



USE OF FORCE REPORT 2019



NYPD

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USE OF FORCE REPORT

2019

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Data and information contained in this report are subject to change based on complaint and investigative updates.

POLICE COMMISSIONER'S MESSAGE



Police Commissioner's Message

This is the New York City Police Department's fourth-annual Use of Force Report. Since its inception in 2016, this report has provided a full accounting of all uses of force as defined by policy, including firearms discharges; conducted electrical weapon (CEW) discharges; and general uses of force in which police subdue subjects, use impact weapons, use oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray, or employ foot or hand strikes. This report also catalogues incidents of force used against police officers, and further emphasizes the NYPD's commitment to transparency and accountability.

While the NYPD has tracked police firearms discharges since 1971, and general uses of force in arrest situations since 1983, it was in 2007 that the police department began publishing its Annual Firearms Discharge Report – the precursor to the report presented here. In 2016, the Annual Firearms Discharge Report was replaced with the Use of Force Report, now our most comprehensive publication on the NYPD's use of force.

In 2016, coinciding with the introduction of the Use of Force Report, the NYPD instituted a new policy to document force used by, and against, police officers. The policy established three levels of force – up to, and including, deadly physical force – and defined the type of reporting or investigation that must take place after uses of force at each level. The change in policy also ensured that individual police department members – and the NYPD as a whole – take responsibility for and justify the actions taken in every incident. Further modifications to the NYPD's use of force policy occurred in October 2019, with the creation of an additional level (Level 4) of reportable force. For data consistency, however, all information collected in 2019 will be presented in this report under the previous structure consisting of three levels of force.


During the last 48 years, extraordinary progress has been made in reducing the number of firearms discharges by members of the NYPD. With a continued commitment to evaluating and learning from both our performance and our resources, then effectively applying those lessons into practice, 2019 saw the second-fewest firearms discharges by members of this police department ever recorded. The effects of our well-defined firearms policies, recurring training, tactical preparedness and proficiency, thorough oversight, and accountability are profound: a 93.5 percent decrease in firearms discharges since tracking began in 1971. While the use of force – including the use of deadly physical force – is sometimes necessary, it is clear that members of the NYPD rarely use force – and exercise substantial restraint if, and when, they do.

Fighting crime and keeping all New Yorkers safe is the dedicated mission of the men and women of the NYPD. As precision-policing methods focus on the drivers of violence, our Neighborhood Policing philosophy continues to transform the way we build trust and strengthen relationships with the people we serve in every community – localizing both police service and crime-fighting. Continuous in-service training that focuses on enforcement encounters teaches our members invaluable de-escalation techniques and other alternatives to force. And our detailed use-of-force policy holds us strictly accountable. As we make our way forward, the NYPD will continue to evolve and build upon this foundation to ensure that policing in New York City remains equitable and just, while never sacrificing transparency and public safety.



Dermot Shea

Police Commissioner



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



Executive Summary

The New York City Police Department's annual Use of Force Report reflects the department's commitment to furthering the goal of transparency, accountability, and progress. In 2019, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) recorded the second lowest number of police firearms discharges since discharge recordkeeping began in 1971. Although 2019 saw an increase in both calls for service and weapons calls, the downward trend in the use of less-lethal force continued for the year. While the department did experience an increase in the use of less-lethal conducted electric weapons (CEWs) and a slight increase of impact weapon use, the NYPD recorded a decrease in force incidents involving oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray, mesh restraining blankets, and canine bite categories. This report contains a detailed accounting of the use of force by members of the service, from the lowest level of force, including grappling, hand strikes, and foot strikes, up to and including the intentional discharge of a firearm in adversarial conflicts.

The NYPD has long been a leader in reporting and investigating deadly force and firearms discharges. The department accounts for every shot fired by its members, whether intentionally or unintentionally, except for discharges during firearms training. Beginning in 2007, the NYPD issued an annual report that fully catalogued all shooting incidents, including the number of subjects killed and wounded, the number of innocent bystanders killed and wounded, animal shootings, accidental discharges, unauthorized uses of department firearms, and police suicides with firearms. The collected firearms discharge data is continually analyzed and assessed to evaluate and improve NYPD policies and practices.

In 2016, the department replaced the Annual Firearms Discharge Report with a Use of Force Report, in conjunction with an overhaul of the NYPD's force policies and incident reporting structure. This reporting structure now encompasses all data captured by the firearms discharge reports and also contains an accounting of all other reportable uses of force by members of the service for an entire year, allowing for a deeper analysis of use of force in the NYPD. Tracking how, when, where, and why NYPD personnel use force helps inform the department and the public, and is an invaluable tool for working towards the NYPD's goals of minimizing force incidents and injuries while maximizing transparency in those situations where force is unavoidable.

All of the department's use of force policies and procedures are found in the Department Manual which is publicly available on-line at the NYPD web page, www.nyc.gov/nypd. In October 2019, the Department modified its use of force categories to include a new force level, Level 4, to clarify the investigative lead in all instances of firearm discharges by members of service. Prior to this modification, the types of force members of the NYPD employed were separated into three categories:

- Level 1 consisting of hand strikes, foot strikes, forcible takedowns, discharging oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray, discharging conducted electrical weapons (CEWs) in “cartridge mode,” and using mesh restraining blankets to secure subjects.
- Level 2 consisting of the intentional striking of a person with any object (including a baton, other equipment, etc.), police canine bites, or using CEWs in “drive stun” mode.
- Level 3 consisting of the use of physical force that is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury (e.g., discharging a firearm).

As of October 8, 2019, however, the department modified the use of force policy with the creation of an additional level, Level 4, comprising any discharge of a firearm by a member of service or from a firearm belonging to a member of service. Any death or serious injury with a likelihood of death to a subject or bystander will, under the new policy, similarly result in a Level 4 classification. The creation of Level 4 also altered the previous definition of Level 3 by removing firearms discharges from its classification.

Figure 1

| Use of Force Policy Modifications | | |
|---|----------------|--|
| Pre-October 8, 2019 | | As of October 8, 2019 |
| The use of physical force that is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury, including a firearm discharge. The type of injury is death; Serious Physical Injury; Alleged/Suspected Excessive Force (resulting in Serious Physical Injury); Attempted Suicide (Serious Physical injury) | Level 3 | The use of physical force that is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury, except for firearm discharges. The type of injury is Serious Physical Injury; Alleged/Suspected Excessive Force (resulting in Serious Physical Injury); Attempted Suicide (Serious Physical injury) |
| Not Applicable. | Level 4 | All police firearm discharges or the injury type is death or a serious injury and likely to die. |

These policy and data collection modifications will alter the way the Department makes comparisons of certain historical force data. Thus, in order to organize the data presented in this report coherently, all data collected for 2019 is presented under the three levels of force that were previously in place. See Appendix G (page 89) for 2019 Level 4 data.

Thorough oversight and investigation are built into the NYPD force policy. All levels of force must be reported on Threat, Resistance or Injury (TRI) Reports. All Level 1 force incidents are investigated by the member’s immediate supervisor. Level 2 incidents are investigated by department executives in the rank of captain or above. The NYPD Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) investigates Level 3 incidents where physical force capable of causing death or serious physical injury was used, but the subject’s injuries are not life-threatening. The NYPD Force Investigation

Division (FID) investigates all cases that involve police firearms discharges, and cases in which a subject dies or is seriously injured and likely to die. Prior to the October 2019 policy modifications, these cases fell within the Level 3 classification. Since October 8, 2019, any incident of this nature would classify as a Level 4 use of force. A use of force incident may, and often is, a complicated event involving multiple members of the service and subjects. The highest level of force used by a member of the service or the most severe injury sustained by a subject determines the level classification of the incident as a whole and, as a result, the appropriate reporting and investigative requirements.

While this report is solely based on the calendar year 2019, it is worth noting that, in 2020, the NYPD continues to make further modifications to policy and the TRI Report, as the department complies with evolving policies at both the city and state level, and to standardize the submission of use of force data to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In keeping with the department's commitment to increase transparency and build trust with the communities it serves, the NYPD continues to improve its force policies and reporting practices.

Firearms Discharges

The data from 2019 continues to show a consistent decrease in firearms discharges dating back to when the department's official recording began. In 1971, there were: 810 firearms discharge incidents, 221 subjects shot and injured, 93 subjects shot and killed, and 2,113 total rounds fired. For 2019, the NYPD recorded the second lowest number ever of firearms discharge incidents at 52.

The 52 firearms discharge incidents in 2019 is a 48.5% increase compared to the 35 firearms discharge incidents recorded in 2018, which stands as the lowest number ever recorded. Approximately half of the 2019 discharges (25) were intentional discharges by members of the service in the course of adversarial conflicts with criminal subjects. Twenty-four subjects were struck by police gunfire in 2019; 11 sustained fatal injuries and 13 sustained non-fatal injuries. Five subjects fired shots at members of the service. Two members of the service were shot and killed by gunfire in adversarial conflict-intentional discharge incidents in 2019, both by friendly fire. Four members were shot and injured by subjects in adversarial conflict-intentional discharge incidents in 2019.

Six intentional firearms discharge incidents in 2019 were animal attacks, up from four in 2018. There were eight unintentional discharges in 2019, the same as in 2018. There were 13 unauthorized uses of NYPD firearms in 2019, of which nine were member suicides.

Conducted Electrical Weapons (CEWs)

There were 1,271 CEW discharge incidents in 2019, an increase from the 998 incidents in 2018. This increase in discharges corresponds to the expanded distribution of CEWs among members

of the service on patrol, which increased 123.7% from the previous year. Of the 1,271 CEW discharge incidents, 808 were intentional discharges, 621 occurred in arrest situations, 380 when members were seeking to control an emotionally disturbed person, and seven in animal attacks. There were no fatalities connected with the use of CEWs. The remaining discharges, the vast number of which were unintentional discharges that occurred during mandatory equipment tests, and the rest occurred in such situations as violent prisoners, car stops, and suspicious person stops.

The CEWs were deemed effective in 759, or 93.9%, of the 808 intentional CEW discharge incidents. The ineffective discharges were attributed to various causes including probes failing to make contact with the subject, probes falling out after making contact, probes removed by the subject, or probe wires breaking.

Observations in NYPD Uses of Force

There were 8,595 total reportable police force incidents in 2019 –94.4% were classified as Level 1, 3.9% as Level 2, and 1.7 % as Level 3. Of the 8,595 reportable force incidents, 7,006 incidents–81.5% of the total reportable incidents–involved the minimal amount of reportable force: hand strikes, foot strikes, and forcible takedowns of subjects. Uses of force also included 163 discharges of OC spray, 82 uses of impact weapons, 15 uses of mesh restraining blankets to control subjects, and six canine bites.

In 2019, members of the NYPD used force in approximately 1% of all encounters with emotionally disturbed persons–1,821 uses of force reported among the 171,490 radio runs concerning emotionally disturbed persons. Arrest situations were the most commonly recorded type of encounter in which members used force; however, arrests where force was used represent only 2.4% of the total amount of arrests made by members of the NYPD in 2019. The second most commonly recorded type of force encounter were situations involving emotionally disturbed persons.

Substantial injuries are generally those that require *treatment* at a hospital. Serious injuries are generally those that require *admission* to a hospital. There was a total of 11,245 individuals subjected to police use of force in 2019. Of those subjects, 97.1% sustained no injuries or minor injuries. 169 subjects, or 1.5%, were substantially injured, and 150, or 1.3%, were seriously injured. A total of 4,260, or 20.2%, of the members of the service involved in 2019's force incidents were injured. Of that number, 311, or 7.3%, NYPD personnel involved in 2019's force incidents were substantially or seriously injured.

New York Police Department



NYPD USE OF FORCE POLICY



NYPD Use of Force Policy

STATUTORY AUTHORITY AND CASE LAW

Under New York State law, police officers may use force to protect life and property, to effect arrests, and to prevent escapes. Private persons, except in certain limited circumstances, may only use force in self-defense or in defense of others, and must exhaust all attempts at retreat before using deadly physical force, except in their own dwellings. In contrast, police officers are obligated to take action, and are required to pursue fleeing perpetrators and use force, if necessary, to stop the flight.

The use of force by a police officer often results from a subject resisting arrest. Resisting arrest is a crime under New York State law.

Although police achieve compliance in the vast majority of encounters with verbal commands alone, when those commands are insufficient, and subjects choose to ignore instructions or resist, officers may use an array of force options to compel subjects to submit to lawful authority. These options range from physical force, to less-lethal options (e.g., OC spray, conducted electrical weapons (CEW), or impact weapons), to deadly physical force, when justified by the threat of violence. Officers are not required to move sequentially from one level of force to the next. For instance, officers may escalate from verbal commands to pointing a CEW or may de-escalate from a threat of force or a use of force to verbal commands, as situations evolve.

Two Supreme Court cases, *Tennessee v. Garner*, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) and *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), established the constitutional standards for police uses of force. *Graham* established a standard of “objective reasonableness” that restricts an officer’s authority to compel or constrain an individual. *Garner* sets forth the standard governing use of deadly force, namely that officers may use deadly force when there is probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm.

In *Graham*, the Supreme Court wrote that “the ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” In *People v. Benjamin*, 51 NY2d 267 (1980), the New York State Court of Appeals observed that “it would, indeed, be absurd to suggest that a police officer has to await the glint of steel before he can act to preserve his safety.” *Graham* and *Benjamin* both explicitly acknowledge the strain under which officers make life or death use of force decisions.

New York State law authorizes officers to use physical force only when they “reasonably believe such to be necessary” to effect arrest, prevent escape, or defend a person or property from harm.

NYPD POLICY

NYPD policy on the use of force is more restrictive than New York State and federal laws, and holds members of the NYPD to an even higher standard of restraint. New York State law, for example, allows the use of deadly physical force to protect property, but department policy does not. Under NYPD policy, deadly force may only be used against a person to “protect members of the service and/or the public from imminent serious physical injury or death” (Patrol Guide 221-01). Thus, there may be uses of force permissible under New York State and/or federal law, that still violate department policy.

Under NYPD policy, “force may be used when it is reasonable to ensure the safety of a member of the service or a third person, or otherwise protect life, or when it is reasonable to place a person in custody or to prevent escape from custody” (Patrol Guide 221-01). In accordance with this standard of reasonableness, any application of force that is judged to be “unreasonable under the circumstances...will be deemed excessive and in violation of department policy” (Patrol Guide 221-01). Use of force, in this context, is broadly defined to encompass a wide range of force options that may be employed to gain compliance or to ensure the control of a subject.

The NYPD has long had progressive and effective firearms discharge policies, including clear rules on when firearms can be used and recurring semi-annual firearms training. These policies have had a highly positive impact over the past 48 years. Over the past several years, members of the NYPD have become increasingly restrained in the use of firearms because there are clearer rules, more vigorous oversight, and more training. Yet, despite the uptick in firearms discharges for 2019 over 2018, the data shows a record of increasing firearms restraint dating back to 1971, when there were 810 discharge incidents, compared with 52 discharge incidents in 2019. In 1971, 314 subjects were shot by police, of which 93 were killed. In comparison, in 2019, 24 subjects were shot by police, of which 11 were killed. This represents a 92% decline in subjects shot by police and an 88% decline in those of which were killed.

In October 2019, the department made changes to its force reporting structure and its force policies with an aim to improve user interface and reduce errors and inconsistencies thereby increasing the accuracy of data. These revisions were the result of feedback from operational personnel, ongoing data and process analyses, and thorough deliberation by the department’s force policy working group. Although there was already a strong framework in both policy and data collection, several necessary changes were identified, including the elimination of paper-based force reports in favor of an entirely digital system; redesign of the database to protect against data entry errors that had been identified in the first iteration of the data collection

Figure 2

model; the authorization for sergeants to act as investigative supervisors in uses of CEWs in cartridge mode, the documentation of the use of force by and against auxiliary members of the service; and the designation of a new level of reportable force, Level 4.

The recent modifications to the NYPD’s use of force policies and data collection model will alter the way we compare historical force data. To ease the transition to the new model, and to organize the data coherently, Level 4 is not being utilized for the purpose of this report and all information collected for 2019 will be presented in this report under the previous framework of three levels of force. Incidents of a Level 4 nature, for the purpose of this report, are classified as Level 3.

As of October 8, 2019, the department categorizes reportable force incidents into the following four levels:

Level 1 (Physical Force/Less-Lethal Device)

Level 1 includes the use of hand strikes, foot strikes, forcible take-downs, wrestling/grappling, the discharge of oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray, the discharge of a CEW in “cartridge mode,” and the use of mesh restraining blankets to secure subjects.

Level 2 (Use of Impact Weapon/Canine/Less-Lethal Device)

Level 2 includes the intentional striking of a person with any object (including batons and other blunt instruments), a police canine bite, and the discharge of a CEW in “drive stun” mode.


Level 3 (Use of Deadly Physical Force, except Firearm)

Level 3 includes the use of physical force that is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury, except for firearms discharges.

Level 4 (Firearm Discharge) – Established October 8, 2019

Level 4 is any discharge of a firearm by a member of the service or from a firearm belonging to a member of the service. See Appendix G (page 89) for 2019 Level 4 data.

**2019
Levels of Force**



* Level 4 is not included in the 2019 reporting data

Actions that are not reportable uses of force includes; ordering a person to lie on the ground; guiding them to the ground in a controlled manner; or the mere use equipment such as Velcro straps or polycarbonate shields to restrain subjects, unless an injury is sustained.

The degree of injury to a subject or a bystander can alter the categorization of an incident and whether it is reported/investigated as a Level 1, Level 2, Level 3, or Level 4 use of force. Physical injuries to subjects such as minor swelling, contusions, lacerations, or abrasions, and complaints of substantial pain are categorized as Level 1 force incidents. Physical injuries that are consistent with the application of Level 2 force (e.g. unconsciousness, the loss of a tooth, lacerations requiring stitches or staples) will elevate an incident to Level 2. Allegation or suspicion of excessive force, the attempted suicide of a prisoner resulting in no injury or a minor physical injury, or the use of any prohibited act will also result in a Level 2 classification.

Serious physical injuries that result in a Level 3 classification include, but are not limited to: broken/fractured bones, injuries requiring hospital admission, heart attacks, strokes, aneurysms, or other life-threatening/serious illnesses and injuries. Alleged or suspected excessive force accompanied by serious physical injury or attempted suicide of a prisoner that causes a serious injury elevate an incident to a Level 3 classification. Any death or serious injury with a likelihood of death to a subject or bystander will result in a Level 4 classification under the new force review framework.

FORCE INVESTIGATION AND REVIEW

In addition to improving data collection, the department's force review process also establishes a robust internal investigation. The NYPD's use of force oversight and management controls include:

OVERSIGHT

Immediate Supervisor

The immediate supervisor is an available supervisor, who was not involved in the incident, from the same command as the member of the service involved in a force incident. The immediate supervisor must be at least one rank higher than all involved members. In the event that no supervisor in an appropriate rank is available, the duty captain will determine who will be responsible for assuming the responsibilities of the immediate supervisor. Immediate supervisors investigate Level 1 uses of force.

Duty Captain

The duty captain is the front-line executive supervisor, overseeing all personnel performing duty within a patrol borough, during hours when commanding officers/executive officers are not present. Duty captains investigate Level 2 uses of force in the absence of the commanding officer/executive officer.

Duty Chief

The duty chief is the principal operations commander of the NYPD when no other department executives of higher rank are present, acting as a representative of the Chief of Department and responding to serious incidents within New York City, including police-involved shootings and deaths in police custody. The duty chief may assist in force investigations during hours when precinct and borough executives are not present.

Borough/Bureau Investigations Units

Investigations units, assigned to bureau and borough commands, investigate instances of non-criminal violations of department regulations and lesser misconduct, as well as domestic incidents and certain criminal incidents involving members of the NYPD. The investigations units may be called on to assist in Level 2 force investigations by a duty captain.

First Deputy Commissioner

The First Deputy Commissioner oversees the Force Investigation Division, the entity within the department responsible for investigating the most serious force incidents, and the Risk Management Bureau, which performs a number of roles with respect to use of force, including monitoring use of force data and the quality of force investigations. The Department Advocate's Office, which prosecutes administrative discipline cases, and the Deputy Commissioner, Trials, which presides over the NYPD's internal discipline trials, also directly report to the First Deputy Commissioner.

The First Deputy Commissioner also chairs the Use of Force Review Board, which reviews all Level 3 and Level 4 uses of force, determines whether police actions were within policy, and makes disciplinary recommendations to the Police Commissioner when uses of force fall outside policy.

Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB)

IAB combats police corruption by analyzing corruption allegations and trends, and conducts comprehensive investigations that ensure the highest standards of integrity. IAB investigates all Level 3 use of force incidents.

Force Investigation Division (FID)

FID investigates all Level 4 incidents (i.e., incidents involving firearms discharges by members of the service and incidents in which subjects have died or are seriously injured and likely to die). FID reviews the tactics employed in each incident to derive tactical lessons learned and to make both general training recommendations and training recommendations specifically for the individual members of the service involved in discharge incidents.

Risk Management Bureau (RMB)

RMB is the department's liaison to the Office of the Inspector General and the court-appointed Federal Monitor. RMB is responsible for ensuring the complete and proper implementation of court-ordered reforms. RMB also assesses compliance with NYPD policies, identifies and develops programs to minimize risk to the department, and provides oversight of the NYPD's performance monitoring programs. RMB sub-units include the Quality Assurance Division, the Risk Mitigation Division, and the Compliance Division. RMB and the First Deputy Commissioner's Office lead force review meetings every month with borough and bureau personnel. The purpose of these meetings is to assess compliance with use of force policy.

Deputy Commissioner, Department Advocate

The Department Advocate's Office administratively prosecutes all employees of the New York City Police Department for violations of the Department's rules, regulations, and procedures, and makes recommendations to the First Deputy Commissioner concerning suspensions and restorations to duty of Department personnel. Attorneys provide legal guidance to investigative units, analyze Department investigations, draft charges and specifications, negotiate and submit case dispositions for the Police Commissioner's review, and litigate disciplinary matters before the Deputy Commissioner of Trials.

Deputy Commissioner, Trials

The Deputy Commissioner, Trials presides over the administrative trials of department disciplinary cases, and renders written findings of fact and recommendations to the Police Commissioner consistent with department rules, policies, and applicable statutes and case law.

Use of Force Review Board

The Use of Force Review Board is an oversight mechanism for maintaining the integrity of the department's force policy. Composed of executive staff members, the board reviews the most serious force cases and renders determinations regarding the actions of members of the department during force encounters.

TRAINING


A member's training serves as the foundation and framework for deciding whether and how to use force. Revisions to the NYPD's use of force policy and reporting structure have led to changes in training. As use of force data is collected and analyzed, department policy is revised, training is evaluated, and new instructional scenarios are employed.

Training Bureau


The Training Bureau oversees NYPD training and educational programs, providing recruits, uniformed members, and civilians with the most up-to-date academic, tactical, and technological training available. In-service training for members of the service include sessions on the latest tactics, de-escalation strategies, Crisis Intervention Team training, and changes in the law and police procedures, as well as ways to positively interact and collaborate with community members. Additionally, all uniformed members of the service complete rigorous firearms training as recruits, and must re-qualify for the use of their service and off-duty weapons twice a year for the entirety of their careers. Members also receive specialized training when they are assigned to certain units, such as the Emergency Service Unit.

Department firearms training emphasizes that the principal goal of every member of the NYPD is to protect life, including the lives of bystanders, victims, subjects, and other members of the service. Yet, it is sometimes necessary to protect life by using deadly physical force. To make the right decision about whether and how to use deadly force, members of the service rely on judgment, skill, and most importantly, training. Members of the NYPD are trained to use deadly physical force to "stop the threat," which means ending a subject's ability to threaten imminent death or serious physical injury. To accomplish this purpose in dynamic shooting situations, members are trained to shoot at the center mass of the subject, the largest target available. Arms and legs are smaller and less static, and therefore, less certain targets. Hitting a subject in these extremities is also far less likely to stop an assailant. Members are trained to only use deadly physical force to protect themselves or others from imminent serious physical injury or death.

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FIREARMS DISCHARGES



Firearms Discharges

Overview

The New York City Police Department has experienced a steady decline in the number of firearms discharge incidents since official recordkeeping began in 1971. From a high of 994 incidents in 1972, to a historic low of 35 in 2018, it is evident that the NYPD is moving in the right direction. For 2019, the NYPD recorded 52 discharge incidents which, despite being the second lowest number of police firearms discharges in NYPD history, was a 48.6% increase in the total number of police firearms discharge incidents compared to 2018.

Before 2010, the department never had fewer than 100 firearms discharge incidents in a given year. The 52 discharges of 2019 equals 2017 for the second lowest number of police firearms discharges in NYPD records. This low number of police firearms discharges underscores the diligence and restraint displayed by members of the service in their interactions with the public, as well as changes and improvements in firearms policy and training.

The department analyzes each firearms discharge category to improve understanding of the various types of incidents and adjusts training and policy, as necessary. The discharge data in this report has been compiled from Preliminary Investigation Worksheets, medical examiner's reports, arrest and complaint reports, Force Investigation Division reports, Use of Force Review Board findings and recommendations, quarterly and annual publicly reported data tables, and previous Annual Firearms Discharge Reports. While there is undeniable value in an analysis and discussion of police firearms discharges, the relatively small number of discharges in 2019 (52 overall discharge incidents, including 25 adversarial conflict discharges) limits the scope of conclusions that can be drawn, as well as any basis on which to forecast future trends.

Even when intentional firearms discharges by police are deemed justifiable in a court of law, they are nevertheless reviewed by the NYPD for tactical deviations and violations of procedure, as well as any other factors that suggest modifications to policy and procedure may be necessary. If, upon review, it is determined to impose discipline in a case, the discipline may not necessarily result from the actual discharge of the firearm, but from a violation of other department procedures. All members who discharge their firearms are sent to a firearms tactical review course, regardless of the circumstances of the discharge.

Figure 3

| Historical Snapshot, 2006-2019 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 |
| Adversarial Conflict | 59 | 45 | 49 | 47 | 33 | 36 | 45 | 40 | 35 | 33 | 37 | 23 | 17 | 25 |
| Animal Attack | 30 | 39 | 30 | 28 | 30 | 36 | 24 | 19 | 18 | 15 | 11 | 9 | 4 | 6 |
| Unintentional Discharge | 26 | 15 | 15 | 23 | 21 | 15 | 21 | 12 | 18 | 15 | 14 | 12 | 8 | 8 |
| Mistaken Identity | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Unauthorized Use of a Firearm | 8 | 6 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 6 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 4 |
| MOS Suicide/Attempted Suicide | 3 | 6 | 8 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 9 | 8 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 9 |
| Total Discharges | 127 | 111 | 105 | 106 | 92 | 92 | 105 | 81 | 79 | 67 | 72 | 52 | 35 | 52 |

The NYPD classifies police firearms discharges into the following categories:

Intentional Discharge–Adversarial Conflict (ID-AC): when a member of the service intentionally discharges a firearm during a confrontation with a subject. There were 25 intentional discharges in adversarial conflict incidents in 2019.

Intentional Discharge–Animal Attack (ID-AA): when a member of the service intentionally discharges a firearm to defend against an animal attack. There were six intentional discharge incidents in the course of animal attacks in 2019.

Unintentional Discharge: when a member of the service unintentionally discharges a firearm. There were eight unintentional discharge incidents in 2019.

Mistaken Identity: when a member of the service intentionally fires on another member of the service in the mistaken belief that the other member is a criminal subject. Mistaken identity cases do not include crossfires, when a member of the service accidentally strikes a fellow member of the service while firing at another subject. There were no cases of mistaken identity in 2019.

Unauthorized Use of a Firearm: when a member of the service intentionally discharges a firearm outside the scope of his or her employment, or when another person illegally discharges a member’s firearm. There were 13 total unauthorized discharge incidents involving NYPD firearms in 2019, nine of which were member suicides.

Intentional Discharge–No Conflict: when a member of the service discharges a firearm to summon assistance. Due to the rarity of discharges to summon assistance, this category is usually excluded from the report. There were no discharges classified as Intentional Discharge–No Conflict in 2019. The NYPD did experience one Intentional Discharge–No Conflict in 2016, the only one of its kind in a decade.

Figure 4



Figure 5




Figure 6




Figure 7




Figure 8

NYPD Firearms Discharge, 1971-2019



Intentional Discharges – Adversarial Conflicts

In 2019, the NYPD had 36,397 uniformed members of the service (this number includes members in plainclothes and undercover assignments). Of them, 54, or about 0.15% intentionally discharged their firearms in an adversarial conflict.

In 2019, members responded to more than 6.4 million calls for police service, of which 64,302 involved weapons. Of the thousands of arrests for weapons that resulted from these encounters, 3,299 were gun arrests, which represents an 11.8% increase in gun arrests from 2018. Apart from arresting armed suspects, uniformed members of the service also had thousands of additional, potentially volatile interactions with the public, including investigative encounters, car stops, responding to and escorting thousands of emotionally disturbed persons to hospitals and care facilities. In the overwhelming majority of incidents in which uniformed members took armed subjects or emotionally disturbed persons into custody, they did not fire their weapons.

In 2019, there were 25 intentional firearm discharge-adversarial conflict incidents (ID-AC), involving 54 uniformed members of the service who discharged their firearms. These conflicts involved 32 subjects. In five different ID-AC incidents, subjects discharged firearms directly at members of the service. Of all 2019 ID-AC incidents, 24 subjects were shot, of which eleven died.

The total number of uniformed members injured by gunfire in ID-AC exchanges has varied greatly over the 48 years the department has been tracking this data – from a high of 50 members shot and injured by subject gunfire in 1973, to a low of zero members shot and injured in 2009. In 2019, four police officers were shot and injured by subject gunfire in ID-AC incidents, compared with one member shot and injured in 2018. Tragically, two members of the service were shot and killed in the line of duty in 2019 during two other ID-AC incidents; both by “friendly fire.”



Figure 9

Subject Deaths

While the total number of subjects killed during adversarial exchanges varies from year to year, an average of nine subjects per year have been shot and killed by uniformed members of the service from 2010 to 2019. In 2019, 11 subjects were killed by police firearms discharges in ID-AC incidents. The number of subjects shot and killed by police gunfire was 5 in 2018; the increase in 2019 marks a return to the 20-year average of 11 subjects shot and killed by police gunfire in New York City.

Of the 11 subjects killed by police gunfire in 2019, each possessed some form of weapon or dangerous instrument that appeared to be capable of causing death or serious physical injury. Seven subjects possessed loaded firearms, two possessed knives, one attacked an officer with a metal chair, and one operated his vehicle in a manner that threatened imminent serious physical injury to members of the service (the 11 ID-AC incidents in which subjects were killed are described in detail in Appendix B).




Figure 10

Subject Injuries

Over the past 10 years, an average of 15 subjects were shot and injured each year by police gunfire. In 2019, 13 subjects were shot and injured by police, three more than the number of subjects shot and injured by police in 2018.

Of the 13 subjects shot and injured in 2019, three were armed with firearms, three with imitation firearms, two with knives, one with a simulated firearm, and one with a metal baseball bat. The remaining three subjects were operating vehicles in a manner that threatened imminent serious physical injury or death to the members of the service on scene. In two separate, but similar incidents, the subjects were operating stolen vehicles, stopped by members of the service, and proceeded to strike the discharging police officers with the stolen vehicles. In one incident the officer was struck and pinned against another vehicle. In the other, the officer was struck and pinned against a wooden fence. In the third incident involving a vehicle, the operator of the vehicle had struck two officers with the vehicle, and was driving towards the discharging officer at the time of discharge. The injured subject was the front passenger of the vehicle at the time of discharge, and the discharging officer has been placed on modified assignment pending further investigation.

In one of the three incidents where subjects were armed with firearms, members of the service discharged their weapons at a subject who was shooting at another individual. In the second incident, the subject was shot when he was resisting arrest and pointing a loaded firearm at the discharging police officer. In the third incident, the subject had discharged his firearm at another individual and was subsequently shot and injured by responding officers.

In all three incidents involving imitation firearms, the subjects had pointed the imitation firearms at responding members of the service immediately before being shot and injured. In the incident involving the subject with a simulated firearm, a responding officer shot the subject after the subject, who repeatedly refused commands to show his hands, stated that he had a gun, pulled out a black wallet and pointed it at the officer. In the two incidents where the subjects were armed with cutting instruments, both subjects were advancing at officers while brandishing knives when they were shot by members of the service. In the incident in which the subject was armed with a blunt instrument, the discharging member was menaced with a metal baseball bat. Due to the circumstances of that incident, the member of the service has been placed on modified assignment pending further investigation.

Bystander Injuries

Unfortunately, bystanders may be injured during ID-AC incidents – either as a direct result of, or incidental to, police action. In 2019, one bystander was injured during an ID-AC incident, struck

in the foot by a bullet discharged by a police firearm. This occurred while the bystander was engaged in a physical altercation with an armed subject who was discharging a firearm at him. The injury was nonfatal. There were no other bystander injuries in 2019.

Member of the Service Deaths

Two members of the service sustained fatal injuries during two separate ID-AC incidents in 2019. In both incidents, the members were killed as a result of “friendly fire.” Both incidents involved multiple members of the service discharging their weapons while other members were in their line of fire. In one incident, the subject was in the process of robbing a commercial establishment when multiple responding members arrived on scene. The subject pointed what was subsequently identified as an imitation firearm at the responding members and the members of the service opened fire on the subject. Because of the positioning of the responding members, two members were struck by “friendly fire.” A sergeant sustained nonfatal injuries and a detective died from his wounds. The other friendly fire incident, in which a member of service and the subject were both shot and killed, is described in detail in Appendix B.

These two tragic incidents illustrate that, despite the department’s continuous efforts at improving training, guidance, and oversight, a focus to deter these tragedies must always remain.

Member of the Service Injuries

A total of eight members of the service sustained nonfatal injuries during seven separate ID-AC incidents, including the sergeant that was injured by “friendly fire.” In two similar incidents, members of the service were conducting car stops on alleged stolen vehicles when the subjects pinned and injured members of the service with the vehicles. In one incident, an officer was pinned by the subject’s vehicle against another vehicle. In the other incident, an officer was pinned against a wooden fence by the subject’s vehicle. In three separate ID-AC incidents, four members were shot and injured in an exchange of gunfire with armed subjects. In the final ID-AC incident resulting in injury to members of the service, a member was struck in the head with a metal chair, causing serious physical injury. That incident, in which the subject was shot and killed, is described in further detail in Appendix B.

Other Considerations

An actual or perceived weapon or dangerous instrument was involved in each of the 25 ID-AC incidents of 2019. Ten of the 25 weapons/dangerous instruments were loaded firearms capable of discharging live rounds. One was a revolver and nine were semiautomatic pistols. Three of the weapons possessed by ID-AC subjects were imitation firearms and one subject simulated a firearm. The imitation firearms included an air pistol, a replica pistol, and a spring-assisted pocket

knife in the shape of a revolver. The simulated firearm was a black wallet the subject displayed after telling members of the service that he had a gun. Four ID-AC incidents involved subjects who were operating vehicles in a manner that were readily capable of causing serious physical injury to members of the service on the scene. Five subjects possessed knives and threatened members of the service or other individuals at the time of the discharge incidents. One subject possessed a metal baseball bat and one subject struck a police officer with a metal chair when they were fired upon by police.




Figure 11




Figure 12

There were a total of 32 subjects involved in ID-AC incidents in 2019; 27 were male and 5 were female. The subjects' ages ranged from 17 to 58, with a median age of 27.5. Of all the ID-AC subjects, 78.1% were between the ages of 21 and 39. Nineteen of the subjects were younger than 30, and only one was over 50 years old. The race and ethnicity of the subjects was determined by eyewitness reports, the subjects' self-identification, existing government-issued documentation, racial/ethnic physical characteristics, medical examiner reports, and other sources. Of the 32 subjects involved in ID-AC incidents, 19 were black, 10 were Hispanic, 1 was

was white and 2 were Asian. Expressed as percentages, of the total number of ID-AC subjects in 2019, 59.4% were black, 31.3% were Hispanic, 3.1% were white, and 6.3% were Asian. The racial and ethnic composition of the ID-AC subjects generally corresponds to the 470 criminal shooting suspects in the 776 criminal shooting incidents in New York City in 2019. Among the 470 identified criminal shooting *suspects* in New York City in 2019, approximately 74.9% were black, 21.5% Hispanic, 2.3% white, and 1.3% Asian.




Figure 13

Of the 54 uniformed members of the service who intentionally discharged their firearms during ID-AC incidents in 2019, five were female (9.3%) and 49 were male (90.7%). The NYPD’s uniformed staff, taken as an average over the course of 2019, was 18.2% female and 81.8% male. Broken down by race and ethnic background, 68.5% of members involved in 2019 ID-AC incidents were white, 22.2% were Hispanic, 5.6% were black, and 3.7% were Asian. The department’s uniformed staff race/ethnicity percentages in 2019 were 48.1% white, 28.5% Hispanic, 15.1% black, and 8.4% Asian/other.




Figure 14

Historically, members in the rank of police officer, and with fewer years of service, are more likely to be involved in ID-AC incidents compared with other members with more years of service and in higher ranks. These members are more likely to be serving in patrol capacities, and thus, are more likely to encounter situations that may lead to adversarial conflicts. Approximately 75.9% of members that discharged their firearms in adversarial conflicts in 2019 (41 of 54 members) had ten years of service or less at the time of their discharge incidents.




Figure 15

Members of the service in the rank of police officer comprised 74.1% of all members (40 out of 54 members), who discharged their weapons in ID-AC incidents in 2019. Over the past decade, members in the rank of police officer consistently accounted for approximately 65% of total uniformed staff and comprised between 55% and 86% of members who discharged their firearms in ID-AC incidents. Sergeants consistently represented approximately 13% of total uniformed staff over the past 10 years, and comprised between 7% and 21.9% of ID-AC members. Sergeants represented approximately 18.5% of ID-AC involved members of the service in 2019 and detectives represented approximately 7.4%. None of the members who discharged their weapons in ID-AC incidents were in the rank of lieutenant or above in 2019.




Figure 16

Of the 54 members involved in adversarial conflicts in 2019, 22, or 40.7%, were in plainclothes at the time of the discharge. One member was in plainclothes because he was off-duty in the only adversarial conflict of 2019 that occurred while a member was off-duty. Two plainclothes

members of the Detective Bureau were performing investigative functions at the time of their discharge incident. The other 19 members in plainclothes were all serving as members of anti-crime teams, proactively seeking out violent armed offenders, at the time of their respective adversarial conflicts. However, the majority of members involved in ID-AC incidents were assigned primarily to patrol functions – generally interacting with the public more than members in other assignments. Of the 32 members that were attired in uniform during their respective ID-AC incidents, all were performing patrol related functions at the time.

Approximately 90.7% (49 of 54) of the members who discharged their weapons during the 2019 ID-AC incidents were assigned to the Patrol Services Bureau. Three were assigned to investigative assignments in the Detective Bureau, one was assigned to the Housing Bureau, and one was assigned to the Special Operations Division.

Ten ID-AC incidents in 2019 occurred during the third tour (between 1531 hours and 2330 hours), 11 occurred during the first tour (2331-0730), and four occurred during the second tour (0731-1530).

Officer Assignment, ID-AC Incidents, 2019




Figure 17

ID-AC Incidents by Tour, 2019




Figure 18

All but one of the adversarial conflicts in 2019 occurred within the five counties of New York City. Of the 25 incidents, seven occurred in the Bronx, six in Brooklyn, five each in Manhattan and Queens, one in Staten Island, and one off-duty incident in Nassau County. Each geographic borough recorded an increase in ID-AC incidents compared to the previous year except for Brooklyn, which had the same number of incidents, and Staten Island, which recorded a decrease from 2018. ID-AC incidents

occurred in 19 separate precincts throughout New York City. Three precincts had multiple ID-AC incidents in 2019; the 73rd Precinct in Brooklyn had three, the 44th Precinct in the Bronx had three, and the 47th Precinct in the Bronx had two.

While ID-AC incidents do not necessarily reflect geographic crime patterns, boroughs and precincts with more criminal shootings tend to be the locations ID-AC are more likely to occur. Each of the three precincts that recorded more than one adversarial conflict also recorded in excess of 20 criminal shooting incidents in 2019. As a point of comparison, the majority of precincts in the city saw less than ten criminal shooting incidents in 2019, and 40.3% of precincts saw fewer than five criminal shootings.





Figure 19

As shown on a map of *Criminal Shooting Incidents vs. Police Adversarial Discharges* (page 33), adversarial conflict police firearms discharges tend to occur in areas of New York City where there are higher levels of gun violence. Since the *2007 Annual Firearms Discharge Report* first mapped police and criminal shootings, the maps have demonstrated a generally consistent geographical correlation between police shootings and criminal gun violence. The frequency and locations of police-involved shootings are directly and proportionally related to criminal gun activity and criminal shootings in New York City.



Criminal Shooting Incidents vs. Police Adversarial Discharges, 2019

Figure 20



* Police Firearm Discharge - Adversarial
24 within New York City
1 within Nassau County

Uniformed members of the service discharged a total of 286 rounds during ID-AC incidents in 2019, a 167.3% increase compared to 2018 when 107 rounds were fired, a 68.2% increase compared to 2017 when 170 rounds were fired, and a 40.2% increase compared to the 204 rounds discharged in 2016. This increase was driven by three incidents that accounted for 48.6% of total ID-AC rounds fired, or a combined total of 139 of 286 total rounds fired. Forty-seven of the 54 members of the service who discharged their firearms during ID-AC incidents in 2019 discharged ten rounds or fewer. Seven members discharged between 11 and 16 rounds. The number of rounds discharged during any given adversarial encounter is not, by itself, dispositive on whether a member’s use of force was justified or within department guidelines.




Objective Completion Rate

The department does not calculate “hit percentage” when describing ID-AC incidents. The NYPD uses an “objective completion rate” per incident to determine the effectiveness of police firearms discharges. When a uniformed member properly and lawfully perceives a threat severe enough to require the use of a firearm and fires properly and lawfully at a specific threat, the most relevant measure of success is whether the member ultimately stops the threat. This is the objective completion rate. Regardless of the number of shots that strike a particular subject, the objective is considered completed when the actions of the subject that threaten imminent serious physical injury or death are stopped by a member’s use of deadly physical force, i.e., a subject stops their threatening actions after being shot.

In 2019, uniformed members of the service successfully stopped the threat by discharging their weapons in 24 of the 25 ID-AC incidents, with at least one subject shot in each of those 24 incidents, for an objective completion rate of 96%. The objective completion rate is used for statistical and informational purposes, and is not a factor considered in the investigation of the individual incidents.

Figure 23

OBJECTIVE COMPLETION RATE, 2010 - 2019




Shooting Technique

Using a two-handed grip, standing, and carefully aligning a firearm’s sights with the target are not always practical during an adversarial conflict incident. There are occasions when follow-up investigations are unable to determine the shooting grips and/or shooting stances used by discharging members of the service. Of the 54 members involved in adversarial conflicts in 2019, 18 were determined to have used a two-handed, supported position, and six utilized a one-handed, unsupported position. Post-shooting investigations also determined the shooting stance of 28 members involved in ID-AC incidents: 26 were in a standing position and two were in a prone position at the time of their firearms discharges. The investigations also determined the distance of 43 discharging members from their targets during ID-AC incidents. 19 members discharged their weapons at a distance of 15 feet or less from their target subjects, and 25 were at a distance of more than 15 feet. While all uniformed members of the service are trained to fire at a target from as far away as 75 feet, these close-contact adversarial conflicts require split-second, life-and-death decisions by each discharging member of the service.

Figure 24

ID-AC Distance to Target by MOS Shooter, 2019




Intentional Discharges – Animal Attack

In 2019, police responded to thousands of calls for service involving dogs and other animals. This analysis does not encompass all animal attacks on members of the service and others. Officers encountered many more attacks while on patrol, executing search warrants, or investigating complaints that were not processed through the 911 or 311 dispatch systems. Only incidents involving firearms discharges by police are discussed here.

Figure 25


ID-AA Rounds Fired per Officer, 2019



Department policy authorizes uniformed members of the service to discharge their firearms intentionally during animal attacks only to defend themselves or others from imminent physical

ID-AA Rounds Fired per Incident, 2019

Figure 26



injury and only when there is no opportunity to retreat or other reasonable means to eliminate the threat. Members are equipped with less-lethal tools that can counter animal attacks, including batons and OC spray, but these options may not always be feasible or effective. There were six instances of intentional firearms discharges during animal attacks (ID-AA) in 2019, representing a

50.0% increase compared to 2018. Half of the ID-AA discharges were on-duty incidents; the other three incidents involved off-duty members of the service.

All six incidents stemmed from aggressive dogs advancing on or attacking members of the service or other individuals present. During these ID-AA incidents, six members of the service discharged a total of 12 rounds, two rounds less than in 2018, representing a decrease of 14.3%. Of the discharging members, three fired only one round, one fired two rounds, one fired three rounds, and one fired four rounds. As a result of these discharges, four dogs were shot and killed and one was shot and injured. One member of the service was bitten by a pit bull during an ID-AA incident in 2019.

Four of the six ID-AA incidents in 2019 occurred during the second tour, between 0731 and 1530 hours. The other two incidents occurred during the third tour, between 1531 and 2330 hours. No ID-AA incidents occurred in 2019 during the first shift, between 2331 and 0730 hours.

Neither Manhattan nor Brooklyn recorded an ID-AA incident in 2019. Queens had two ID-AA incidents, and the Bronx and Staten Island had one each. Two off-duty ID-AA incidents occurred in Nassau County.

Figure 27

ID-AA Incidents by Tour, 2019





Figure 28

ID-AA Incidents by Borough, 2019





Unintentional Discharges

There were eight unintentional firearms discharge incidents in 2019, the same amount as occurred in 2018. Each of the eight incidents involved one member of the service unintentionally discharging one round. Two members of the service shot and injured themselves, but no bystanders or perpetrators were injured during the unintentional discharge incidents that occurred in 2019.

Of the eight unintentional firearms discharges, five occurred while members were on-duty. Three of the on-duty and one of the off-duty incidents occurred in department facilities. One on-duty incident occurred during the apprehension of a wanted suspect and one occurred in a New York City Housing Authority building. Two of the three off-duty incidents occurred while the members were at home.

In 2019, only members of the service in the ranks of sergeant (two), police officer (five) and detective (one) unintentionally discharged their firearms.



Members that unintentionally discharged their weapons in 2019 ranged from having less than a year of service to having 29 years of service, with a majority having more than 10 years of service at the time of the incident.

Loading/Unloading

Four unintentional discharges in 2019 occurred while members were loading or unloading their weapons. Two of these incidents involved on-duty members within department facilities and two involved off-duty members at home. One of these members of the service was injured as a result of their unintentional discharges.

Holstering

Two members of the service unintentionally discharged their weapons in 2019 while they were attempting to holster their weapons. One sustained an injury as a result.

Handling

Two unintentional discharges in 2019 resulted from the handling of a firearm unrelated to loading/unloading or holstering. One of these discharge incidents occurred when a member of the service mishandled a firearm while taking police action, and the other occurred in a department facility. No injuries resulted to members of the service or others during either of these incidents.

Unauthorized Discharges

There were 13 firearms discharges in 2019 that were classified as unauthorized use of firearms, a 116.7% increase compared to 2018. Nine of these incidents involved members of the service dying by suicide from a firearm – a 125% increase compared to the prior year. Two of the four other unauthorized discharge incidents resulted from non-members gaining access to a member’s firearm and discharging a round. One of the two remaining unauthorized incidents involved a member of a service discharging a round into the air during an off-duty dispute. That member was arrested and suspended from duty. The last unauthorized discharge incident involved a member who claimed that a non-member gained access to the member’s firearm and used it to commit suicide. Upon investigation, it was determined that the death was inconsistent with a suicide and the member was fired and arrested.

UMOS Suicides

All nine uniformed members of the service who died by suicide using a firearm in 2019 were male. Five of the members were in the rank of police officer, one was in the rank of detective, two were in the rank of sergeant, and one was in the rank of deputy chief.




Figure 31

The members of the service had between seven and 39 years of service at the time of the respective incidents. Four had less than 10 years of service and four having more than 20 years of service. All but one incident occurred off-duty.

Members of the service, in the course of their assigned duties, may encounter incidents that result in varying degrees of emotional and psychological trauma. The department actively encourages its members to seek assistance through both internal or external resources. Department resources include the Employee Assistance Unit, the Counseling Services Unit, the Chaplain’s Unit, the NYPD Helpline, Peer Support, and the Psychological Evaluation Unit. External

resources include Police Officers Providing Peer Assistance (POPPA), FINEST CARE, the Police Self Support Group, NYC WELL, Lifeline, and the Crisis Text Line.

In 2019, the department implemented numerous initiatives aimed at expanding services for a member experiencing a critical incident or personal hardship. The Health and Wellness Section, emerging from a task force of department clinicians, chaplains, and members of service, was established with the goal of improving and supporting both the physical and mental well-being of members of the service. Among the resources of the Health and Wellness Section are a partnership with New York Presbyterian Hospital to offer free and confidential counseling to all uniformed members of the service, development of the Peer Support Program, which trains volunteer peer support representatives in each NYPD command, and a Health and Wellness phone application. The Health and Wellness Section has also worked at updating policy and training aimed at improving members' physical, mental, and emotional health.



2019 also saw the use of established department resources to further expand mental health services. This includes the resiliency training SAFER, offered through the Police Organization Providing Peer Assistance (POPPA), to officers during firearms requalification. SPRING 3100, the official magazine of the NYPD, also devoted an entire issue to promoting mental and physical health by offering useful strategies to maintain a healthy lifestyle and highlighting the numerous services available to all members.

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CONDUCTED ELECTRICAL WEAPONS



Conducted Electrical Weapons

The use of conducted electrical weapons (CEWs) – also referred to as electronic control weapons or tasers – is a less-lethal use of force option for law enforcement personnel. Under NYPD policy, CEWs may be used to gain control of noncompliant subjects who physically resist restraint or exhibit active physical aggression, or to prevent subjects from physically injuring themselves or others. CEWs are less-lethal devices and are intended to augment members' existing force options and to provide a greater margin of safety for both subjects and members in confrontational situations. Depending on the method of deployment, the use of a CEW under the department's use of force policy may be deemed a level 1 or 2 force incident. The NYPD's policy governing CEWs is generally in line with the recommendations published in reports by nationally recognized independent bodies, including the Police Executive Research Forum, the National Institute of Justice, and the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

CEWs use replaceable cartridges containing compressed nitrogen to propel two small probes that are attached to the handheld unit by insulated conductive wires. The wires transmit short controlled pulses of electricity in five-second cycles that stimulate the skeletal muscles of the human body. These short electrical pulses affect the sensory and motor functions of the peripheral nervous system causing temporary incapacitation by preventing coordinated muscular action, without affecting vital organs. Once the five-second cycle is complete, an immediate recovery occurs. CEWs collect and store data regarding each use for post-incident review.

Research conducted by PERF, a nonprofit organization focused on policing issues, suggests that the likelihood of injuries to both suspects and police officers are reduced among agencies that authorize CEW usage compared to those that do not. Since 2015, the NYPD has expanded the number of members trained and authorized to use CEWs. In 2019, a total of 28,624 uniformed members of the service were CEW-trained and authorized, and 6,954 CEWs were assigned to enforcement commands and personnel. This represents an increase of 21.5% compared to the 23,564 total members trained and authorized to employ CEWs in 2018, and a 123.7% increase in the number of CEWs assigned to commands compared to the 3,108 CEWs assigned in 2018. The number of members trained and authorized in 2019 is significantly higher than in 2017, when only 16,442 uniformed members of the service were CEW-trained and authorized, and represents an increase of 74.1%.

The use of CEWs in cartridge mode is a force option that allows the police to engage noncompliant and/or aggressive subjects from a distance, providing members of the service more time to react and develop a tactical plan in what are typically fast-paced and violent situations. Additionally, CEWs often help members gain rapid control and compliance, thereby

minimizing the likelihood of injury or fatal medical consequences for both members and subjects. Of course, when subjects are presenting members of the service or others with an imminent threat of serious physical injury or death, the use of CEWs may not be the appropriate or reasonable option.

CEW Discharge Incidents, Event Type




Figure 32

There were 1,271 CEW discharge incidents in 2019, including 1,511 individual discharges. Multiple discharges may occur during a single CEW discharge incident and there may be CEW discharges during incidents classified under higher levels of force, for example, in cases of firearms discharges when CEWs were also used. The 2019 CEW discharge incidents represent a 27.4% increase compared to the 998 CEW discharge incidents in 2018. This increase in CEW discharge incidents may be attributable to the addition of 5,060 more members trained and authorized in CEW-use and the doubling of available CEWs in the field. The 3,846 additional CEWs were distributed to commands throughout the city, under the Patrol Services Bureau, Transit Bureau, Housing Bureau, Special Operations Division, Detective Bureau, Counterterrorism Bureau, Intelligence Bureau, and others.

The large majority of 2019's CEW discharge incidents (78.8%) occurred during arrest situations or situations where members were attempting to subdue violent emotionally disturbed persons (EDPs). Of the 1,271 CEW discharge incidents, 621 occurred during arrests, and 380 occurred while members were attempting to take violent EDPs into custody. The remaining CEW discharge incidents occurred in situations that included: unintentional discharges, prisoners, animal attacks, vehicle stops, and suspicious person stops.

Emotionally disturbed persons (EDPs), as defined by the NYPD Patrol Guide, are persons who appear to be mentally ill or temporarily deranged and are conducting themselves in a manner that a uniformed member of the service reasonably believes is likely to result in serious injury to themselves or others. Encounters with EDPs do not necessarily result in arrest. Consistent with the New York State Mental Hygiene Law, department policy directs members to take an

EDP into protective custody for the subject’s safety and the safety of the public, and to ensure that proper medical and psychiatric evaluation can take place at a safe location.

Members of the service usually do not know the emotional and/or psychological status of a subject upon first contact, but they are trained to recognize situational and behavioral cues and to bring emotionally disturbed subjects into custody using de-escalation tactics and with only the reasonable amount of force necessary. When verbal directions fail, and a subject exhibits active aggression, a CEW discharge is often one of the safest options for both the subject and members of the service. The 380 CEW discharge incidents during EDP encounters in 2019 constitute a fraction of a percent of the 171,490 calls for service classified as 10-54 “EDP” calls. In the vast majority of these assignments, members managed the incident without resorting to any use of force, let alone a CEW discharge.

Deployment Mode

A CEW can be deployed in two separate modes: “probe” mode and “drive-stun” mode. Probe mode is the preferred method of discharge under NYPD policy. Of the 1,271 CEW discharge incidents in 2019 – 1,100 (86.5%) were deployed in probe mode. In this mode, two metal probes are propelled by the CEW’s cartridge toward a subject across an intervening space, providing adequate separation from the intended target. Used in this mode, the CEW may cause neuromuscular incapacitation, and effectively immobilize a subject.

CEW Deployment Mode, 2019




Figure 33

There were 98 CEW discharges where only drive-stun mode was deployed in 2019. In drive-stun mode, the CEW unit is brought into direct contact with the subject’s body or clothing without a cartridge, or after a cartridge has been discharged. By itself, a drive-stun discharge does not achieve the immobilizing effects of probe deployment because it does not affect a subject’s nervous system. However, there may be circumstances where both probe and drive-stun mode are used in concert. In some instances, only one probe penetrates a subject or there is insufficient distance between probes and the use of a CEW in drive-stun mode is necessary to “complete the circuit” and achieve neuromuscular incapacitation.

Effectiveness

The goal of CEW discharges, and generally for all uses of force, is to safely gain control of violent, actively resistant, and/or aggressive subjects without having to resort to further use of force. Historically, a CEW discharge was deemed “effective,” whether deployed in probe mode or drive-stun mode, if the discharge led to members rapidly gaining custody and control of the subject immediately after its use. Going forward, as of October 2019, the NYPD has adopted and codified the following definition of CEW effectiveness in the Patrol Guide: “Any immediate reaction, even if momentary, that causes a change in an actively aggressive subject’s or emotionally disturbed person’s physical actions and/or psychological behavior as the result of a predeployment verbal warning, activation, laser warning, warning arc, or discharge of a CEW.”

A thorough review of 2019 force data indicates that 759 CEW discharge incidents were categorized as effective in gaining rapid control of the target subject. Of the 1,271 discharge incidents, 808 were intentional. Of the 808 intentional CEW discharge incidents, 93.9% were deemed effective.




Figure 34

Ineffective discharge incidents were attributable to such situations as the probes failing to make adequate contact with the subject’s skin or clothing, the probes missing the subject entirely, a subject fighting through the pain, or the probe wires breaking. An ineffective discharge incident may have multiple, simultaneous causes.

Discharging Personnel

Personnel in the rank of police officer and sergeant were responsible for 94.4% of all CEW discharges in 2019 (1,427 of 1,511 total CEW discharges). Unlike members serving in investigative capacities, or higher ranking members of the service, police officers and sergeants assigned to patrol-related functions are much more likely to be involved in antagonistic and violent police-citizen interactions and are more likely to be first on scene at such incidents that may lead to CEW discharges.

Until 2015, only supervisors (e.g., sergeants and lieutenants) and members of the service assigned to the Emergency Service Unit were trained and authorized to carry and deploy CEWs. Since then, the department has trained and equipped non-supervisory personnel with CEWs, providing them to members in the rank of police officer. As the number of police officers trained and equipped with CEWs has risen, they have constituted a larger proportion of the discharging population.

In 2016, police officers were responsible for only 189 CEW discharge incidents. In 2017, police officers were responsible for 484 discharge incidents. The significant increase in the number of police officers trained and equipped with CEWs in 2018 and 2019 corresponded to similar increases in the number of discharges by members in the rank of police officer. In 2018, police officers accounted for 827 CEW discharges. In 2019, police officers accounted for 1,199 of 1,511 total CEW discharges, or 79.4%. Because patrol officers are usually first on-scene with violent and combative subjects, and because more police officers are trained and equipped with CEWs, patrol officers accounted for a significant proportion of the CEW discharges in 2019, and will likely continue to do so in the future.

CEW Discharges by Rank, 2019 (Total: 1,511)




Figure 35

Time and Place of Discharges

CEW discharge incidents occurred most frequently during the third tour (1531-2330 hours) in 2019. The first and second tours recorded similar numbers of CEW incidents. More discharge incidents typically occur in geographic boroughs where there are higher numbers of calls for service. In 2019, the Bronx led New York City in CEW discharge incidents, with 30.4% of all CEW discharge incidents. Brooklyn had slightly fewer with 29.0% of the city's CEW discharge incidents.

Figure 36 CEW Discharges, Geographic Borough, 2019




Figure 37 CEW Discharges, Tour, 2019





Figure 38 911 Calls for Service by Borough, 2019



New York Police Department



GENERAL USES OF FORCE



General Uses of Force

All members of the service are responsible and accountable for the proper use of force. Under New York State law, a member may use force to effect arrest, prevent escape, and protect life and property. Any force used by members of the NYPD must comply with New York State and federal laws, as well as department policy. In all cases, members must use only the reasonable amount of force necessary to gain compliance. Members of the service seek to gain voluntary compliance, when appropriate and consistent with personal safety, in order to reduce or eliminate the necessity to use force. However, voluntary compliance is not always achievable and some interactions may result in the use of force.

Historically, NYPD use of force incidents were documented through paperwork such as Arrest Reports, Medical Treatment of Prisoner Forms, Aided Reports, and Line-of-Duty Injury Reports. Use of force data was captured, but not in a centralized location. In June 2016, to increase accountability, better identify training deficiencies, and improve oversight, the Threat, Resistance or Injury (TRI) Report was introduced to record more complete data about the types of force used, the demographic information of individuals subjected to force, the members of the service who used force and/or were subjected to force, any injuries inflicted and/or sustained, and other circumstances surrounding use of force incidents.

The NYPD has made vast improvements in the areas of force reporting and force data collection. However, recognizing that more can be done, in October of 2019, the department revised its force policies, the TRI Report, and the force data capture system. The TRI Report is now entirely computer-based

and contains a narrative section for members of the service to detail the circumstances of the incident and preliminary investigative findings. To further the dual goals of transparency and accountability, the




Figure 39

department will continue its efforts to consistently improve on its systems and processes. In 2019, there were 10,270 TRI Interaction Reports completed documenting 8,595 reportable use of

force incidents. Of the completed TRI Reports, 1,675 were for incidents that did not involve the use of force by members of the service, but were still a reportable incident under department force policies. For instance, a prisoner in department custody assaulted by another prisoner would generate a TRI Report. Similarly, the suicide of a subject in police custody is reportable by a TRI Report, but is not considered a use of force incident. Additionally, instances where subjects assault members of the service, without any use of force by members of the NYPD, would also generate TRI Reports.

Under the three levels of force defined by the NYPD's use of force policy (before the policy changes implemented in October of 2019), 2019's force incidents consisted of 94.4% Level 1 uses of force, 3.9% Level 2 uses of force, and 1.7% Level 3 uses of force. In 2018, force incidents comprised 94% Level 1 uses of force, 4% Level 2 uses of force, and 2% Level 3 uses of force.

Force Reporting Levels, 2019




Figure 40

Of the 8,595 force incidents in 2019, 81.5%, 7,006 incidents, involved the minimum amount of reportable force (i.e., forcible takedowns, hand strikes, and foot strikes). There were 1,271 CEW discharge incidents, which represents 14.8% of total reportable force incidents. This total includes intentional discharges at actively aggressive subjects and unintentional discharges while conducting operability tests in department facilities.

The remaining force incidents by equipment/force option included: 163 uses of OC spray (1.9%), 82 uses of impact weapons (1.0%), 15 uses of mesh restraining blankets (0.2%), 52 firearms discharges (0.6%), and 6 canine bites (0.1%). Over the last several years, there has been a decrease in force incidents involving the use less-lethal weapons other than CEWs. Overall, in 2019, there were a total of 266 force incidents using impact weapons, mesh restraining blankets, OC spray, and canine bites. This is 67 incidents fewer than the 333 incidents in 2018, and 252 fewer than the 518 incidents in 2017. From June to December 2016, there were a total of 396 force incidents in these categories. The NYPD began tracking the use of these force options in June 2016, after instituting its revised force policies and new reporting system. Thus, the information for 2016 is limited to the last seven months of that year and not available for prior years.

While there was a slight increase of impact weapon use in 2019 compared to 2018, the downward trend in the use of less-lethal force options, other than CEWs, continued in 2019. The use of mesh restraining blankets in 2019 fell by 55.9% compared to 2018, the use of OC spray fell by 22.7%, and incidents of canine bites fell by 50.0%. The use of impact weapons did increase by 7.9% in 2019 compared to 2018.

Type of Encounter in Which Police Used Force, 2019




Figure 41

Of the total force incidents (8,595) recorded on TRI Reports, 58.9%, or 5,062 incidents, occurred in arrest situations. Force was used in approximately 2.4% of total arrests (214,615) effected by members of the department in 2019. The combined total of use of force in arrests and incidents involving emotionally disturbed persons accounted for 80.1% of all NYPD uses of force. Summons enforcement accounted for 1.7%, and suspicious person/conditions stops accounted for 1.0% of force incidents.

Figure 42

Force Used During Arrests, 2019





Figure 43

Total Arrests by Race, 2019



Uniformed Members Using Force, 2019




Figure 44

The race and ethnicity of the uniformed members of the service using force in 2019 closely tracks the racial/ethnic breakdown of uniformed staff in the department. The racial composition of the subjects of police force reflects the racial composition of the violent criminal population in the city, as measured by arrests, assault suspects, robbery suspects, shooting suspects, and people who resist arrest.

Violent Crime and Force Used to Effect Arrest, 2019




Figure 45




Figure 46

Approximately 64.3% of individuals subjected to police force were between the ages of 16 and 35. Of individuals subjected to force between the ages of 16 and 25, 61.2% were black, 30.0% were Hispanic, 4.9% were white, and the remainder were Asian or other ethnicities. Of the subjects between the ages of 26 and 35, 57.4% were Black, 29.1% were Hispanic, 10.0% were white, and the remainder were Asian or other ethnicities. Of subjects ages 60 and older, 44.8% were black, 19.9% were Hispanic, 27.6% were white, and the remainder were Asian or other ethnicities.

Brooklyn accounted for 29.4% of citywide police uses of force, while Manhattan and the Bronx together accounted for approximately 50.1%. Uses of force occurred most often (44.5%) on the third tour, from 1531 hours to 2330 hours, with 25.6% of force incidents occurring on the first tour, from 2331 to 0730 hours, and 29.9% occurring on the second tour, from 0731 to 1530 hours.

Figure 47

Force Reporting by Geographic Borough, 2019




Figure 48

Force Reporting by Tour, 2019




Figure 49

Force Reporting by Subject Race, 2019





Figure 50


Subjects of Force by Age, 2019



CIVILIAN FORCE COMPLAINT

While force complaints received by the Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) have been on the decline over the last decade, from 3,226 in 2010 to 1,970 in 2019, the number of complaints in 2019 increased compared to 2018. There were 223 more force complaints to the CCRB in 2019 compared to the prior year, representing a 12.8% increase. The number of force allegations substantiated by CCRB in 2019 was 98; this represents a 34.2% increase compared to the 73 allegations substantiated in 2018.

Members of the NYPD respond to millions of calls for service each year, bringing members into direct contact with victims, witnesses, suspects, and other civilian bystanders. The overwhelming majority of these calls for service occur each year without police use of force or complaints of unnecessary force. In 2019, NYPD personnel responded to more than 6.4 million calls for service, and only a fraction of a percent of those interactions resulted in force complaints against uniformed members of the service. The ratio of calls for service to force complaint cases in 2019 is approximately 3,249 to 1. The ratio of calls for service to substantiated allegations is about 65,306 to 1. The ratio of use of force incidents to substantiated force allegations is approximately 88 to 1.



Force Used Against Members of the Service

Policing is an inherently dangerous profession, and members of the service understand that any encounter may turn violent. NYPD personnel strive to gain voluntary compliance but are not always successful. Some contentious encounters between uniformed members and the public become violent, and lead to injuries to both subjects and members of the service.

In 2019, there were 7,732 incidents in which subjects used force against members of the service. These incidents are often one and the same as the incidents in which members use force, but for analytical purposes, force used by members and force used against members are discussed independently. The majority of force used against NYPD personnel took place during arrest situations (56.1%) and encounters with emotionally disturbed persons (19.8%). Almost all force used against members of the service was limited to physical force without weapons (97.1%). In the remaining 228 incidents of force used against members of the service, weapons were used or displayed.

Figure 52

Force Used Against Members by Event Description, 2019




Figure 53

Type of Force Used Against Members, 2019



The highest percentage of incidents of force against members of the service in 2019 was recorded in Brooklyn (27.7%), followed by the Bronx (26.0%), and Manhattan (25.1%). The first tour (2331-0730 hours) accounted for 43.9% of incidents of force against members, the third tour (1531-2330 hours) accounted for 30.6%, and the second tour (0731-1531 hours) accounted for 25.5%. The use of force against members tracks closely to the use of force by members of the service against subjects in terms of geography and time of occurrence.

Figure 54






Figure 55



Of the 11,245 subjects of police force in 2019, 10,926 individuals (97.2%) sustained no injuries or minor injuries. A total of 319 subjects sustained substantial or serious physical injuries. During the 7,732 incidents of force used against members of the service, 4,260 members of the NYPD sustained injuries, of which 311 injuries were deemed substantial or serious. Substantial injuries are generally those that require treatment at a hospital. Serious injuries are generally those that require admission to a hospital.

Figure 56



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New York Police Department




APPENDICES



Appendices

Figure 57

Appendix A: 2019 Revised NYPD Force Documentation and Investigation Process



*FID or IAB may respond to any force incident or subject injury and may assume responsibility of the investigation based on the circumstances of the incident.

** This flowchart represents NYPD Use of Force policy as of 10/8/2019. For the purpose of data consistency and coherency in this report, the previous reporting structure was utilized and all Level 4 incidents were reported within Level 3 classification.

Figure 57

Appendix B: Subjects Killed During Intentional Discharge – Adversarial Conflict Incidents

Disclaimer: In some cases, factual information provided is based on preliminary findings of ongoing investigations. Additional information may develop as the department's investigation progresses and/or related court or grand jury proceedings are concluded.

Incident 1 – 7th Precinct (Male/Black/32) - 02/08/2019

On February 8, 2019, at approximately 0705 hours, uniformed officers responded to a 911 call of a violation of an order of protection. Upon arrival, the officers were greeted by the victim and, while searching the location, one of the officers encountered a male subject hiding inside of a closet. As the officer was escorting the subject out, the subject grabbed a knife from inside the location, ran toward the victim and began to stab him. In response, the officers discharged their firearms striking the subject. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased at 0801 hours. A kitchen knife was recovered on scene. The toxicology report indicated the presence of cotinine, methamphetamine, and amphetamine in the subject's system at the time of his death.

Incident 2 – 46th Precinct (Male/Black/32) - 04/14/2019

On April 14, 2019, at approximately 2249 hours, uniformed officers responded to a 911 call for a harassment. Upon arrival, the officers encountered the male subject armed with a knife and a wooden stick. After the subject refused numerous commands to drop the knife, one officer deployed his CEW, causing the subject to fall on the ground. As the officers approached the subject to place him in custody, the subject jumped to his feet, regained possession of the knife and wooden stick and advanced towards the officers. In response, one officer discharged his firearm, striking the subject. The subject was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased at 2346 hours. A serrated knife and wooden stick were recovered on scene. The toxicology report indicated the presence of amphetamine and methamphetamine in the subject's system at the time of his death.

Incident 3 – 34th Precinct (Male/Hispanic/42) - 04/18/2019

On April 18, 2019, at approximately 1625 hours, officers responded to a ShotSpotter activation of one round fired. A subsequent 911 call provided a description of a male subject. Upon arrival, the officers observed a male subject who matched the provided description. As the officers approached, the subject fled into a parking lot where he brandished a black firearm and discharged three rounds at the officers, striking one officer once in the right axilla area. In response, the officers discharged their firearms, striking the subject one time. The subject was

transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased at 1710 hours. A Ruger 9E 9mm semi-automatic handgun was recovered on scene. The toxicology report indicated the presence of fentanyl, norfentanyl, benzoylecgonine, morphine, cannabinoids, and cocaine in the subject's system at the time of his death.

Incident 4 – 113th Precinct (Male/Black/27) - 08/30/2019

On August 30, 2019, at approximately 0148 hours, officers were conducting a canvass for a suspect involved in a non-fatal shooting. During the canvass, officers observed a male suspect who fit the description of the shooting suspect. As the officers attempted to stop the subject, he discharged two rounds at the officers. In response, both officers discharged their firearms, striking the subject. The subject was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased at 0247 hours. A Kel-Tec 9mm semi-automatic handgun was recovered on scene. The toxicology report indicated that there was neither alcohol nor controlled substances in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 5 – 73rd Precinct (Male/Black/29) - 09/02/2019

On September 2, 2019, at approximately 0235 hours, officers were conducting patrol when they observed a male in a hooded sweatshirt and a ski-type mask holding his waistband. Ignoring the officers' request to stop and show his face, the subject began to flee on foot. A brief pursuit ensued, during which the subject drew a firearm from his waistband, and discharged it several times towards the officers, striking a police vehicle. In response, one officer discharged his firearm at the subject. The subject then continued to flee and shortly thereafter, officers were directed by a resident to the rear of a nearby location. As officers approached, the subject fired multiple rounds towards the officers. In the subsequent exchange of gunfire, the subject was struck several times. The subject was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased at 0354 hours. A Colt 1911 Series 70 .45 caliber semi-automatic handgun and Taurus PT111 Millennium G2 9mm semi-automatic handgun were recovered on scene. The toxicology report indicated the presence of THC and difluoromethane in the subject's system at the time of his death.

Incident 6 – 120th Precinct (Male/Black/39) - 09/17/2019

On September 17, 2019, at approximately 0842 hours, officers responded to a 911 call for a prior assault. Upon arrival, the officers met the victim and began a canvass. While canvassing with the victim, they observed the male subject. The officers returned the victim to her residence then proceeded to the subject's location and attempted to place him into custody. During the apprehension, the subject resisted, drew a firearm from his sweatshirt and discharged two rounds, striking one officer in the hand and another officer in the gun belt. Subsequently, one

officer discharged her firearm, striking the subject. The subject was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased at 0920 hours. A Sig Sauer P226 9mm semi-automatic handgun was recovered on scene. The toxicology report indicated the presence of alcohol, marijuana, THC, benzoylecgonine, cocaine, and methamphetamine in the subject's system at the time of his death.

Incident 7 – 47th Precinct (Male/Black/27) - 09/29/2019

On September 29, 2019, at approximately 0030 hours, officers engaged in a foot pursuit of a male subject armed with a loaded revolver. During the apprehension, a physical struggle between the officers and subject ensued. Several officers discharged their firearms, striking the subject and one officer. Both the officer and the subject were transported to the hospital where they were both later pronounced deceased. A FIE Titanic .32 caliber revolver was recovered on scene. The toxicology report indicated the presence of methamphetamine in the subject's system at the time of his death.

Incident 8 – 76th Precinct (Male/Black/30) - 10/15/2019

On October 15, 2019, at approximately 1952 hours, while conducting routine patrol, officers observed a male discharging a firearm. The officers exited their vehicle, drew their firearms, and issued several verbal commands for the subject to drop his weapon. Both officers then discharged their firearms, striking the subject. The subject was transported to the hospital and pronounced deceased on October 16, 2019, at 0046 hours. A Taurus PT111 G2 9mm semi-automatic handgun was recovered on scene. The toxicology report indicated the presence of alcohol and cotinine in the subject's system at the time of his death.

Incident 9 – 52nd Precinct (Male/Hispanic/31) - 10/17/2019

On October 17, 2019, at approximately 1449 hours, officers observed a male subject operating a vehicle without wearing his seatbelt. During the subsequent car stop, an inquiry revealed the subject had three active warrants. While the officers attempted to place the subject into custody, the subject resisted, re-entered his vehicle and attempted to place the vehicle into drive. One officer deployed a CEW which was ineffective. The officer then entered the vehicle in an attempt to gain control of the gear shift. A struggle ensued as the subject, in an attempt to flee, continued to place the car into drive and then into reverse. During this struggle in the vehicle, the officer discharged his firearm one time, striking the subject. The subject was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased at 1518 hours. The toxicology report indicated the presence of marijuana and methamphetamine in the subject's system at the time of his death.

Incident 10 – 32nd Precinct (Male/Hispanic/29) - 10/23/2019

On October 23, 2019, at approximately 0155 hours, officers responded to a 911 call of a male kicking at a door and breaking glass on the second floor of a residential apartment building. While canvassing, one officer was confronted by the subject at which time the subject discharged one round from his firearm, striking the officer in the chest area of his ballistic vest. After the discharge, a physical struggle ensued between the officer and subject, during which, the officer and other officers discharged their firearms striking the subject. The subject was pronounced deceased at the scene at 0413 hours. A Jimenez Arms 9mm semi-automatic handgun was recovered at the scene. The toxicology report indicated that there was neither alcohol nor controlled substances in the subject's system at the time of his death.

Incident 11 – 73rd Precinct (Male/Black/33) - 10/25/2019

On October 25, 2019, at approximately 1736 hours, officers were flagged down by a store owner reporting a disorderly person inside the establishment. While attempting to place the male subject into custody, he began to resist arrest. As the officers attempted to restrain this individual, a second male subject intervened and began fighting the officers. While the second subject was physically striking one officer, the other officer deployed his CEW striking the subject with no effect. As the struggle continued, the second subject struck one officer with a metal chair causing serious physical injuries. That officer then discharged his firearm striking the second subject. The subject was pronounced deceased at the scene at 1852 hours. As a result of his injuries, the officer struck by the metal chair was admitted to the hospital. The toxicology report of the deceased subject is pending at the time of this report.

Appendix C: Other Death Investigations Conducted by the Force Investigation Division

Disclaimer: In some cases, factual information provided is based on preliminary findings of ongoing investigations. Additional information may develop as the department's investigation progresses and/or related court or grand jury proceedings are concluded.

Death in Custody

Death in custody incidents typically occur after the restraint of a particular subject. The term "in custody," refers to a subject whom officers have either decided that there was probable cause to arrest or that restraint was necessary for the safety of the subject or other persons present. In death in custody situations, subjects may be located anywhere, (e.g., at the scene of an incident, at a hospital, at a police facility, or in a courthouse awaiting arraignment), and death may occur due to intervening circumstances or actors beyond police control. Such intervening circumstances include: medical crises like heart attacks and strokes; suicides; drug-related deaths from drugs taken or ingested prior to custody; and injuries inflicted before custody during accidents, or assaults by people other than involved parties. In 2019, there were eight death in custody incidents.

Incident 1 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 112th Precinct (Male/Black/57) - 01/03/2019

On January 3, 2019, the male subject, who resided at a nursing care facility, was discovered by medical staff in an unconscious state. Officers responded to the scene and the subject, after regaining consciousness, was transported to the hospital where his condition worsened. While being treated by hospital medical staff, a quantity of narcotics was recovered from the subject and he was subsequently placed under arrest. The subject went into cardiac arrest several times throughout the night and on January 4, the subject was pronounced deceased at the hospital. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was acute intoxication by the combined effects of fentanyl, fluoroisobutyrylfentanyl, and heroin. The toxicology report indicated the presence of fentanyl, norfentanyl, fluoroisobutyrylfentanyl, hydroxyfentanyl, and morphine in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 2 – Suicide/No Police Force Used – 40th Precinct (Male/Black/37) - 02/25/2019

On February 25, 2019, officers had probable cause to take the male subject into custody. Prior to being taken into custody, the subject had sustained an apparent self-inflicted gunshot wound and was subsequently admitted to the hospital. On March 4, the subject was pronounced deceased while hospitalized. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was

a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head. The toxicology report indicated the presence of fentanyl, norfentanyl and cannabinoids in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 3 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 120th Precinct (Male/White/49) - 05/08/2019

On May 8, 2019, the male subject was arrested for criminal contempt while inside of a residence. Upon the subject being transported to the precinct, medical attention was requested due to the subject's intoxicated state, as well as a laceration to the back of his head, which occurred prior to the officers' arrival. The subject was removed to the hospital and admitted for further medical care. On May 22, the subject was pronounced deceased while at the hospital. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was complications following blunt head trauma with subdural hemorrhage and hepatic cirrhosis due to chronic alcohol use. The toxicology report indicated the presence of fentanyl, norfentanyl, and ethanol in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 4 – Suicide/No Police Force Used – 48th Precinct (Male/Black/32) - 06/15/2019

On June 15, 2019, officers responded to a 911 call for a rescue. After the officers entered the apartment with Emergency Medical Services (EMS) personnel, the body of a F/B/10 was located in a bedroom. During a further search, the male subject and the body of a F/B/34 were located lying in a separate bedroom. The subject was bleeding from his head with an apparent self-inflicted gunshot wound. He was in possession of a firearm and not responding to the officers. Emergency Service Unit (ESU) personnel responded, disarmed the subject and placed him into custody. Both females were pronounced deceased on scene. The subject was removed to the hospital and was later pronounced deceased on June 29 while in the hospital. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head.

Incident 5 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 44th Precinct (Male/White/48) - 07/19/2019

On July 19, 2019, the male subject was awaiting arraignment while in the custody of the NYC Department of Corrections at Bronx Central Booking when he suffered a seizure and went into cardiac arrest. The subject was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was complications of alcohol abuse. The toxicology report indicated the presence of ethanol, acetone, and nordiazepam in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 6 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 84th Precinct (Male/Hispanic/60) - 07/31/2019

On July 31, 2019, the male subject was awaiting arraignment while in custody at Brooklyn Central Booking when he suffered a seizure and went into cardiac arrest. The subject was transported to

the hospital. On December 14, the subject was pronounced deceased while in the hospital. According to the subject's death certificate, the death was due to natural causes.

Incident 7 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 43rd Precinct (Male/Hispanic/41) - 08/11/2019

On August 11, 2019, an officer responded to a radio run of an emotionally disturbed person (EDP) walking in traffic. Upon canvassing, the officer located a male subject rolling around in a gas station. The officer approached the subject as he continued to roll his body and rear-handcuffed him with the assistance of two unidentified male civilians. After being handcuffed, the subject began foaming at his mouth, and the officer administered NARCAN with no effect. The subject went into cardiac arrest and was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was acute cocaine intoxication, hypertensive and atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease, and myxomatous degeneration of mitral valve. The toxicology report indicated the presence of cocaine, benzoylecgonine, and cotinine in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 8 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 106th Precinct (Male/Hispanic/52) - 09/02/2019

On September 2, 2019, officers responded to a call of an assault in progress. While speaking with the complainant, the officers were informed that the male subject was inside of an ambulance parked approximately one block away. When the officers and complainant arrived at the ambulance, the complainant positively identified the subject being treated by EMS as the person who assaulted her. The officers then placed the subject under arrest. The subject was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the immediate cause of death was hemoperitoneum due to or as a consequence of splenic rupture of undetermined etiology and cirrhosis of the liver with splenomegaly. The toxicology report indicated the presence of cotinine and ethanol in the subject's system at the time of death.

Death Preceding Custody

Death preceding custody incidents typically occur immediately before the intended restraint of a particular subject, after officers have either decided that there was probable cause to arrest or that restraint was necessary for the safety of the subject or other persons present, but had not, in fact, established control of the person. Nine cases investigated by the Force Investigation Division in 2019 are categorized as death preceding custody. In four cases, the subjects were fleeing the police when the deaths occurred.

Incident 1 – Suicide/No Police Force Used – 40th Precinct (Male/Black/27) - 02/11/2019

On February 11, 2019, officers were assigned to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person on a roof. Upon arrival, officers encountered the male subject standing on the ledge of the roof and brandishing a knife. As the officers were awaiting the response of the ESU, they established a dialogue with the subject who stated an intention to end his own life. ESU personnel arrived on scene and also attempted to establish a dialogue with the subject, who repeated his intention to end his own life. After approximately twenty-one minutes of dialogue, the subject leapt from the roof ledge and fell to the ground. The subject was immediately removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the immediate cause of death was blunt impact injuries of the head, torso, and extremities. The toxicology report indicated the presence of cotinine in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 2 – Fleeing Subject/No Police Force Used – 60th Precinct (Male/White/31) - 03/01/2019

On March 1, 2019, officers attempted to apprehend the subject on an active parole warrant at his residence, a 19-story residential apartment building. As the officers were at the front door of the subject's apartment attempting to make contact, the subject went out onto the balcony of the apartment. In an effort to evade arrest, the subject fell to the ground. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the immediate cause of death was blunt impact injuries of the torso. The toxicology report indicated the presence of fentanyl, norfentanyl, acetylfentanyl, hydroxyfentanyl, morphine, cotinine, and cannabinoids in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 3 – Fleeing Subject/No Police Force Used – 5th Precinct (Male/Hispanic/42) - 05/25/2019

On May 25, 2019, officers responding to a 911 call of a robbery in progress observed the male subject fleeing the location in a vehicle. As the subject fled, he struck a marked patrol vehicle then drove across the span of a bridge and onto an exit ramp. Shortly thereafter, the subject drove against traffic on the exit ramp, struck another marked patrol vehicle and continued driving. While still on the exit ramp, the subject stopped, exited his car, and leapt over the guardrail where he landed on the ground, approximately thirty-one feet below. The subject was removed to the hospital where, on May 26, he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was multiple blunt impact injuries. The toxicology report indicated the presence of cannabinoids and ethanol in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 4 – Fleeing Subject/No Police Force Used – 18th Precinct (Male/Black/25) - 06/04/2019

On June 4, 2019, officers responded to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person. Upon their arrival, the subject fled from the responding officers. During his flight, the subject suffered from

an apparent medical condition causing him to fall backwards and strike the rear of his head against the sidewalk. The subject was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was acute cocaine intoxication with excited delirium syndrome. The toxicology report indicated the presence of cocaine, benzoylecgonine, and cotinine in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 5 – Fleeing Subject/No Police Force Used – 47th Precinct (Male/Hispanic/36) - 06/25/2019

On June 25, 2019, officers responded to a report of a violation of an active order of protection. While at the door of the location, a 13th floor apartment, the officers attempted to establish a dialogue with the subject. At that time, the subject climbed out of a window and descended down to the window of a 10th floor apartment. Shortly thereafter, the subject appeared to lose his grip and fell to the ground. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt force injuries. The toxicology report indicated the presence of ethanol, chlordiazepoxide, nordiazepam, and oxazepam in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 6 – Suicide/No Police Force Used – 109th Precinct (Male/White/45) - 10/23/2019

On October 23, 2019, officers responded to 911 calls for a suicidal male. Responding officers located the subject on a rooftop of a 15-story building and established a dialogue with him. After approximately 50 minutes of dialogue, the subject lowered his body off the ledge of the building and released his grip, causing him to fall to the ground below. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt impact injury of the torso. The toxicology report indicated the presence of gabapentin, benzoylecgonine and cocaine in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 7 – Suicide/No Police Force Used – 109th Precinct (Female/Asian/52) - 11/21/2019

On November 21, 2019, officers responded to a radio run of an emotionally disturbed person on a fire escape, possibly wanting to jump. Upon arrival, officers observed the female subject outside on the sixth floor fire escape with her back to the building, holding onto the railing. While officers were attempting to establish a dialogue with the subject, she bent her knees in a squatting position and lunged forward into the air, jumping off of the fire escape and landing on the ground below. The subject was removed to the hospital where she was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt injuries of head, neck, and torso. The toxicology report indicated that there was neither alcohol nor controlled substances in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 8 – Suicide/No Police Force Used – 68th Precinct (Male/White/44) - 12/06/2019

On December 6, 2019, officers responded to a 911 call of a suicidal male on a bridge. Upon arrival, officers observed the subject in dialogue with Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority (TBTA) officers. ESU officers arrived and attempted to further engage the subject in dialogue when the subject jumped from the upper level of the bridge. Harbor Unit officers recovered the subject from the water, and the subject was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt impact injuries of the head and torso. The toxicology report indicated the presence of terbinafine and cotinine in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 9 – Suicide/No Police Force Used – 75th Precinct (Female/Asian/42) - 12/10/2019

On December 10, 2019, officers attempted to make contact with a female subject at her apartment door, but she refused them entry despite having placed several 911 calls for assistance. When the subject failed to respond to the officers at her door, they became concerned for her safety. Believing her to be in distress, the officers forcibly entered the apartment. Once inside the apartment, the officers could not locate anyone inside, but they found an open window. Looking out the window, the officers observed the woman on the ground below. The subject was transported to the hospital where she was later pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt trauma of the head, torso and extremities. The toxicology report indicated the presence of ketamine, morketamine, fentanyl and norfentanyl in the subject's system at the time of death.

Death No Custody Contemplated

Deceased persons sometimes were not taken into police custody nor did the police contemplate taking them into custody, and these cases are classified as *death when no custody contemplated*. One case investigated by the Force Investigation Division in 2019 was categorized as death no custody contemplated.

Incident 1 – Fleeing Vehicle – 103rd Precinct (Female/Black/60) - 11/05/2019

On November 5, officers had commenced and subsequently terminated the pursuit of a stolen vehicle. The operator continued to flee in the stolen vehicle and then exited the vehicle while it was still in motion. The unoccupied vehicle remained in motion, striking the female subject as she walked in a crosswalk. The subject was removed to the hospital where she was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt impact injuries of the head, and torso. The toxicology report indicated that there was neither alcohol nor controlled substances in the subject's system at the time of death.

Figure 58

Appendix D: 2019 Firearm Discharge Incidents by Precinct/Location of Occurrence

| Precinct/Location | Adversarial Conflict | Animal Attack | Unintentional | Unauthorized/Suicide | Total |
|--------------------|----------------------|---------------|---------------|----------------------|-----------|
| 007 Precinct | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 013 Precinct | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 028 Precinct | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 032 Precinct | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 034 Precinct | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| 040 Precinct | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| 044 Precinct | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| 045 Precinct | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| 046 Precinct | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 047 Precinct | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| 048 Precinct | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 052 Precinct | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| 061 Precinct | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 063 Precinct | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| 069 Precinct | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| 073 Precinct | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| 075 Precinct | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 076 Precinct | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 078 Precinct | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| 083 Precinct | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 102 Precinct | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 104 Precinct | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 105 Precinct | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 |
| 106 Precinct | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 3 |
| 107 Precinct | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| 111 Precinct | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 112 Precinct | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 113 Precinct | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 115 Precinct | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| 120 Precinct | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| 121 Precinct | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 122 Precinct | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Nassau County | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 4 |
| Orange County | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Suffolk County | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Westchester County | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| TOTAL | 25 | 6 | 8 | 13 | 52 |

Appendix E: Historical Data on Police Firearm Discharges

Figure 59

Total Rounds Discharged, 1971-2019




Figure 60

Subjects Shot and Injured by Officers, 1971-2019





Figure 61

Subjects Shot and Killed by Officers, 1971-2019



Appendix E: Historical Data on Police Firearm Discharges

Figure 62

Officers Shot and Injured by Subjects, 1971-




Figure 63

Officers Shot and Killed by Subjects, 1971-




Figure 64

Appendix F: 2019 Use of Force Incidents by Members' Command

| Precinct/Command | Firearm | Electrical Weapon | Impact Weapon | Police Canine | OC Spray | Restraining Mesh Blanket | Physical Force | Total |
|-------------------------|---------|-------------------|---------------|---------------|----------|--------------------------|----------------|-------|
| 001 PRECINCT | 0 | 9 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 40 | 52 |
| 001 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 6 |
| 005 PRECINCT | 0 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 35 | 42 |
| 005 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 |
| 006 PRECINCT | 0 | 17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 57 | 74 |
| 007 PRECINCT | 1 | 18 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 40 | 61 |
| 007 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 9 |
| 009 PRECINCT | 0 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 49 | 66 |
| 009 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| 010 DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 010 PRECINCT | 0 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 25 | 37 |
| 010 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| 013 PRECINCT | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 79 | 85 |
| 013 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 10 |
| 014 PCT-MIDTOWN SO. PCT | 0 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 88 | 119 |
| 017 DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 017 PRECINCT | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 42 | 45 |
| 018 PCT-MIDTOWN NO. PCT | 0 | 12 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 50 | 65 |
| 019 PRECINCT | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 56 | 58 |
| 020 DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 020 PRECINCT | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 35 | 44 |
| 020 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 023 PRECINCT | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 57 | 63 |
| 024 PRECINCT | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 50 | 55 |
| 025 PRECINCT | 0 | 16 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100 | 118 |
| 026 DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| 026 PRECINCT | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 30 | 37 |
| 028 PRECINCT | 2 | 21 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 89 | 114 |
| 030 DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 030 PRECINCT | 0 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 51 | 63 |
| 032 DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| 032 PRECINCT | 1 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 77 | 91 |
| 033 DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 033 PRECINCT | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 42 | 47 |
| 034 PRECINCT | 2 | 22 | 1 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 66 | 97 |
| 034 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 040 DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 040 PRECINCT | 1 | 13 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 119 | 135 |

| Precinct/Command | Firearm | Electrical Weapon | Impact Weapon | Police Canine | OC Spray | Restraining Mesh Blanket | Physical Force | Total |
|------------------------|---------|-------------------|---------------|---------------|----------|--------------------------|----------------|-------|
| 040 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 15 |
| 041 PRECINCT | 1 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 56 | 69 |
| 041 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 6 |
| 042 DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 042 PRECINCT | 0 | 17 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 99 | 124 |
| 042 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| 043 DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| 043 PRECINCT | 0 | 19 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 74 | 95 |
| 043 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| 044 DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 044 PRECINCT | 3 | 83 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 188 | 276 |
| 044 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| 045 DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 045 PRECINCT | 0 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 47 | 55 |
| 045 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 6 |
| 046 DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 046 PRECINCT | 1 | 27 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 266 | 299 |
| 046 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| 047 DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 047 PRECINCT | 1 | 47 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 137 | 185 |
| 047 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| 048 DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 048 PRECINCT | 2 | 36 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 88 | 126 |
| 048 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 9 |
| 049 DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| 049 PRECINCT | 0 | 15 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 50 | 67 |
| 049 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 050 DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 050 PRECINCT | 1 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 27 | 36 |
| 050 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| 052 DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 052 PRECINCT | 1 | 64 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 1 | 139 | 211 |
| 052 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 060 DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| 060 PRECINCT | 0 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 76 | 87 |
| 060 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 061 PRECINCT | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 29 | 38 |
| 062 DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 062 PRECINCT | 0 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 40 | 52 |

| Precinct/Command | Firearm | Electrical Weapon | Impact Weapon | Police Canine | OC Spray | Restraining Mesh Blanket | Physical Force | Total |
|------------------------|---------|-------------------|---------------|---------------|----------|--------------------------|----------------|-------|
| 063 PRECINCT | 0 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 65 | 74 |
| 063 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 066 DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| 066 PRECINCT | 1 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 18 |
| 066 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 067 DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| 067 PRECINCT | 0 | 23 | 2 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 109 | 141 |
| 068 DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 068 PRECINCT | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 47 | 53 |
| 068 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 069 DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 069 PRECINCT | 1 | 7 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 56 | 68 |
| 069 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| 070 PRECINCT | 0 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 75 | 90 |
| 071 PRECINCT | 0 | 10 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 98 | 111 |
| 071 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 072 PRECINCT | 0 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 97 | 117 |
| 073 PRECINCT | 4 | 34 | 4 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 103 | 150 |
| 073 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| 075 DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| 075 PRECINCT | 1 | 36 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 195 | 242 |
| 075 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| 076 PRECINCT | 1 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 38 | 48 |
| 076 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 077 DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 077 PRECINCT | 0 | 18 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 85 | 105 |
| 078 PRECINCT | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | 42 |
| 078 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 079 PRECINCT | 0 | 12 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 100 | 118 |
| 079 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| 081 PRECINCT | 0 | 10 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 60 | 72 |
| 083 PRECINCT | 2 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 71 | 89 |
| 083 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| 084 PRECINCT | 0 | 11 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 32 | 45 |
| 084 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| 088 DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 088 PRECINCT | 0 | 12 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 29 | 45 |
| 088 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 090 PRECINCT | 0 | 19 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 66 | 85 |

| Precinct/Command | Firearm | Electrical Weapon | Impact Weapon | Police Canine | OC Spray | Restraining Mesh Blanket | Physical Force | Total |
|------------------------|---------|----------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|-------|
| 094 PRECINCT | 0 | 10 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 31 | 43 |
| 100 PRECINCT | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 27 | 32 |
| 100 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 11 |
| 101 PRECINCT | 0 | 14 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 117 | 132 |
| 101 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 101ST DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 102 PRECINCT | 2 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 69 | 76 |
| 103 PRECINCT | 2 | 15 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 96 | 114 |
| 104 PRECINCT | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 31 | 40 |
| 104TH DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 105 PRECINCT | 1 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 62 | 79 |
| 105TH DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 106 PRECINCT | 3 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 55 | 69 |
| 106 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 106TH DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 107 PRECINCT | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 42 | 49 |
| 107 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 |
| 108 PRECINCT | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 17 | 22 |
| 109 PRECINCT | 0 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 42 | 54 |
| 109 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 110 PRECINCT | 0 | 9 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 63 | 74 |
| 110 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 110TH DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 111 PRECINCT | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 18 | 21 |
| 111 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| 112 PRECINCT | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 25 | 27 |
| 113 PRECINCT | 0 | 23 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 142 | 168 |
| 113 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 113TH DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| 114 PRECINCT | 0 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 58 | 72 |
| 114 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 115 PRECINCT | 0 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 62 | 74 |
| 115TH DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| 120 PRECINCT | 1 | 21 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 150 | 174 |
| 120 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| 121 DETECTIVE SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 121 PRECINCT | 1 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 66 | 76 |
| 121 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 |
| 122 PRECINCT | 0 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 45 | 57 |

| Precinct/Command | Firearm | Electrical Weapon | Impact Weapon | Police Canine | OC Spray | Restraining Mesh Blanket | Physical Force | Total |
|-----------------------------------|---------|----------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|-------|
| 122 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| 123 PRECINCT | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 29 | 33 |
| 123 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| AUTO CRIME | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| BRONX COURT SECT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| BRONX SPECIAL VICTIMS SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| BROOKLYN COURT SECTION | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 10 |
| BUS UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| CANDIDATE ASSESSMENT DIVISION | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| CENTRAL INVESTIGATIONS DIV | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| CENTRAL PARK PRECINCT | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 10 |
| CHIEF OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| CIVILIAN TRAINING UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| CRIME SCENE UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE INVEST SEC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| CRITICAL RESPONSE COMMAND | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 8 |
| DA SQUAD BRONX | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| DA SQUAD BROOKLYN | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| DET BORO BKLYN SO HOMICIDE SQ | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| DET BORO BRONX OPER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 |
| DET BORO QUEENS NORTH | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| DET BORO SI OPERATIONS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| DISORDER CONTROL UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| DRUG ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 |
| EMER SERV SQ 01 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 8 |
| EMER SERV SQ 02 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 |
| EMER SERV SQ 03 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 5 |
| EMER SERV SQ 04 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 7 |
| EMER SERV SQ 05 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| EMER SERV SQ 06 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 6 |
| EMER SERV SQ 07 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 12 |
| EMER SERV SQ 08 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 7 |
| EMER SERV SQ 09 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 |

| Precinct/Command | Firearm | Electrical Weapon | Impact Weapon | Police Canine | OC Spray | Restraining Mesh Blanket | Physical Force | Total |
|--------------------------------|---------|-------------------|---------------|---------------|----------|--------------------------|----------------|-------|
| EMER SERV SQ 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| EMER SERV UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| FACILITIES MANAGEMENT DIVISION | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| FIREARMS SUPPRESSION SECTION | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| GANG SQUAD BRONX | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| GANG SQUAD BROOKLYN NORTH | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 10 |
| GANG SQUAD BROOKLYN SOUTH | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| GANG SQUAD MANHATTAN NORTH | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 6 |
| GANG SQUAD MANHATTAN SOUTH | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| GANG SQUAD QUEENS NORTH | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| GANG SQUAD QUEENS SOUTH | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 10 |
| GANG SQUAD STATEN ISLAND | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| GRAND LARCENY DIVISION | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 6 |
| GUN VIOL SUPP DIV Z1 (BK,Q,SI) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| GUN VIOL SUPP DIV Z2 (MAN,BX) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| GUN VIOLENCE SUPPRESSION DIV | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| HATE CRIME TASK FORCE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| HB BRONX/QUEENS RESPONSE TEAM | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| HB BROOKLYN RESPONSE TEAM | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 |
| HB MANHATTAN RESPONSE TEAM | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| HIGHWAY UNIT NO 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| HIGHWAY UNIT NO 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| HIGHWAY UNIT NO 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 |
| HOMELESS OUT & SHLTR SEC DIV | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| HOMELESS OUTREACH UNIT | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 5 |
| HOUSING PSA 1 | 0 | 12 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 47 | 60 |
| HOUSING PSA 2 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 53 | 65 |

| Precinct/Command | Firearm | Electrical Weapon | Impact Weapon | Police Canine | OC Spray | Restraining Mesh Blanket | Physical Force | Total |
|--------------------------------|---------|-------------------|---------------|---------------|----------|--------------------------|----------------|-------|
| HOUSING PSA 3 | 0 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 71 | 83 |
| HOUSING PSA 4 | 0 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 25 | 35 |
| HOUSING PSA 5 | 1 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 38 | 50 |
| HOUSING PSA 6 | 0 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 49 | 64 |
| HOUSING PSA 7 | 1 | 15 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 55 | 74 |
| HOUSING PSA 8 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 54 | 60 |
| HOUSING PSA 9 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | 44 |
| INTEL-CRIMINAL INTEL SECTION | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 17 | 19 |
| INTELLIGENCE BUREAU | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| INTEL-PUBLIC SECURITY SECTION | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| INTERNAL AFFAIRS BUREAU | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 6 | 7 |
| JUVENILE CRIME SECTION | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| MAJOR CASE SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| MAN COURT SECTION | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 10 |
| MAN/BX SS ZONE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 6 |
| MTN DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| MTN SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| MTS DET SQUAD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| MTS SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| NARC BORO BRONX | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 29 | 33 |
| NARC BORO BROOKLYN NORTH | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 26 | 29 |
| NARC BORO BROOKLYN SOUTH | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 14 | 16 |
| NARC BORO MANHATTAN NORTH | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 24 | 24 |
| NARC BORO MANHATTAN SOUTH | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 11 | 12 |
| NARC BORO QUEENS NORTH | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 11 |
| NARC BORO QUEENS SOUTH | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 14 |
| NARC BORO STATEN ISLAND | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 7 |
| OFFICE CHIEF SPECIAL OPER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| OFFICE OF MGMT ANALYSIS & PLAN | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| OTHER | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 18 | 20 |
| PATROL BORO BRONX | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 10 |
| PATROL BORO MAN SOUTH | 0 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 25 | 31 |
| PATROL BORO QUEENS NORTH | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 |

| Precinct/Command | Firearm | Electrical Weapon | Impact Weapon | Police Canine | OC Spray | Restraining Mesh Blanket | Physical Force | Total |
|--------------------------------|---------|-------------------|---------------|---------------|----------|--------------------------|----------------|-------|
| PATROL BORO STATEN ISLAND | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 12 | 15 |
| PATROL SERVICES BUREAU | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| PBBN SCHOOL SAFETY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| PBBN SPECIALIZED UNITS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| PBBS SPECIALIZED UNITS | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 13 |
| PBBX SCHOOL SAFETY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 45 | 45 |
| PBBX SPECIALIZED UNITS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 |
| PBMN SCHOOL SAFETY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 7 |
| PBMN SPECIALIZED UNITS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| PBMS SCHOOL SAFETY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 14 |
| PBMS SPECIALIZED UNITS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 |
| PBQN SCHOOL SAFETY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| PBQN SPECIALIZED UNITS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 6 |
| PBQS SCHOOL SAFETY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| PBQS SPECIALIZED UNITS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 8 |
| PBSI SCHOOL SAFETY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| PBSI SPECIALIZED UNITS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| POLICE COMM OFFICE | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| POLICE LABORATORY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| QNS COURT SECTION | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 |
| QNS/BKLYN/SI SS ZONE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| RECRUIT TRAINING SECTION | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 |
| SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIV | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| SPECIAL VICTIMS DIV ZONE 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| SPECIAL VICTIMS DIV ZONE 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| SPECIAL VICTIMS DIVISION | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| SPECIALIZED TRAINING SECTION | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| STATEN ISLAND COURT SECTION | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| STRATEGIC RESP GRP 1 MANHATTAN | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 19 | 22 |
| STRATEGIC RESP GRP 2 BRONX | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 17 | 21 |
| STRATEGIC RESP GRP 3 BROOKLYN | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 8 | 12 |
| STRATEGIC RESP GRP 4 QUEENS | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 9 |
| STRATEGIC RESP GRP 5 SI | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 9 |

| Precinct/Command | Firearm | Electrical Weapon | Impact Weapon | Police Canine | OC Spray | Restraining Mesh Blanket | Physical Force | Total |
|--------------------------------|---------|-------------------|---------------|---------------|----------|--------------------------|----------------|-------|
| STRATEGIC RESPONSE GROUP | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 13 |
| STRIKE FORCE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| TB ANTI TERRORISM UNIT | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 47 | 50 |
| TB CITYWIDE VANDALS TASK FORCE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| TB SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 7 |
| TRANSIT BORO BKLN TASK FORCE | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 7 |
| TRANSIT BORO BX/QNS TASK FORCE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| TRANSIT BORO MANH TASK FORCE | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 17 | 20 |
| TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 33 | 38 |
| TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 11 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 28 | 34 |
| TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 12 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 42 | 47 |
| TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 38 | 39 |
| TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 20 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 19 | 22 |
| TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 23 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 6 | 11 |
| TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 3 | 0 | 5 | 4 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 30 | 42 |
| TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 30 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 37 | 43 |
| TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 32 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 43 | 54 |
| TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 33 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 33 | 38 |
| TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 34 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 17 | 20 |
| TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 4 | 0 | 7 | 3 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 46 | 66 |
| TRANSPORTATION BUREAU | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| TRB BRONX TRAFFIC ENF UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| TRB BROOKLYN TRAFFIC ENF UNIT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| TRB CITYWIDE TRAFFIC T/F | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 20 | 24 |
| TRB HIGHWAY DISTRICT | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| TRB MANHATTAN SUMMONS ENF SEC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 |

| Precinct/Command | Firearm | Electrical Weapon | Impact Weapon | Police Canine | OC Spray | Restraining Mesh Blanket | Physical Force | Total |
|-----------------------------------|-----------|----------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|-------------|
| TRB QUEENS TRAFFIC ENF UNIT | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| TRB SOUTH INTERSECTION CONTROL | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| TRB TRAFF SPECIAL OPS SECTION | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| VED MAJOR CASE SECTION | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| VICE ENFORCEMENT DIV ZONE 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| VICE ENFORCEMENT DIV ZONE 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 6 |
| WARRANT SECTION | 0 | 15 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 57 | 74 |
| Total | 52 | 1271 | 82 | 6 | 163 | 15 | 7006 | 8595 |

Figure 65

Appendix G: 2019 NYPD Use of Force Policy Modifications

| Use of Force Policy Modifications | | |
|---|----------------|---|
| Pre-October 8, 2019 | | As of October 8, 2019 |
| <i>Use of:</i> hand strikes; foot strikes; forcible takedowns; wrestling/grappling; O.C. spray; mesh restraining blanket; CEW (cartridge mode) OR Physical Injury | Level 1 | No Change |
| <i>Use of:</i> impact weapon (baton, other equipment, etc.) police canine bite, CEW (drive stun mode), any prohibited act. OR <i>Type of Injury:</i> Substantial Physical Injury; Alleged/Suspected Excessive Force (including incidents with no apparent injury); Attempted Suicide (excluding Serious Physical injury) | Level 2 | The term “substantial physical injury” has been deleted to align with New York State Penal Law. Added language specific to injury type: Physical Injury consistent with use of Level 2 force; unconsciousness; loss of tooth; application of stitches/staples. |
| <i>Use of:</i> physical force readily capable of causing death or serious injury, including firearm discharge. OR <i>Type of Injury:</i> Death; Serious Physical Injury; Alleged/Suspected Excessive Force (resulting in Serious Physical Injury); Attempted Suicide(Serious Physical injury) | Level 3 | Removed firearms discharges from the type of force used. Removed death and serious injury <u>and</u> likely to die from the type of injury. |
| Not Applicable | Level 4 | Includes all police firearm discharges OR The type of injury is death or serious injury and likely to die. |

*changes are in bold

Although data presented in the 2019 Use of Force Report has been presented in the previous three level policy structure, the following data represents use of force incidents from October 8, 2019 to December 31, 2019, arranged in the current four level policy structure.

Force Incident Levels

| | |
|---------------------------|------|
| Level 1 | 1623 |
| Level 2 | 47 |
| Level 3 | 27 |
| Level 4 | 13 |
| * No Force Incident Level | 355 |

| | |
|--------------------|-------------|
| Grand Total | 2065 |
|--------------------|-------------|

* Incidents in which force was used only against an MOS.

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