources to all members of the service. The NYPD continues its outreach efforts to increase awareness of the available resources and encourages fellow members to reach out to other members of the service who may need help.

Conducted Electrical Weapons

CEWs (often referred to as tasers), provide a less-lethal use of force option for law enforcement personnel. CEWs may be used to gain control of non-compliant subjects who physically resist restraint or exhibit active physical aggression, or to prevent subjects from physically injuring themselves or other persons. CEWs are classified by the NYPD as less-lethal devices and are intended to augment and provide a greater margin of safety for members of the service who might otherwise be forced to physically subdue a dangerous subject. The use of a CEW under the department's use of force policy is deemed an intermediate use of force option like O.C. pepper spray or impact techniques. The NYPD's policy governing CEWs is in line with the recommendations published in reports by nationally recognized independent bodies, including the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) and the National Institute of Justice.

CEWs use replaceable cartridges containing compressed nitrogen to propel two small probes that are attached to the handheld unit by insulated conductive wires. The wires transmit short controlled pulses of electricity in five-second cycles that stimulate the skeletal muscles of the human body. These short electrical pulses affect the sensory and motor functions of the peripheral nervous system to cause temporary incapacitation by preventing coordinated muscular action, without affecting vital organs. Once the five-second cycle is complete, an immediate recovery occurs. CEWs collect and store data regarding each use for post-incident investigations.

PERF, an organization focused on policing issues, conducted a study comparing agencies deploying CEWs with a sample of similar agencies that did not deploy these devices. Statistical results indicate that CEW discharges are a safer alternative to other less-lethal options for subduing a subject. The PERF study suggests that the likelihood of injuries to both suspects and officers are reduced among agencies that use CEWs. Since 2015, the NYPD has expanded the number of members trained and authorized to use CEWs. In 2018, a total of 23,564 uniformed members of the service were CEW-trained and authorized, and 3,108 CEWs were assigned to precincts, police service areas, and transit districts. This represents an increase of 43.3% compared to the 16,442 total members trained and authorized to employ CEWs in 2017, and a 31.0% increase in the number of CEWs assigned to commands compared to the 2,372 CEWs assigned in 2017.

The use of CEWs in cartridge mode is a force option that allows the police to engage noncompliant and/or aggressive subjects from a distance, providing members of the service more time to react and develop a tactical plan in what are typically fast paced and violent situations. Additionally, CEWs often help members gain rapid control and compliance, thereby minimizing the likelihood of injury or fatal medical consequences. Of course, when subjects are

presenting members of the service or others with an imminent threat of serious physical injury or death, the use of CEWs may not be the appropriate or reasonable option.

2018 CEW Discharges, Incident Type




Figure 30

There were 998 CEW discharge incidents in 2018 (there were 1,072 individual discharges; multiple discharges may occur in a single CEW discharge incident and there may be CEW discharges in incidents classified under higher levels of force, e.g., firearms discharges). This represents a 37.1% increase compared to the 728 CEW discharge incidents in 2017. This increase in CEW discharge incidents is consistent with the addition of approximately 7,000 members trained and authorized to employ CEWs.

A majority of the CEW discharge incidents, 67.2%, were during arrest situations or situations where members were attempting to subdue a violent emotionally disturbed person (EDP). Of the 998 CEW discharge incidents, 415 occurred during arrests, and 256 occurred while members were attempting to take violent EDPs into custody. The remaining CEW discharge incidents occurred in situations that included: unintentional discharges, prisoners, animal attacks, vehicle stops, and suspicious person stops. Of the 285 incidents classified as “other,” 78.6%, were unintentional CEW discharges.

Emotionally Disturbed Persons (EDPs), as defined by the NYPD Patrol Guide, are persons who appear to be mentally ill or temporarily deranged and are conducting themselves in a manner in which a uniformed member of the service reasonably believes is likely to result in serious injury to themselves or others. EDP encounters are not necessarily arrest-related. However, consistent with the New York State Mental Hygiene Law, department policy directs members to take an EDP into protective custody for the subject’s safety and the safety of the public, and to ensure that proper medical and psychiatric evaluation can take place at a safe location.

Members of the service usually do not know the emotional and/or psychological status of a subject upon first contact, but they are trained to recognize situational and behavioral cues and to bring emotionally disturbed subjects into custody using only the reasonable amount of force necessary. When verbal directions fail, and a subject exhibits active aggression, a CEW discharge is often one of the safest options for both subjects and members of the service. The 256 CEW discharge incidents during EDP encounters in 2018 constitute approximately 0.1% of the 179,569 calls for service classified as 10-54 “EDP” calls. In the vast majority of these assignments, members managed the incident without resorting to any use of force, let alone a CEW discharge.

Deployment Mode

A CEW can be deployed in two separate modes: “probe” mode and “drive-stun” mode. Probe mode is the preferred method of discharge under NYPD policy. Of the 998 CEW discharges in 2018, 878 (88.0%) were deployed in probe mode. In this mode, two metal probes are propelled by the CEW’s cartridge toward a subject across an intervening space, providing adequate separation from the intended target. Used in this mode, the CEW may cause neuromuscular incapacitation, and effectively immobilize a subject.

There were 56 deployments of CEWs in drive-stun mode in 2018. In drive-stun mode, the CEW unit is brought into direct contact with the subject’s body or clothing without a cartridge, or after a cartridge has been discharged. A drive-stun discharge does not achieve the immobilizing effects of probe deployment because it does not affect a subject’s nervous system. However, in circumstances where only one probe penetrates a subject or there is insufficient distance between probes, the use of a CEW in drive-stun mode may “complete the circuit” and achieve neuromuscular incapacitation.

Effectiveness

The goal of CEW discharges, and generally for all uses of force, is to safely gain control of violent, actively resistant, and/or aggressive subjects without having to resort to further use of force. Whether deployed in probe mode or drive-stun mode, a CEW discharge was classified in 2018, and prior years, as “effective” if members are able to rapidly gain custody and control of the subject immediately following its use.

2018 CEW Deployment Modes




Figure 31

A thorough review of 2018 TRI Incident data indicates that 580 CEW discharge incidents were categorized as effective in gaining rapid control of the target subject. Of the 998 discharge incidents, there were 224 unintentional CEW discharge incidents. Of the 774 intentional CEW discharge incidents, 74.9% were deemed effective.

Ineffective discharge incidents were attributable to situations such as the probes failing to make adequate contact with the subject’s skin or clothing, the probes missing the subject entirely, a subject fighting through the pain, or the probe wires breaking. An ineffective discharge incident may have multiple, simultaneous causes, which are displayed in the adjacent chart.

2018 Effectiveness of CEW Discharges




Figure 32

Discharging Personnel

Personnel in the rank of police officer and sergeant were responsible for 93.9% of all CEW discharges in 2018 (1,007 of 1,072 total CEW discharges). Unlike members serving in investigative capacities, or higher ranking members of the service, police officers and sergeants are much more likely to be involved in antagonistic and violent police-citizen interactions (because of their likelihood to be first on scene at such incidents) which may lead to CEW discharges.

2018 CEW Discharges by Rank




Figure 33

Until 2015, only supervisors (e.g., sergeants and lieutenants) and members of the service assigned to the Emergency Service Unit were trained and authorized to carry and deploy CEWs. Since then, the department has trained and equipped non-supervisory personnel with CEWs, providing them to members in the rank of police officer. As the number of police officers trained and equipped with CEWs has risen, they have represented a larger proportion of the discharging population. In 2016, police officers were responsible for only 189 CEW discharge incidents. In 2017, 484 discharge incidents were by police officers. In 2018, members of the service in the rank

of police officers accounted for 77.1% of all CEW discharges (827 of 1,072 total CEW discharges). Because patrol officers are usually first on-scene with violent and combative subjects, and because more police officers are trained and equipped with CEWs, patrol officers accounted for a significant proportion of the CEW discharges in 2018, and will likely continue to do so in the future.

Time and Place of Discharges

CEW discharges were relatively consistent across the three shifts, with a larger percentage (41.8%) occurring during the third shift (1531-2330 hours). More discharges typically occur in geographic boroughs where there are higher numbers of calls for service. In 2018, Brooklyn, Manhattan, and the Bronx led New York City in terms of CEW discharges, each accounting for around 27% of discharges.




Figure 36




Figure 35

2018 Calls for Service by Borough




Figure 34

General Uses of Force

All members of the service are responsible and accountable for the proper use of force. Under New York State law, a member may use force to effect arrest, prevent escape, and protect life and property. Any force used by members of the NYPD must comply with New York State and federal laws, as well as department policy. In all cases, members must use only the reasonable amount of force necessary to gain compliance. Members of the service seek to gain voluntary compliance, when appropriate and consistent with personal safety, in order to reduce or eliminate the necessity to use force. However, voluntary compliance is not always achievable, and some interactions may result in the use of force.

Historically, the NYPD tracked use of force incidents through documentation such as arrest reports, Medical Treatment of Prisoner Forms, Aided Reports, and Line of Duty Injury Reports. In June of 2016, the Threat, Resistance or Injury (TRI) Report was introduced to capture more complete data about the types of force used, the subjects of force incidents, the members of the service who used force and/or were subjected to force, any injuries inflicted and/or sustained, and other circumstances surrounding use of force incidents. The NYPD is continuously fine-tuning its use of force reporting structure to improve accuracy and clarity. This effort resulted in changes to the TRI Report in 2017, and more revisions are currently being implemented as the NYPD prepares to participate in the national data collection effort to standardize police use of force data submissions to the FBI.





Figure 37

In 2018, there were 9,414 TRI Reports completed that documented 7,879 reportable use of force incidents. Of the completed TRI Reports, 1,535 were for incidents that did not involve the use of force by members of the service, but were still a reportable incident nonetheless. For instance, a prisoner in department custody assaulted by another prisoner would generate a TRI Report. Similarly, the suicide of a subject in police custody is reportable by a TRI Report, but is not considered a use of force incident. Additionally, instances where subjects use force against members of the service, without uses of force by members of the NYPD, would also generate TRI Reports.

Under the three levels of force defined by the NYPD's use of force policy, 2018's force incidents consisted of 94% Level 1 uses of force, 4% Level 2 uses of force, and 2% Level 3 uses of force. In 2017, force incidents comprised 89% Level 1 uses of force, 8% Level 2 uses of force, and 3% Level 3 uses of force.

Of the 7,879 force incidents in 2018, 82.7%, 6,513 incidents, involved the minimum amount of reportable force, i.e., forcible takedowns, hand strikes, and foot strikes. There were 998 incidents of CEW discharge, which represents 12.7% of total reportable force incidents, which includes intentional discharges at actively aggressive subjects, and unintentional discharges while conducting operability tests in department facilities.

The remaining force incidents by equipment/force option included: 211 uses of OC spray (2.7%), 76 uses of impact weapons (1.0%), 34 uses of mesh restraining blankets (0.4%), 35 firearms discharges (0.4%), and 12 canine bites (0.2%). The downward trend in the use of other force options (i.e., mesh blankets, impact weapons, OC spray), and the increased use of CEWs, continued in 2018. Coinciding with the increase of CEW discharge incidents over the last two years, is the decrease in force incidents involving impact weapons. From June to December 2016, there were 95 impact weapon use incidents compared to the 105 incidents in all of 2017, and the 76 incidents in the entirety of 2018. (The NYPD did not begin to track the use of impact weapons until the new use of force policy was instituted in June 2016. Thus, the information for 2016 is limited to the last seven months of that year.)



2018 Types of Encounter in Which Police Used Force




Figure 39

In 2018, incidents involving emotionally disturbed persons and prisoners accounted for 18.2% and 4.5%, respectively, of the total uses of force. Summons enforcement accounted for 1.5%, and suspicious person/conditions stops accounted for 0.7% of force incidents. Of the total force incidents (7,879) recorded on TRI Reports, 63.9%, or 5,035 incidents, occurred in arrest situations. This figure equates to force being used in approximately 2.0% of total arrests (246,779) effected by members of the department.

2018 Force Used During Arrests




Figure 41

2018 Total Arrests by Race




Figure 40

2018 Uniformed Members Using Force




Figure 42

The race and ethnicity of the uniformed members of the service using force in 2018 mirrors the racial/ethnic breakdown of uniformed staff in the department. The racial composition of the subjects of police force reflects the racial composition of the violent criminal population in the city, as measured by arrests, assault suspects, robbery suspects, shooting suspects, and people who resist arrest.

2018 Violent Crime and Force Used to Effect Arrest




Figure 43

Approximately 64% of subjects were between the ages of 16 and 35. Brooklyn accounted for 32% of citywide police uses of force, while Manhattan and the Bronx together accounted for approximately half of the total. Uses of force occurred most often (43%) on the late afternoon/evening shift, from 1531 hours to 2330 hours, and fairly evenly split among the day and overnight shifts.

2018 Force Reporting by Shift




Figure 46

2018 Force Reporting by Borough




Figure 47

2018 Force Reporting by Subject Race




Figure 45

2018 Subjects of Force by Age




Figure 44

CIVILIAN FORCE COMPLAINT

Force complaints received by the Civilian Complaint Review Board declined from 4,471 in 2009 to 1,767 in 2018, a decrease of 60.5%. The number of force allegations substantiated by CCRB in 2018 was 73.

Members of the NYPD respond to millions of calls for service each year, bringing members into direct contact with victims, witnesses, suspects, and other civilian bystanders. The overwhelming majority of these calls for service occur each year without police use of force or complaints of unnecessary force. In 2018, NYPD personnel responded to more than 6.175 million calls for service, and a total of 1,767 force complaints were lodged against uniformed members of the service. The ratio of calls for service to force complaint cases in 2018 is approximately 3,495 to 1. The ratio of calls for service to substantiated allegations is about 84,589 to 1. The ratio of use of force incidents to substantiated force allegations is approximately 108 to 1.

Historical CCRB Force Complaints vs. Substantiated Force Allegations, 2009 - 2018




Figure 48

Force Used Against Members of the Service

Policing is an inherently dangerous profession, and members of the service understand that any encounter may turn violent. NYPD personnel strive to gain voluntary compliance but are not always successful. Some contentious encounters between uniformed members and the public become violent, and lead to injuries to both subjects and members of the service. In 2018, there were 7,117 incidents where subjects used force against members of the service. These incidents are often one and the same as those in which members use force –but for analytical purposes force used by members and force against members are discussed independently. During the 7,117 incidents, 4,073 members of the service sustained injuries, of which 323 injuries were deemed substantial or serious. The majority of force inflicted on NYPD personnel took place in arrest situations (63.6%), and most involved simple physical force without weapons (97.2%). Encounters with emotionally disturbed persons accounted for the second most uses of force against members of the service (19.3%).

2018 Force Used Against Members by Event Description




Figure 49

In the vast majority of force incidents against members of the service, 6,920 subjects (97.2%) used only physical force, i.e., punching, kicking, and grappling. In the remaining 197 incidents, a weapon was used or displayed.

2018 Type of Force Used Against Members




Figure 50

The highest percentage of incidents of force against members of the service in 2018 were in Brooklyn (30.5%), followed by the Bronx (25.6%), and Manhattan (24.4%). The afternoon/evening shift (1531-2330 hours) accounted for 43.6% of incidents of force against members, the overnight shift (2331-0730 hours) accounted for 30.7%, and the day shift (0731-1531 hours) for 25.7%. The use of force against members tracks closely to the use of force by members of the service against subjects in terms of geography and time of occurrence.

2018 Force Used Against Members by Shift




Figure 51

2018 Force Used Against Members by Borough




Figure 52

Of the 10,507 subjects of police force in 2018, 10,228 individuals (97.3%) sustained no injuries or minor injuries. There were a total of 279 subjects that sustained substantial or serious physical injuries. Of the 18,286 members of the service involved in use of force incidents in 2018, 98.2% sustained no injuries or minor injuries. A total of 323 members were substantially or seriously injured. Substantial injuries are generally those that require treatment at a hospital. Serious injuries are generally those that require admission to a hospital.

2018 Use of Force Related Injuries (Subject vs. Members)





Figure 53

Appendices

Appendix A: NYPD Use of Force Documentation and Investigation Process



***FID** or **IAB** may respond to any force incident or subject injury and may assume responsibility of the investigation based on the circumstances of the incident.

Appendix B: Subjects Killed During Intentional Discharge - Adversarial Conflict Incidents

Disclaimer: In some cases, factual information provided is based on preliminary findings of ongoing investigations. Additional information may develop as the department's investigation progresses and/or related court or grand jury proceedings are concluded.

Incident 1 – 48 Precinct (Male/Black/52) (01/29/2018)

On January 29, 2018, at approximately 1943 hours, uniformed officers responded to a 911 call of an in-progress assault with a knife in the confines of the 48 Precinct. The officers, en route to the location, observed the male subject, armed with a knife in his hand, chasing a male victim around on the street. The officers instructed the subject to drop the knife, to no avail. The subject, still holding the knife, shifted his attention away from the victim and advanced towards the responding officers instead. As the subject advanced to approximately six feet away from the officers, the officers discharged their firearms, striking the subject. The subject was removed to the hospital and was pronounced deceased at 1959 hours. A KA-BAR knife was recovered at the scene. The toxicology report indicated that there were neither alcohol nor controlled substances in the subject's system at his time of death.

Incident 2 – 69 Precinct (Male/Black/19) (03/05/2018)

On March 5, 2018, at approximately 2230 hours, an off-duty police officer pulled into a gas station in the confines of the 69 Precinct. The officer was seated in his vehicle when two male subjects, both armed with firearms, robbed the gas station. As the subjects were walking away from the gas station, the officer exited his vehicle and identified himself as a police officer to the subjects by stating "Police, Don't Move!" The subjects turned towards the officer with firearms in hand, and the officer discharged his firearm at them. One subject was struck once and the other subject fled. The off-duty officer called 911 to request assistance. The injured subject was removed to the hospital and pronounced deceased at 0013 hours on March 6, 2018. A loaded, defaced firearm was recovered at the scene. The investigation to identify and arrest the other subject is still ongoing. The toxicology report indicated the presence of marijuana in the subject's system at the time of his death.

Incident 3 – 71 Precinct (Male/Black/34) (04/04/2018)

On April 4, 2018, at approximately 1642 hours, officers responded to several 911 calls of a male pointing a gun at people in the confines of the 71 Precinct. Upon arrival at the location, they observed a male subject holding what appeared to be a firearm in his hand. The officers issued several commands to the subject to drop the perceived firearm. The subject assumed a shooting

stance and pointed a silver object at the officers. The officers then discharged their firearms at the subject, striking him multiple times. The subject was removed to the hospital by EMS, and pronounced deceased at 1701 hours. A fuel soldering torch was recovered on the scene. The toxicology report indicated the presence of alcohol and marijuana in the subject's system at the time of his death.

Incident 4 – 104 Precinct (Female/White/54) (09/17/2018)

On September 17, 2018, at approximately 1733 hours, in the confines of the 104 Precinct, uniformed officers responded to a 911 call of a burglary in progress. Upon arrival, the officers were informed by the female subject that she believed someone was inside of her home. The officers entered the residence while directing the subject to stay outside. In the course of searching the home, the subject entered and approached one officer with a kitchen knife in her hand. The officer ordered the subject to drop the knife, but she lunged towards the officer instead. The officer discharged his firearm at the subject, stopping her. EMS pronounced the subject deceased at the scene at 1744 hours. A kitchen knife was recovered on scene. The toxicology report indicated the presence of alcohol in the subject's system at the time of her death.

Incident 5 – 120 Precinct (Male/Asian/50) (12/09/2018)

On December 09, 2018, at approximately 2250 hours, uniformed officers were responding to a 911 call of a family dispute in the confines of the 120 Precinct. The officers were conducting a preliminary investigation into the situation when a male subject became irate and reached for a kitchen knife. One officer verbally commanded the subject not to reach for the knife, and then discharged his CEW at the subject after the subject disregarded his commands. The CEW was ineffective and the subject charged the officers with the knife in his hand. The officers discharged their firearms, striking the subject. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased at 2323 hours. One officer was injured by friendly fire and removed to the hospital. A knife with an 18 inch blade was recovered from the scene. The toxicology report indicated the presence of alcohol in the subject's system at his time of death.

Appendix C: Other Death Investigations Conducted by Force Investigation Division

Disclaimer: In some cases, factual information provided is based on preliminary findings of ongoing investigations. Additional information may develop as the department's investigation progresses and/or related court or grand jury proceedings are concluded.

Death in Custody

Death in Custody incidents typically occur after the restraint of a particular subject. The term "in custody," refers to a subject whom officers have either decided that there was probable cause to arrest or that restraint was necessary for the safety of the subject or other persons present. In death in custody situations, subjects may be located anywhere, (e.g., at the scene of an incident, at a hospital, at a police station, or in a court house awaiting arraignment), and death may occur due to intervening circumstances or actors beyond police control. Such intervening circumstances include: medical crises like heart attacks and strokes; suicides; drug-related deaths from drugs taken or ingested prior to custody; and injuries inflicted before custody during accidents, or assaults by people other than involved parties. In 2018, there were 11 death in custody incidents.

Incident 1: Medical/Police Force Used – MTN Precinct (Male/Hispanic/37) (01/01/2018)

Officers responded to a 911 call for a violent, emotionally disturbed person (EDP) spitting and biting people inside a night club. Night club employees were escorting the intoxicated male subject out of the club as responding officers arrived on scene. Security staff and responding officers had to wrestle the actively resisting subject into handcuffs. Officers escorted the subject and emergency medical services (EMS) personnel to the hospital, and the subject subsequently went into cardiac arrest. He was pronounced deceased at the hospital. According to his death certificate, the cause of death was acute intoxication of drugs that included: ketamine, gamma-hydroxybutyric acid (GHB), methamphetamine, and amphetamine.

Incident 2: Medical/Police Force Used – 50 Precinct (Male/Black/48) (01/28/2018)

Officers responded to a 911 call of an EDP, where the caller stated that his son was having a "mental episode" and had locked himself in a bedroom. Responding officers arrived on the scene and, although rear-handcuffed, the subject continued to kick and spit at first responders. The subject became unresponsive and was removed to the hospital by EMS. The subject was pronounced deceased at the hospital by emergency room staff. A quantity of narcotics and a firearm were recovered from the subject's apartment. The subject's cause of death, as indicated

on the certificate of death, was the sudden death of an intoxicated individual (alcohol, phencyclidine [PCP], heroin, fentanyl, and cocaine) during a physical struggle.

Incident 3: Medical/No Police Force Used – 48 Precinct (Male/Hispanic/31) (03/08/2018)

On January 9, 2018, the subject was arrested for a gunpoint robbery. The subject complained of stomach pain while awaiting arraignment, and he was transported to the hospital for medical attention. Due to complications, the subject was placed in a medically induced coma and, on March 7, 2018, was transferred to a hospice. On March 8, 2018, the subject was pronounced deceased by hospice staff. The subject's death certificate indicated that the immediate cause of death was complications due to chronic alcoholism.

Incident 4: Medical/No Police Force Used – 46 Precinct (Male/Black/30) (03/31/2018)

Officers responded to a 911 call of an assault in progress. Upon arrival at the location, the officers encountered the victim who informed them that the subject assaulted him. The male subject was arrested by responding officers, but subsequently became unresponsive. The subject was treated and transported to the hospital by EMS where he was pronounced deceased by hospital staff. According to his death certificate, the subject's cause of death were complications from acute PCP intoxication, physical altercation, and dehydration.

Incident 5: Medical/No Police Force Used – 102 Precinct (Male/Black/35) (4/17/2018)

On April 16, 2018, the subject, while admitted to the psychiatric department of a hospital, allegedly assaulted another patient. Officers placed the subject under arrest, and he remained at the hospital to continue his evaluation. On April 17, 2018, the subject was found unresponsive by the officer assigned to guard him. The subject underwent cardiac arrest, could not be resuscitated, and was pronounced deceased by hospital staff. The subject's death certificate indicated that his cause of death was a pulmonary embolism.

Incident 6: Medical/Police Force Used – 25 Precinct (Male/Hispanic/41) (5/27/2018)

Officers responded to a 911 call of a violent EDP. When officers arrived on the scene, the subject was being subdued by two males. The subject was compliant and was rear-cuffed without issue. However, as soon as the subject had to be escorted down the stairs to exit the building, he became combative causing him and officers to fall down the stairs. The subject became unresponsive and was removed to the hospital by EMS, where he was pronounced deceased by hospital staff. The subject's death certificate indicated that his cause of death was acute cocaine intoxication.

Incident 7: Medical/No Police Force Used – 104 Precinct (Male/Black/44) (7/13/2018)

Officers responded to a 911 call of a possible burglary in progress. Responding officers were met by the caller who informed them that the male subject had entered their backyard and had climbed over their fence into an adjoining backyard. The officers were able to place the subject under arrest without incident. After arriving at the precinct for processing, the subject lost consciousness. The subject was transported by EMS to the hospital, where he was subsequently pronounced deceased. The subject's death certificate indicated that his cause of death was acute n-ethylpentylone intoxication. The toxicology report indicated the presence of cocaine and n-ethylpentylone in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 8: Medical/No Police Force Used – 20 Precinct (Male/Black/54) (8/5/2018)

According to witnesses and 911 callers, the male subject trespassed into the walk-in refrigerator of a restaurant. The subject assaulted a restaurant employee before other employees were able to physically restrain him. Responding officers arrived on scene and discovered the subject being held down by several restaurant employees. The subject was unresponsive and was treated and transported to the hospital by EMS. He was pronounced deceased at the hospital by hospital staff. The subject's death certificate indicated that his immediate cause of death was sudden death while in an agitated state. The toxicology report indicated the presence of doxepin in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 9: Medical/No Police Force Used – 75 Precinct (Male/Black/47) (8/26/2018)

Officers responded to a 911 call of an EDP walking in traffic dressed only in his underwear. Responding officers found the male subject lying in the roadway. As the subject was attempting to roll himself into oncoming traffic, officers handcuffed him and removed him from the road to await EMS. The subject subsequently became unresponsive, was treated and transported to the hospital by EMS, and pronounced deceased by emergency room staff. According to the subject's death certificate, his cause of death was acute cocaine intoxication. A toxicology screening detected alcohol and cocaine in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 10: Medical/No Police Force Used – 67 Precinct (Male/Hispanic/23) (10/3/2018)

On September 17, 2018, officers initiated a traffic stop on the subject after observing him disobey a steady red traffic light while operating a motorcycle. The subject fled on his motorcycle and collided with an occupied vehicle a short distance away. He was arrested and transported from the scene to the hospital. The subject's condition deteriorated, going into cardiac arrest, and was pronounced deceased on October 3, 2018. The subject's death certificate indicated that his immediate cause of death was from complications due to blunt force trauma to the head as a

result of a motor vehicle collision. No toxicology testing was performed by the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner.

Incident 11: Medical/No Police Force Used – 63 Precinct (Male/Black/24) (10/23/2018)

Officers responded to a 911 call for a violent EDP. Upon arriving at the location, the officers were met by the subject's relatives who informed them that the subject was recently released from a psychiatric hospital and was acting erratically. Responding officers handcuffed the subject due to safety concerns. After several minutes, the subject calmed down and was taken onto an ambulance. The subject became unresponsive and was transported to the hospital, where he was pronounced deceased by emergency room staff. The subject's death certificate indicated that his cause of death was cardiac arrhythmia, and the toxicology report indicated that he had marijuana in his system at the time of death.

Death Preceding Custody

Death Preceding Custody incidents typically occur immediately before the intended restraint of a particular subject, after officers have either decided that there was probable cause to arrest or that restraint was necessary for the safety of the subject or other persons present, but had not, in fact, established control of the person. Nine cases investigated by FID in 2018 are categorized as deaths preceding custody. In six cases, the subjects were fleeing the police when the deaths occurred.

Incident 1: Suicide/No Police Force Used – 68 Precinct (Female/White/67) (5/28/2018)

Officers responded to a 911 call of a suicidal EDP. Responding officers were met by the female subject who stated that she did not want to speak with them. As the officers engaged in conversation with the subject, she advanced towards the officers and brandished a knife in her right hand. The officers directed her to drop the knife as they backed away from her. The subject proceeded to turn and go up a staircase. The officers, believing the threat was contained, requested Emergency Services Unit (ESU) personnel to respond. While awaiting ESU, the subject went up to the roof and jumped to her death. The subject was pronounced deceased on scene by EMS. Two suicide notes were recovered from the subject's apartment. The subject's death certificate indicated that her immediate cause of death was blunt impact injuries to her head, torso, and extremities consistent with a fall from an elevated height.

Incident 2: Suicide/No Police Force Used – 81 Precinct (Male/Black/75) (6/27/2018)

Officers responded to a 911 call of a suicidal EDP. Upon arrival at the location, they observed the male subject in bed holding a revolver to the right side of his head. Responding officers requested assistance from additional patrol units while being assisted by ESU officers. The subject spoke

with an ESU officer for approximately 20 minutes before he fired a shot into his right temple. The subject was rushed to the hospital by EMS, where he was pronounced deceased by hospital staff. Two firearms were recovered from the subject's apartment.

Incident 3: Fleeing Subject/No Police Force Used – 52 Precinct (Male/Black/28) (7/1/2018)

Officers were pursuing the male subject who matched the description of an armed suspect that had just robbed a grocery store. The officers were in close pursuit of the subject up the stairs of an elevated subway station, but temporarily lost sight of him when he ran up another set of stairs onto the platform. A subway conductor informed the officers that the subject had jumped in between two subway cars right before they arrived onto the platform. The subject was found on the tracks and was pronounced deceased on scene by EMS. The subject's death certificate indicated that the subject's immediate cause of death was electrocution, and toxicology screening indicated that the subject had alcohol and marijuana in his system at the time of death. A firearm was recovered on the subway tracks.

Incident 4: Fleeing Subject/No Police Force Used – 78 Precinct (Male/Black/25) (8/18/2018)

Officers were pursuing the male subject into a subway station, after being informed by witnesses that he had, allegedly, just tried to rob one victim and forcibly touched another. The subject jumped the turnstile, ran down the stairs towards the platform, jumped onto the track bed, and ran into the tunnel. The subject lost his footing, fell onto the tracks, and became unresponsive. EMS pronounced the subject deceased on scene. The subject's death certificate indicated that his cause of death was electrocution, and toxicology screening indicated that he had marijuana in his system at the time of his death.

Incident 5: Fleeing Subject/No Police Force Used – 78 Precinct (Male/Black/17) (10/4/2018)

Officers stopped three individuals, for violating NYC Transit Rules of Conduct, on a subway platform. The male subject, one of the individuals stopped, refused to identify himself, fled, and ran into the tunnel. The subject was eventually discovered to have been struck by a train, and was pronounced deceased on scene by EMS. The subject's cause of death, as indicated on his death certificate, were multiple blunt force injuries due to being struck by a train. Toxicology screening indicated the presence of marijuana in the subject's system at his time of death.

Incident 6: Suicide/No Police Force Used – 106 Precinct (Male/Asian/25) (10/26/2018)

Officers observed the male subject sitting in his vehicle, which was parked in front of the 106 Precinct stationhouse. As officers were engaging with the subject, he shot himself in the head. A day earlier, the subject had allegedly menaced the mother of his children, and her current boyfriend, with a firearm. The subject was removed to the hospital and was pronounced

deceased. A firearm was recovered from the subject's vehicle. The toxicology report indicated that the subject had cocaine and marijuana in his system at the time of his death.

Incident 7: Fleeing Subject/No Police Force Used – 108 Precinct (Male/Hispanic/22) (11/10/2018)

Officers initiated a traffic stop on the male subject who was operating a motorcycle. The subject fled and collided with an occupied vehicle a short distance away. The subject, along with his passenger, were both unresponsive and transported to the hospital. Both the subject and the passenger were pronounced deceased by hospital staff. The subject had a suspended driver's license and did not have a motorcycle endorsement. The subject's death certificate indicated that his immediate cause of death was blunt force injuries to the head and torso, as a result of a motor vehicle collision. The toxicology report indicated the presence of marijuana in the subject's system at the time of his death.

Incident 8: Fleeing Subject/No Police Force Used – 73 Precinct (Male/Black/28) (11/11/2018)

Officers responded to a call of an unconscious male when they found the male subject lying face down on the ground, in an alleyway, beneath an apartment building's rear fire escape. Further investigation revealed that the subject, who had an open warrant, was one of two suspects that had fled from a traffic stop the day before. Officers had pursued the suspects into the apartment building that the subject was found behind, but had lost sight of them before terminating the pursuit. The subject's death certificate listed his cause of death as multiple blunt trauma consistent with falling from a height. The toxicology report indicated the presence of marijuana in the subject's system at the time of his death.

Incident 9: Fleeing Subject/No Police Force Used – 26 Precinct (Male/Black/30) (12/23/2018)

Officers observed the subject avoid paying the fare to enter the subway system, and initiated a stop. The subject fled from the officers and ran into the tunnel. The subject was struck by a train, and pronounced deceased on scene by EMS. The subject's death certificate listed his cause of death as multiple blunt force injuries from being struck by a train. The toxicology report indicated the presence of fentanyl, morphine, and codeine in the subject's system at the time of his death.

Appendix D: Firearm Discharge Incidents by Precinct/Location

Precinct/Location	Adversarial Conflict	Animal Attack	Unauthorized	Unintentional	Total
025 PRECINCT	0	0	0	1	1
028 PRECINCT	1	0	0	0	1
030 PRECINCT	1	0	0	0	1
040 PRECINCT	1	0	0	0	1
041 PRECINCT	0	1	0	1	2
042 PRECINCT	0	0	0	1	1
044 PRECINCT	0	0	0	1	1
047 PRECINCT	1	0	1	1	3
048 PRECINCT	1	0	0	0	1
052 PRECINCT	1	0	0	0	1
060 PRECINCT	0	0	0	1	1
066 PRECINCT	1	0	0	0	1
067 PRECINCT	1	0	0	0	1
069 PRECINCT	1	1	0	0	2
071 PRECINCT	1	0	0	0	1
075 PRECINCT	1	0	0	0	1
079 PRECINCT	1	0	0	0	1
083 PRECINCT	0	0	1	0	1
084 PRECINCT	0	1	0	0	1
090 PRECINCT	0	0	1	1	2
101 PRECINCT	1	0	0	0	1
104 PRECINCT	1	0	0	0	1
105 PRECINCT	0	1	0	0	1
106 PRECINCT	1	0	0	0	1
113 PRECINCT	0	0	0	1	1
120 PRECINCT	2	0	0	0	2
121 PRECINCT	0	0	1	0	1
Orange County	0	0	1	0	1
Pennsylvania	0	0	1	0	1
TOTAL	17	4	6	8	35

Appendix E: Historical Data on Police Firearm Discharges

Total Rounds Discharged, 1971 - 2018




Figure 54

UMOS Shot and Killed by Subjects, 1971 - 2018




Figure 55

UMOS Shot and Injured by Subjects, 1971 - 2018




Figure 56

Subjects Shot and Killed by UMOS, 1971 - 2018




Figure 57

Subjects Shot and Injured by UMOS, 1971 - 2018




Figure 58

Appendix F: 2018 Uses of Force Incidents by Members' Command

Precinct/Command	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
001 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
001 PRECINCT	9	2	0	1	1	50	63
005 PRECINCT	6	0	0	2	0	26	34
006 PRECINCT	13	0	0	0	0	53	66
007 PRECINCT	7	0	0	1	0	37	45
007 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
009 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
009 PRECINCT	6	0	0	4	1	46	57
009 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
010 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
010 PRECINCT	11	0	0	1	0	38	50
013 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
013 PRECINCT	8	0	0	1	0	46	55
013 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
014 PCT-MIDTOWN SO. PCT	11	0	0	2	0	50	63
017 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
017 PRECINCT	2	0	0	0	0	17	19
018 PCT-MIDTOWN NO. PCT	11	0	0	6	0	60	77
019 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
019 PRECINCT	6	0	0	0	0	37	43
020 PRECINCT	4	0	0	0	0	26	30

Precinct/Command	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
020 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
023 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
023 PRECINCT	14	2	0	0	0	72	88
024 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
024 PRECINCT	5	0	1	1	0	50	57
024 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
025 PRECINCT	12	0	1	2	0	109	124
025 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
026 PRECINCT	6	0	0	1	0	22	29
026 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
028 PRECINCT	15	2	0	0	0	62	79
030 PRECINCT	14	0	0	2	0	55	71
032 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
032 PRECINCT	19	1	0	1	0	67	88
032 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
033 PRECINCT	6	0	0	1	0	45	52
034 PRECINCT	23	0	0	7	0	75	105
034 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
040 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
040 PRECINCT	22	2	0	2	0	114	140
040 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
041 PRECINCT	4	0	0	1	0	52	57

Precinct/Command	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
041 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	6	6
042 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
042 PRECINCT	7	2	0	3	0	124	136
042 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	8	8
043 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
043 PRECINCT	15	0	0	3	0	50	68
043 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
044 PRECINCT	59	1	0	5	0	170	235
044 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
045 PRECINCT	13	0	0	0	0	48	61
045 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	9	9
046 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
046 PRECINCT	16	0	0	4	0	192	212
047 PRECINCT	19	2	0	0	0	106	127
047 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	11	11
048 PRECINCT	29	1	0	1	0	117	148
048 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
049 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
049 PRECINCT	22	1	0	1	0	77	101
049 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
050 PRECINCT	10	1	0	0	0	18	29
050 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	1	0	0	2	3

Precinct/Command	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
052 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
052 PRECINCT	22	1	1	5	0	152	181
052 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
060 PRECINCT	6	0	0	2	0	79	87
061 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
061 PRECINCT	11	0	0	2	0	30	43
061 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
062 PRECINCT	4	1	0	1	0	37	43
063 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
063 PRECINCT	11	1	0	1	0	62	75
066 PRECINCT	2	0	0	1	0	11	14
066 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
067 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
067 PRECINCT	24	1	0	4	1	81	111
067 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
068 PRECINCT	5	0	0	2	0	42	49
069 PRECINCT	2	2	1	1	0	46	52
069 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
070 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
070 PRECINCT	12	1	0	3	0	109	125
070 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
071 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	1	1

Precinct/Command	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
071 PRECINCT	12	0	0	4	0	111	127
071 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
072 PRECINCT	5	1	0	0	0	82	88
073 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
073 PRECINCT	17	1	0	3	0	91	112
073 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
075 PRECINCT	23	1	0	8	1	195	228
075 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
076 PRECINCT	3	1	0	0	0	34	38
077 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	1	0	2	3
077 PRECINCT	18	1	0	1	0	103	123
077 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	1	0	0	2	3
078 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
078 PRECINCT	3	3	0	1	0	38	45
079 PRECINCT	7	4	0	2	0	71	84
079 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
081 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
081 PRECINCT	13	1	0	0	0	60	74
081 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
083 PRECINCT	8	0	0	0	0	67	75
083 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
084 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	1	1

Precinct/Command	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
084 PRECINCT	4	1	0	2	0	31	38
084 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
088 PRECINCT	12	1	0	5	0	48	66
090 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
090 PRECINCT	8	0	0	1	0	66	75
094 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
094 PRECINCT	7	2	0	0	0	31	40
100 PRECINCT	6	1	0	1	0	26	34
100 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
101 PRECINCT	15	0	0	2	0	67	84
101 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
101ST DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
102 PRECINCT	2	0	0	2	0	58	62
102 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
102ND DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
103 PRECINCT	11	0	0	2	0	79	92
103 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
103RD DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
104 PRECINCT	3	0	0	2	0	22	27
105 PRECINCT	12	0	0	0	0	72	84
105 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
105TH DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	3	3

Precinct/Command	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
106 PRECINCT	14	1	0	4	0	33	52
106 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
106TH DET SQUAD	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
107 PRECINCT	5	0	0	0	0	26	31
107 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
107TH DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
108 PRECINCT	6	1	1	0	0	19	27
109 PRECINCT	4	0	0	0	0	49	53
109TH DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
110 PRECINCT	7	0	1	0	0	59	67
110TH DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
111 PRECINCT	1	0	0	1	0	14	16
111TH DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
112 PRECINCT	6	0	0	1	0	10	17
112 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
113 PRECINCT	26	1	0	3	0	106	136
113 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	1	0	0	0	0	4	5
113TH DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
114 PRECINCT	4	1	0	2	0	45	52
115 PRECINCT	10	1	1	0	0	44	56
115TH DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
120 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	1	1

Precinct/Command	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
120 PRECINCT	8	1	0	3	0	120	132
120 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
121 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
121 PRECINCT	11	0	0	1	0	51	63
121 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
122 PRECINCT	11	1	0	3	0	25	40
122 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
123 PRECINCT	5	0	0	0	0	13	18
123 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
AUTO CRIME	0	1	0	0	0	6	7
BKLYN ROBBERY SQ	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
BKLYN SPECIAL VICTIMS SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
BRONX COURT SECT	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
BRONX ROBBERY SQUAD	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
BROOKLYN COURT SECTION	0	0	1	0	0	9	10
CANINE TEAM	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
CENTRAL INVESTIGATIONS DIV	0	0	0	0	1	2	3
CENTRAL PARK PRECINCT	1	0	0	0	0	6	7
CHARACTER ASSESSMENT SECTION	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
CIVILIAN TRAINING UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE INVEST SEC	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
CRITICAL RESPONSE COMMAND	1	0	0	1	0	6	8

Precinct/Command	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
DA SQUAD BROOKLYN	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
DEP COMM OF PUBLIC INFO	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
DET BORO BRONX OPER	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
DET BORO MAN NO HOMICIDE SQ	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
DISORDER CONTROL UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
DRUG ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
EMER SERV SQ 01	1	0	0	0	1	2	4
EMER SERV SQ 02	2	0	0	0	2	2	6
EMER SERV SQ 03	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
EMER SERV SQ 04	0	0	0	0	7	0	7
EMER SERV SQ 05	0	0	0	0	1	2	3
EMER SERV SQ 06	1	0	0	0	1	0	2
EMER SERV SQ 07	0	0	0	0	7	3	10
EMER SERV SQ 08	4	0	0	0	4	4	12
EMER SERV SQ 09	1	0	0	0	0	4	5
EMER SERV SQ 10	2	0	0	0	1	1	4
EMER SERV UNIT	1	0	0	0	2	4	7
FINANCIAL CRIMES TASK FORCE	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
FIREARMS SUPPRESSION SECTION	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
GANG SQUAD BRONX	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
GANG SQUAD BROOKLYN NORTH	1	0	0	0	0	7	8
GANG SQUAD BROOKLYN SOUTH	0	0	0	1	0	2	3

Precinct/Command	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
GANG SQUAD MANHATTAN NORTH	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
GANG SQUAD MANHATTAN SOUTH	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
GANG SQUAD QUEENS NORTH	0	1	0	0	0	6	7
GANG SQUAD QUEENS SOUTH	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
GANG SQUAD STATEN ISLAND	0	0	0	0	0	6	6
GRAND LARCENY DIVISION	0	0	0	0	0	6	6
GUN VIOL SUPP DIV Z1 (BK,Q,SI)	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
HB BRONX/QUEENS RESPONSE TEAM	1	0	0	0	0	7	8
HB BROOKLYN RESPONSE TEAM	0	0	0	1	0	11	12
HB MANHATTAN RESPONSE TEAM	0	0	0	1	0	3	4
HEADQUARTERS SECURITY	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
HIGHWAY UNIT NO 1	0	1	0	0	0	2	3
HIGHWAY UNIT NO 2	1	1	0	0	0	4	6
HIGHWAY UNIT NO 3	1	0	0	0	0	5	6
HIGHWAY UNIT NO.5	1	0	0	0	0	1	2
HOUSING PSA 1	13	0	0	1	0	75	89
HOUSING PSA 2	12	1	0	1	0	57	71
HOUSING PSA 3	2	0	0	0	0	45	47
HOUSING PSA 4	14	0	0	3	0	33	50
HOUSING PSA 5	10	2	0	1	0	35	48
HOUSING PSA 6	4	2	0	0	0	21	27
HOUSING PSA 7	12	3	0	3	0	40	58

Precinct/Command	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
HOUSING PSA 8	4	0	0	1	0	63	68
HOUSING PSA 9	6	0	0	1	0	31	38
INTEL-CRIMINAL INTEL SECTION	1	0	0	0	0	3	4
INTERNAL AFFAIRS BUREAU	0	0	0	1	0	2	3
JOINT TERRORIST TASK FORCE	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
LEGAL BUREAU	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
MAJOR CASE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
MAN COURT SECTION	1	0	0	0	0	9	10
MAN SPECIAL VICTIMS SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
MAN/BX SS ZONE	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
MTN DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
MTN SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
MTS DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
NARC BORO BRONX	1	0	0	0	0	55	56
NARC BORO BROOKLYN NORTH	0	0	0	0	0	36	36
NARC BORO BROOKLYN SOUTH	2	0	0	0	0	26	28
NARC BORO MANHATTAN NORTH	0	0	0	1	0	24	25
NARC BORO MANHATTAN SOUTH	0	0	0	1	0	35	36
NARC BORO QUEENS NORTH	1	0	0	0	0	19	20
NARC BORO QUEENS SOUTH	0	0	0	1	0	19	20
NARC BORO STATEN ISLAND	0	0	0	0	0	12	12
OTHER	2	0	0	2	1	36	41

Precinct/Command	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
PATROL BORO BKLYN NORTH	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
PATROL BORO BRONX	0	0	0	0	0	13	13
PATROL BORO MAN NORTH	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
PATROL BORO MAN SOUTH	1	0	0	2	0	14	17
PATROL BORO QUEENS NORTH	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
PATROL BORO STATEN ISLAND	1	0	0	1	0	4	6
PBBN SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	1	0	10	11
PBBN SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
PBBS SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
PBBS SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	0	0	0	0	7	7
PBBX SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	27	27
PBBX SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
PBMN SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	7	7
PBMN SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
PBMS SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	9	9
PBMS SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
PBQN SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	1	0	0	0	6	7
PBQS SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
PBQS SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
PBSI SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	6	6
POLICE COMM OFFICE	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
PROPERTY CLERK DIV	0	0	0	0	0	1	1

Precinct/Command	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
PSB RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SECT.	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
QNS COURT SECTION	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
QNS/BKLYN/SI SS ZONE	0	1	0	0	0	4	5
RECRUIT TRAINING SECTION	1	0	0	0	0	4	5
SCHOOL SAFETY DIVISION	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIV	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
SPECIAL VICTIMS DIV ZONE 2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
SPECIAL VICTIMS DIVISION	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
STAFFING ADMINISTRATION SEC	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
STATEN ISLAND COURT SECTION	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
STRATEGIC RESP GRP 1 MANHATTAN	0	1	0	0	0	11	12
STRATEGIC RESP GRP 2 BRONX	1	0	0	3	0	15	19
STRATEGIC RESP GRP 3 BROOKLYN	1	0	0	0	0	20	21
STRATEGIC RESP GRP 4 QUEENS	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
STRATEGIC RESP GRP 5 SI	0	0	0	0	0	6	6
STRATEGIC RESPONSE GROUP	0	0	0	0	0	11	11
STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY DIVISION	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
STRIKE FORCE	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TAXI UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
TB ANTI TERRORISM UNIT	0	2	0	5	0	32	39
TB CITYWIDE VANDALS TASK FORCE	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
TB SPECIAL OPERATIONS DISTRICT	0	0	0	0	0	12	12

Precinct/Command	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
TRANSIT BORO BKLN TASK FORCE	0	1	0	2	0	10	13
TRANSIT BORO BX/QNS TASK FORCE	0	1	0	1	0	4	6
TRANSIT BORO MANH TASK FORCE	0	1	0	0	0	19	20
TRANSIT BUREAU	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TRANSIT BUREAU CANINE UNIT	0	0	1	0	0	1	2
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 1	2	1	0	9	0	38	50
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 11	5	0	0	4	0	27	36
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 12	4	1	0	4	0	47	56
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 2	2	0	0	3	0	41	46
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 20	2	0	0	0	0	14	16
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 23	1	0	0	3	0	14	18
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 3	6	0	0	3	0	32	41
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 30	3	0	0	1	0	34	38
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 32	8	1	0	2	0	36	47
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 33	4	1	0	4	0	31	40
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 34	1	0	0	1	0	11	13
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 4	4	2	0	4	0	42	52
TRB BRONX TRAFFIC ENF UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TRB BROOKLYN TRAFFIC ENF UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
TRB CITYWIDE TRAFFIC T/F	2	0	0	2	0	10	14
TRB HIGHWAY DISTRICT	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
TRB MANHATTAN SUMMONS ENF SEC	0	0	0	0	0	1	1

Precinct/Command	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
TRB QUEENS TRAFFIC ENF UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TRB SOUTH INTERSECTION CONTROL	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TRB TRAFF SPECIAL OPS SECTION	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
UNIFORMED PROMOTIONS TRN UNIT	1	0	0	0	0	1	2
VED MAJOR CASE SECTION	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
VICE ENFORCEMENT DIV ZONE 1	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
VICE ENFORCEMENT DIV ZONE 2	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
WARRANT SECTION	13	0	0	2	0	54	69
WORLD TRADE CENTER COMMAND	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
TOTAL	998	76	12	211	34	6513	7844

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NYPD

New York City Police Department