

2021 Use of Force Report



NYPD
New York City Police Department




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Use of Force Report 2021

Data and information contained in this report are subject to change based on complaint and investigative updates.

Police Commissioner's Message



Every day, the women and men of the New York City Police Department maintain a steadfast focus dedicated to service, justice, and fundamental fairness to ensure the safety of our city. This commitment engages our members with the people they serve, forging stronger relationships that help build trust and understanding through elevated standards of transparency and accountability. Since 2016, these standards have helped shape the Use of Force Report, an annual text detailing all aspects of the application of force by our members, from a firearms discharge, to a less-lethal force option, or any general use of force utilized to subdue a subject. The report also details the force that subjects used against our members as well.

In the decades since firearm discharges and force related recordkeeping began, the department has made tremendous progress in fighting crime, attributed largely to such factors as strategic innovations, enhanced training, and technological advances. Though each of these elements have certainly contributed to the protection of our city, the most important factor has been the members of this department and their determined commitment to improving safety and the quality of life

in New York City. Dedicated to the department's mission, these members perform their duties to the highest standards of professionalism, demonstrating the utmost respect for life through the substantial restraint they exercise if, and when, they must utilize force.

Department policy ensures that our members take responsibility for, and justify, any use of force actions. The third lowest total on record for firearms discharge incidents by members of this department took place in 2021, and a continuing decrease in areas of less-lethal force utilized by our members also occurred.

In 2021, as New York City continued to face extraordinary challenges that included the complexities of the ongoing health pandemic, the NYPD responded as expected – with dedication and diligence. By maintaining an undeterred commitment to policing our city in a manner that is both smart and fair, the NYPD remains the vanguard, as a department and as a collaborative community partner, in its efforts to reduce the impact of crime and violence on our city's streets. Crime is not just statistics; it is people, it is victims, it is loss, it is harm, and it is what we have vowed to combat each and every day.



Executive Summary

This text is the New York City Police Department's sixth annual Use of Force Report. Since its inception, this report has reflected the department's relentless commitment to enhance the transparency and accountability with respect to the use, reporting, and investigation of force. In 2021, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) recorded 52 police firearms discharges and, while an increase from the previous year, this still represents the third lowest total since discharge recordkeeping began in 1971. During 2021, despite an increase from the previous year in calls for service, total arrests, arrests for weapons possession, and, in specific, gun arrests, the department continued its downward trend in the use of several categories of less-lethal force. The use of impact weapons, Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray, mesh restraining blankets, and canine bites decreased in 2021, and since 2019, the department has only experienced one category increase (impact weapons rose by four instances from 2018 to 2019) among these less lethal options. This report contains a detailed accounting of the use of force by members of the service, from the lowest level of physical force up to and including the intentional discharge of a firearm in adversarial conflicts.

The NYPD accounts for every shot fired by members of the service, whether intentionally or unintentionally, except for discharges during firearms training or a discharge into a firearms safety station within an NYPD facility, a Department of Correction facility, or a Health and Hospitals Corporation facility. In 2007, the NYPD began to publicly release the Annual Firearms Discharge Report, offering a full classification of all shooting incidents, including the number of subjects killed and wounded, the number of innocent bystanders killed and wounded, animal shootings, unintentional discharges, unauthorized uses of department firearms, and police suicides with firearms. The collection, analysis, and assessment of firearms discharge data is an essential element of the department's committed effort to continuously evaluate and enhance both the practices and the policies of the NYPD.

In 2016, the NYPD overhauled its force policies and incident reporting structure, enabling the introduction of the Use of Force Report, which has replaced the Annual Firearms Discharge Report. This annual report has developed beyond the data captured by the firearms discharge reports to include an accounting of all other reportable uses of force by members of the service, allowing for a greater analysis of the use of force in the NYPD. Documenting the how, when, where, and why force is utilized by NYPD personnel provides a useful context that strives to keep the department, and the public, informed through enhanced transparency, that further proves to be an invaluable tool towards minimizing force incidents and injuries in such situations where force, despite any and all efforts of prevention, is unavoidable.

The department's use of force policies and procedures are found in the Department Manual. The manual, along with the NYPD Force Dashboard, are publicly available on-line at the NYPD web page, www.nyc.gov/nypd. The dashboard, a dynamic consolidation of the department's use of force data, is highly transparent, interactive, and user-friendly, providing users with data visualizations to explore the characteristics of force incidents. This

includes, but is not limited to, data regarding members of the service, subjects, types of force, locations, the basis for an encounter, and injuries. Additionally, the dashboard includes legal context, insight on data collection, and details on department policy.

During the first four years of this report (2016-2019), the types of force utilized by NYPD personnel were separated into three levels. As of October 2019, however, the department added a fourth category, making this report just the second text to fully integrate the current four-level use of force policy structure. Level 1 consists of hand strikes, foot strikes, forcible takedowns, discharging OC spray, discharging conducted electrical weapons (CEWs) in cartridge mode, and using mesh restraining blankets to secure subjects. Level 2 includes the intentional striking of a person with any object (including a baton, other equipment, etc.), police canine bites, or using CEWs in "drive-stun" mode. Level 3 consists of the use of physical force that is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury, except for firearms discharges. Level 4 consists of any discharge of a firearm by a member of the service or from a firearm belonging to a member of the service. Level 4 classification, though added to policy in October 2019, was not included in the 2019 Use of Force Report in order to organize the data coherently for public consumption. For 2019, any occurrence that would classify as a Level 4 incident was presented within that year's annual report under the three levels of force classification system, the system that was in place for the vast majority of that year. Due to this modification within both policy and data collection, the department may, going forward, alter the manner in which comparisons of certain historical force data is made.

Built directly into the NYPD force policy is a comprehensive mechanism that includes both oversight and investigation. Department policy requires all levels of force to be documented on Threat, Resistance or Injury (TRI) Reports. Level 1 force incidents, the lowest level of force, are investigated by the member's immediate supervisor. Level 2 incidents are investigated by

department executives in the rank of captain or above. Level 3 incidents, where physical force capable of causing death or serious physical injury was used but the subject's injuries are not life threatening, fall under the investigative lead of the Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB). Level 4 incidents, cases that involve police firearms discharges, and cases in which a subject or bystander dies or is seriously injured and likely to die, are investigated by the Force Investigation Division (FID). This type of occurrence (Level 4), prior to the October 2019 policy modifications, fell within the Level 3 classification. An incident involving the use of force may be, and often is, a complex event involving multiple members of the service and subjects. The highest level of force used

by a member of the service, or the most severe injury sustained by a subject, determines the level classification of the incident as a whole and, as a result, the appropriate reporting and investigative requirements. Since the first issuance of this report in 2016, the NYPD has been unrelenting in its efforts towards improving and evolving the department's force policies and reporting practices. As use of force topics are routinely the subject of significant discussion, dissection, and reform, the department's diligence towards evolving policy to accurately comply on both the city and state level, as well as best practices, affirms the NYPD's commitment to enhanced transparency, developing trust, and collaboratively policing New York City with the community it serves.

FIREARMS DISCHARGES

The data from 2021 continues to show the historical and consistent decline in firearms discharges, and its related figures, dating back to the onset of the department's official recording of member discharges. In 1971, there were 810 firearms discharge incidents, 221 subjects shot and injured, 93 subjects shot and killed, and 2,113 total rounds fired. For 2021, the NYPD recorded the third lowest number ever of firearms discharge incidents at 52, which equals the amount of annual discharges recorded in 2019 and, prior to that, in 2017 as both of those years respectively recorded 52 firearms discharges. While these 52 firearms discharge incidents in 2021 represent a 20.9% increase compared to the 43 firearms discharge incidents recorded in 2020, this number falls 27.8% lower than the highest occurrence of discharges in the history of this report, 72, that took place in 2016. Statistics from 2020 were also affected by COVID-19, the impact of which limited members' interactions with the public and likely influenced a decrease in firearms discharge incidents, calls for service, and total arrests when compared to the previous year.

Thirty-six discharge incidents in 2021 were intentional discharges by members of the service in the course of adversarial conflicts with criminal subjects. Twenty-one subjects were struck by police gunfire in 2021; six sustained fatal injuries and 15 sustained non-fatal injuries. In 12 incidents, subjects discharged firearms directly at members of the service. In 2021, while no members of the service were killed by gunfire, seven members were shot and injured by subjects during intentional discharge-adversarial conflict incidents. Five intentional firearms discharge incidents in 2021 were animal attacks, an increase from two the previous year. Unintentional discharges declined from ten in 2020 to four in 2021. Seven firearms discharge incidents in 2021 were categorized as unauthorized uses of NYPD firearms, an increase from six in 2020, and of these discharges, one resulted in the death of a subject and three were member suicides.

CONDUCTED ELECTRICAL WEAPONS

There were 1,193 CEW discharge incidents in 2021, an 11.2% increase from the 1,073 incidents in 2020. Of these 1,193 CEW discharge incidents, 1,133 were intentional discharges which include 482 that occurred during crime in progress situations and 446 deployments occurring as members were seeking control of an emotionally disturbed person. Additionally, no fatalities were connected with the use of CEWs in 2021. The remaining discharges occurred in such situations as vehicle stops, suspicious activity, wanted subjects, and during the investigations of past crimes. The CEWs were deemed effective in 799, or 70.5%, of the 1,133 intentional CEW discharge incidents. The ineffective discharges were attributed to various causes including probes failing to make adequate contact with the subject, a subject fighting through the pain, or probes falling out after making contact.


OBSERVATIONS IN NYPD USES OF FORCE

There were 6,440 total reportable force incidents in 2021 — 93.7% were classified as Level 1, 4.6% as Level 2, 1.0% as Level 3, and 0.7% as Level 4. Of the 6,440 reportable force incidents, 5,047 incidents—78.4% of the total—involved the minimal amount of reportable physical force (e.g., hand strikes, foot strikes, and forcible takedowns of subjects). Uses of force also included 97 uses of OC spray, 53 uses of impact weapons, 2 uses of mesh restraining blankets, and 1 canine bite. The 6,440 total reportable force incidents represent an increase of 4.6% from the 6,158 total reportable force incidents in 2020.

In 2021, NYPD personnel utilized force in 1,662 encounters with emotionally disturbed persons, which represents approximately 1.0% of the 166,494 radio runs concerning emotionally disturbed persons. Crimes in progress were the most commonly recorded type of incident in which members used force, encounters that often resulted in arrest; however, arrests where force was used represent approximately just 3% of the total number of arrests effected by members of the NYPD. Situations involving emotionally disturbed persons were the second most commonly recorded type of force encounter. Since the inception of this report in 2016, these two incident types (crimes in progress [which includes arrests] and emotionally disturbed persons) have been the most common situations in which members of the service utilize force.

In 2021, a total of 8,311 individuals were subjected to police use of force. Of those subjects, approximately 97% sustained no injuries or minor injuries. 105 subjects, approximately 1.3%, were substantially injured, and 147, approximately 1.8%, were seriously injured. Substantial injuries are generally those that require treatment at a hospital. Serious injuries are generally those that require admission to a hospital. A total of 3,973, approximately 20.4%, of the members of the service involved in 2021's force incidents were injured. Of that number, 302, or 7.6%, NYPD personnel involved in 2021's force incidents were substantially or seriously injured.





NYPD Use Of Force Policy

LEGAL STANDARDS

In New York State and nationwide, police officers are authorized to utilize a reasonable amount of force when encountering specific circumstances. Both federal and state law define the criteria of these circumstances and determine the extent of reasonable force permissible.

The constitutional standards for police use of force were established as a result of two U.S. Supreme Court cases, *Tennessee v. Garner*, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) and *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). In *Garner*, the standard governing the use of deadly force was set forth, namely that officers may use deadly physical force when there is probable cause to believe that the subject poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury. *Graham* established that the review of an officer's use of force must be conducted with an objective reasonableness standard. The Court wrote that "the 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with 20/20 hindsight."

"Reasonableness" as a standard is also recognized at the state level where it was central to the case of *People v. Benjamin*, 51 NY2d 267 (1980). In this case, the New York State Court of Appeals observed that "it would, indeed, be absurd to suggest that a police officer has to await the glint of steel before he can act to preserve his safety." *Benjamin*, like *Graham*, acknowledges the strain under which officers make life or death use of force decisions when determining the appropriateness of an officer's use of force.

Additional guidance on the use of force is provided from New York State Penal Law §35.30. This article allows that police officers may use force when they "reasonably believe such to be necessary" to protect life, to effect arrests, or to prevent escape from custody.

NYPD USE OF FORCE POLICY

The primary duty of every member of the service is to protect human life, including the lives of individuals being placed in police custody. NYPD policy emphasizes the value of human life, the utilization of reasonable force, and the employment of less lethal alternatives. It places a priority, whenever possible, on the use of de-escalation techniques to safely gain voluntary compliance from a subject to reduce or eliminate the need for force. More restrictive than both federal and state statute, NYPD policy holds members of the service to a higher level of restraint than New York State law which, for example, allows the use of deadly physical force to protect property, something department policy strictly prohibits. NYPD policy permits that deadly force may only be used against a person to "protect members of the service and/or the public from imminent serious physical injury or death" (Patrol Guide 221- 01). Thus, there may be instances when a use of force was permissible under New York State and/or federal law but was a violation of department policy.

NYPD policy states "force may be used when it is reasonable to ensure the safety of a member of the service or a third person, or otherwise protect life, or when it is reasonable to place a person in custody or to prevent escape from custody" (Patrol Guide 221-01). In accordance with this standard of reasonableness, any application of force that is judged to be "unreasonable under the circumstances...will be deemed excessive and in violation of department policy" (Patrol Guide 221-01). While use of force, in this context, is broadly defined to encompass an array of force options that may be employed to gain compliance or to ensure the control of a subject, excessive force will not be tolerated and will subject members of the service to departmental discipline, up to and including dismissal.

Compliance, the goal in any police encounter, is commonly achieved through the mere use of verbal commands. In situations when such commands are insufficient or a subject chooses to ignore instructions or resist, officers may utilize a range of force options in order to compel a subject to submit to lawful authority. NYPD policy states that "when appropriate and consistent with personal safety, members of the service will use de-escalation techniques to gain voluntary compliance from a subject to reduce or eliminate the necessity to use force. In situations in which this is not safe and/or appropriate, members of the service will use only the reasonable force necessary to gain control or custody of a subject" (Patrol Guide 221-01). Force options that members of the service may utilize include physical force, less-lethal options (e.g., OC spray, conducted electrical weapons, or impact weapons), even deadly physical force, when justified by the threat of violence. Members of the service are not required to move sequentially from one level of force to the next and, as such, members may for instance, escalate from verbal commands to pointing a CEW or de-escalate from a threatened use of force or the actual use of force to verbal commands as situations develop.

The progression of the department’s firearms policy, built upon evolving strategies such as comprehensive training—including but not limited to tactical communications, firearms, crisis intervention, and de-escalation—enhanced oversight, and a clearly defined explanation of what constitutes an authorized discharge, has positively impacted the department’s application of force over five decades of discharge recordkeeping. Despite this, the department experienced an increase in firearms discharges in 2021, 52 as compared to 43 from the previous year. While this represents a 20.9% increase from discharges in 2020, it does, however, equal the annual discharge totals recorded in 2019 and, prior to that, 2017 and is a 27.8% decrease from the 72 discharges recorded in 2016—the inaugural year of this report.

These 52 firearms discharge incidents also represent the third lowest number ever recorded since department tracking began in 1971. At that time, there were 810 discharge incidents, 314 subjects shot by police, 93 of which were killed, and a total of 2,113 rounds discharged. By comparison, in 2021, there were 21 subjects shot by police, of which six were killed, and a total of 317 rounds discharged. While this represents an 85.0% decrease in rounds discharged, it also represents a decrease of over 93% in each of the following: discharge incidents, subjects shot by police, and subjects shot and killed.

NYPD policy with regard to the documentation of force used by, and against, members of the service was instituted in 2016 and has evolved significantly in the years since. The policy, which has expanded from the originally designated three levels of force to the current establishment of four levels—including deadly physical force—defines the manner of reporting and investigation that must occur after every incident, regardless of the level, that force was utilized.

Since the formation of this policy, modifications to its structure have been instituted in an effort to enhance user interface, improve accuracy, and delineate oversight responsibilities. These modifications to the policy, however, may impact the way in which historical force data is compared.

LEVELS OF FORCE

Level 1 (Physical Force/Less-Lethal Device)

Level 1 includes the use of hand strikes, foot strikes, forcible take-downs, wrestling/grappling with an actively resisting subject, the discharge of OC spray, the discharge of a CEW in “cartridge mode,” and the use of mesh restraining blankets to secure subjects.

Level 2 (Use of Impact Weapon/Canine Bite/Less-Lethal Device)

Level 2 includes the use of any object as an impact weapon, a police canine bite, and the discharge of a CEW in “drive stun” mode.

Level 3 (Use of Deadly Physical Force, except Firearm)

Level 3 includes the use of physical force that is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury, except for firearms discharges.

Level 4 (Firearm Discharge)

Level 4 includes any discharge of a firearm by a member of the service or from a firearm belonging to a member of the service. Level 4 was not included as a separate category in the reporting data prior to 2020.

Actions that are not reportable uses of force include: ordering a person to lie on the ground; guiding them to the ground in a controlled manner; or the mere use of equipment such as Velcro straps or polycarbonate shields to restrain subjects, unless an injury is sustained.




Figure 1

INJURIES AND FORCE CATEGORIES

The degree to which a subject or bystander sustains an injury, as a result of police action, can elevate the categorization of the incident and determine its classification and investigation as a Level 1, Level 2, Level 3, or Level 4 use of force.

Physical injuries to subjects such as minor swelling, contusions, lacerations, abrasions, and complaints of substantial pain are categorized as Level 1 force incidents.

Physical injuries that are consistent with the application of Level 2 force (e.g., unconsciousness, the loss of a tooth, lacerations requiring stitches or staples) will elevate an incident to this level. An allegation or suspicion of excessive force with no injury, the attempted suicide of a prisoner resulting in no injury or a minor physical injury, or the use

of any prohibited act, other than the alleged or suspected use of a chokehold or prohibited method of restraint, will also result in a Level 2 classification.

Serious physical injuries that result in a Level 3 classification include, but are not limited to: broken/fractured bones, injuries requiring hospital admission, heart attacks, strokes, aneurysms, or other life-threatening/serious illnesses and injuries. Alleged or suspected use of a chokehold or a prohibited method of restraint, alleged or suspected excessive force accompanied by serious physical injury or attempted suicide of a prisoner that causes a serious injury elevate an incident to a Level 3 classification.

Any death or serious injury with a likelihood of death to a subject or bystander will result in a Level 4 classification.

FORCE INVESTIGATION AND REVIEW

The department's force review process includes robust internal oversight processes. The NYPD's use of force oversight and management controls include:

Immediate Supervisor

The immediate supervisor is an available supervisor, not involved in the incident, that is assigned to the same command as the member involved in a force incident. The immediate supervisor must be at least one rank higher than all involved members. In the event that a supervisor in an appropriate rank is not available, the duty captain will determine who will assume the responsibilities of the immediate supervisor. Level 1 uses of force are investigated by immediate supervisors.

Duty Captain

The duty captain is the front-line executive, supervising all personnel performing duty within a patrol borough, during hours when commanding officers/executive officers are not present. In the absence of the commanding officer/executive officer of a command, the duty captain will investigate Level 2 uses of force.

Duty Chief

The duty chief is the principal operations commander of the NYPD, when no other department executive of a higher rank is present, who acts as a representative of the Chief of Department and responds to serious incidents within New York City, including police-involved firearms discharges and deaths in police custody. The duty chief may assist in force investigations during hours when command and borough executives are not present.

Borough/Bureau Investigations Units

Investigations units, assigned to bureau and borough commands, investigate instances of non-criminal violations of department regulations and lesser misconduct, as well as domestic incidents and certain criminal incidents involving members of the NYPD. The duty captain may call upon the investigations units to assist on Level 2 force investigations.

First Deputy Commissioner

The First Deputy Commissioner, the second-in-command of the department, oversees numerous units, including those with a direct association with the review and/or investigation of force. These include the Force Investigation Division, responsible for investigating the most serious force incidents, the Risk Management Bureau, tasked with monitoring use of force data and the quality of force investigations, the Department Advocate's Office, which prosecutes administrative disciplinary cases, and the Deputy Commissioner, Trials, which presides over the NYPD's internal discipline trials. The First Deputy Commissioner also chairs the Use of Force Review Board, which reviews all Level 3 and Level 4 uses of force, determines whether the actions of a member of the service were within policy and makes disciplinary recommendations to the Police Commissioner when uses of force fall outside policy.

Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB)

IAB serves as the recipient of all allegations of misconduct involving members of the service and seeks to combat police corruption by analyzing allegations, examining trends, and conducting comprehensive investigations that ensure the highest standards of integrity. All Level 3 use of force incidents fall under the investigative responsibility of IAB.

Force Investigation Division (FID)

All Level 4 incidents, defined as incidents involving firearms discharges by members of the service and incidents in which subjects have died or are seriously injured and likely to die, are investigated by FID. This unit also reviews the

tactics employed in each incident to derive tactical lessons learned and to make both general training recommendations and training recommendations specifically for the individual members of the service involved in discharge incidents.

Risk Management Bureau (RMB)

The Risk Management Bureau works with the city's inspector general and other governmental agencies to collaboratively improve policing and community relations. Responsible for ensuring the complete and proper implementation of court-ordered reforms, RMB also assesses compliance with NYPD policies, identifies and develops programs to minimize risk to the department, and provides oversight of the NYPD's performance monitoring programs. Sub-units of RMB include the Quality Assurance Division, the Risk Mitigation Division, and the Compliance Division. The Risk Management Bureau and the First Deputy Commissioner's Office lead force review meetings every month with borough and bureau personnel. The purpose of these meetings is to assess compliance with use of force policies and to ensure that use of force investigations are both thorough and timely.

Deputy Commissioner, Department Advocate

The Department Advocate's Office administratively prosecutes all employees of the New York City Police Department for violations of the department's rules, regulations, and procedures, and makes recommendations to the First Deputy Commissioner concerning suspensions and restorations to duty of department personnel. Attorneys provide legal guidance to investigative units, analyze department investigations, draft charges and specifications, negotiate and submit case dispositions for the Police Commissioner's review, and litigate disciplinary matters before the Deputy Commissioner of Trials.

Deputy Commissioner, Trials

The Deputy Commissioner, Trials presides over the administrative trials of department disciplinary cases, and renders written findings of fact and recommendations to the Police Commissioner consistent with department rules, policies, and applicable statutes and case law.

Use of Force Review Board

The Use of Force Review Board is an oversight mechanism for maintaining the integrity of the department's force policy. Composed of executive staff members, the board reviews the most serious force cases and renders determinations regarding the actions of members of the department during force encounters.

Training

Department training serves as the foundation for the critical decision making members of the service employ on a daily basis. Training curricula are evaluated and, if necessary, revised due to the analysis of use of force data, modifications in city or state legislation, tactical enhancements, and innovations within the technological field.

Training Bureau

The Training Bureau oversees NYPD training and educational programs, providing recruits, uniformed members, and civilian members with the latest academic, tactical, and technological training available. In-service training for members of the service includes sessions on the most recent tactical and de-escalation strategies, Crisis Intervention Team training, changes in the law and department procedure, and the means in which to positively interact and collaborate with the community.

Additionally, all uniformed members of the service complete rigorous firearms training as recruits, and must re-qualify for the use of their service and off-duty weapons semi-annually for the entirety of their careers. This training, which encompasses both the functional knowledge and the mechanical skills necessary for the safe and proficient use of firearms and less lethal weapons, seeks to develop the foundational skills for members to minimize force while maximizing safety. Members of the service assigned to specialized units, such as the Emergency Service Unit or the Strategic Response Group, also receive additional specialized firearms training.

Department firearms training emphasizes the principal goal of every member of the NYPD, which is to protect life, including the lives of bystanders, victims, subjects, and other members of the service. Yet, at times it may be necessary to protect life by using deadly physical force. When determining whether to use deadly force and how, members of the service rely on their judgment, ability, existing law, department policy, and most significantly, training. Members of the NYPD are trained to utilize deadly physical force to "stop the threat," which means putting an end to a subject's ability to threaten imminent death or serious physical injury. To achieve this in the midst of dynamic

shooting situations, members are trained to shoot at the center mass of the subject, the largest target available. Arms and legs, both smaller and less static, are less certain targets. Hitting a subject in these extremities is far less likely to stop their potentially deadly actions. Members are trained to only use deadly physical force to protect themselves or others from imminent serious physical injury or death.

Use of force training begins with recruits attending the Police Academy. Here, academic lessons, physical training, and tactical instruction all include detailed aspects of force related teachings. Academically, recruits are required to successfully complete the Use of Force chapter of the Academy's Law curriculum. This nine-hour chapter focuses on the justifiable use of force as specified in the New York State Penal Law and the professional standards reflected in department policy. Recruits apply this lesson, which has an emphasis on circumstances requiring force, de-escalation, and approved force options, in realistic situations during Scenario Based Training in order to define proper tactical applications and evaluate techniques. Consolidating existing legal issues and department policy with evolving best practices and tactics provides an optimal learning experience to recruits who, upon graduation, will likely serve in a patrol capacity which includes a high volume of public engagement and interaction.



The physical and tactical training curriculum that recruits experience includes several force-related courses of instruction. Among these are the Use of Force course, which trains recruits on force options under varying circumstances and Use of Force Case Law, which provides recruits with the ability to streamline use of force decision making.

Additionally, recruits are trained and certified in the use of both firearms and less lethal weapons and receive approximately 50 hours of physical training that encompasses an assortment of force tactics including strikes, take-downs, defensive drills, and handcuffing.

The department also remains committed to providing members with frequent and relevant in-service training in an effort to introduce new concepts, update practices, and expand a member's existing knowledge and skillset. Training regularly consists of tactical refreshers, modifications to policy, legislative changes, and recertification of firearm and less lethal weapon qualifications.



Firearms Discharges

OVERVIEW

Any use of force by a member of the service, the most serious of which is a police firearms discharge, is a critical matter that concerns both the department and the public. These potentially traumatic and volatile events can have a lasting effect on members of the service, on the community they serve, and on any, and perhaps all, interactions between the two. Beyond the more than 6.4 million calls for service, members of the NYPD interacted with the public during countless more instances, some initiated by the police and some initiated by the public. Some were planned events, such as community meetings and outreach, and some were spontaneous instances, such as a friendly conversation or a request for directions. Yet amid this multitude of interactions, the outcome of the vast majority of encounters between the police and the public in 2021 did not involve any use of force by members of the service.

This is particularly notable when comparing the 52 discharge incidents in 2021 to the highest and lowest recorded discharge incidents from each of the last five decades. The department began to officially track the number of police firearm discharge incidents in 1971 and during that first decade of recordkeeping, documented a record high 994 police firearms discharges in 1972. While the total discharge incidents in 2021 represent a decrease of more than 94% from 1972, it is also a decrease of more than 86% from 1976's 379 incidents, the fewest annual discharges in that decade. As detailed in the following chart, 2021's 52 firearm discharge incidents fell significantly below each of the highest, and all but the lowest, annual discharge incidents recorded from each of the past five decades. That lone exception is when comparing 2021's discharges incidents to the 35 discharges in 2018—the lowest annual total on record since the department began tracking these incidents.

Highest and Lowest Annual Discharges by Decade vs. 2021 Total Discharges




Figure 2

When comparing the highest and lowest annual discharges by decade, both categories have experienced a significant reduction in each successive decade, an 89.4% and 90.8% decrease, respectively, from the first decade of recordkeeping through the 2010s. Similarly, 2021's 52 discharge incidents also represent a significant decrease when measured alongside these historical statistics. When compared to the cumulative averages of the highest, and of the lowest, annual discharge incidents from the 1970s through the 2010s, 2021's 52 discharge incidents fall 87.3% and 71.9%, respectively, below the averages of their corresponding categories.

The 52 discharge incidents in 2021 represent a 20.9% increase from the 43 incidents recorded in the previous year. However, when viewed in the lens of the COVID-19 pandemic which impacted New York City and members' interactions with the community, this increase could be ascribed to the decrease in interactions with the public in

general during that time. While this marks the second time since the inception of this report that the annual total has increased from the year before, the 52 discharge incidents are the third lowest annual total of discharge incidents ever on record. This number further highlights the strength of department policy and training that helps shape our members' commitment to safety, restraint, and the value of human life.

Every firearm discharge incident, regardless of category, is thoroughly analyzed by the department to improve understanding, develop training, adapt policy, implement technology, and increase safety in New York City. The discharge data in this report has been compiled from Preliminary Investigation Worksheets, medical examiner's reports, arrest and complaint reports, Force Investigation Division reports, Use of Force Review Board findings and recommendations, quarterly and annual publicly reported data tables, the NYPD Force Dashboard, and previous Annual Firearms Discharge Reports. While there is unquestionable value in an analysis and discussion of police firearms discharges, the relatively small amount of discharges in 2021 (52 overall discharge incidents, including 36 adversarial conflict discharges) may limit the scope of conclusions that may be elicited or trends that may be forecasted.

Intentional firearm discharges by police that are deemed justifiable in a court of law are still reviewed by the NYPD for tactical deviations, procedural violations, and any factors that may suggest a need for modifications, either policy or procedural. If, upon review, a determination is made to impose discipline in a case, the discipline may not necessarily result from the actual discharge of the firearm, but from a violation of other department procedures within the scope of the event.

All members who discharge their firearms are required to attend a firearms tactical review session conducted by the Training Bureau's Firearms and Tactics Section, regardless of the circumstances of the discharge.

Historical Snapshot 2016-2021						
	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Adversarial Conflict	37	23	17	25	25	36
Animal Attack	11	9	4	6	2	5
Unintentional Discharge	14	12	8	8	10	4
Mistaken Identity	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unauthorized Use of A Firearm	6	3	2	4	3	4
MOS Suicide/Attempted Suicide	4	5	4	9	3	3
Total Discharges	72	52	35	52	43	52

Figure 3

The NYPD classifies police firearms discharges using the following categories:

Intentional Discharge-Adversarial Conflict (ID-AC)

When a member of the service intentionally discharges a firearm during a confrontation with a subject. There were 36 intentional discharges in adversarial conflict incidents in 2021.

Intentional Discharge-Animal Attack (ID-AA)

When a member of the service intentionally discharges a firearm to defend against an animal attack. There were five intentional discharge incidents in the course of animal attacks in 2021.

Unintentional Discharge

When a member of the service unintentionally discharges a firearm. There were four unintentional discharge incidents in 2021.

Mistaken Identity

When a member of the service intentionally fires on another member of the service in the mistaken belief that the other member is a criminal subject. Mistaken identity cases do not include crossfires, when a member of the service accidentally strikes a fellow member of the service while firing at another subject. There were no cases of mistaken identity in 2021.

Unauthorized Use of a Firearm

When a member of the service intentionally discharges a firearm outside the scope of his or her employment, or when another person illegally discharges a member's firearm. There were seven total unauthorized discharge incidents involving NYPD firearms in 2021, three of which were member suicides.

Intentional Discharge—No Conflict

When a member of the service discharges a firearm to summon assistance. Due to the rarity of discharges to summon assistance—the last occurred in 2016, and was the only one of its kind in a decade—this category is usually excluded from the report. There were no discharges classified as Intentional Discharge—No Conflict in 2021.

Adversarial Conflicts, 2016-2021




Figure 4

Animal Attacks, 2016-2021




Figure 5

Unintentional Discharges, 2016-2021




Figure 6

Total Discharges, 2016-2021




Figure 7

New York City Police Department Firearms Discharge Incidents 1971-2021




Figure 8

INTENTIONAL DISCHARGE – ADVERSARIAL CONFLICT

In 2021, 50 uniformed members of the service intentionally discharged their weapons in an adversarial conflict. These 50 members, about .14% of the department’s 34,850 uniformed members of the service in 2021, represent the third consecutive decline in the total amount of members that intentionally discharged their weapons in adversarial conflicts, falling below 2019’s 54 members and 2020’s 51 members. Additionally, this percentage of members corresponds comparably to the department’s recent annual discharge statistics within this category of firearm discharges. Since the inception of this report in 2016, approximately .13% of the department’s annual average of approximately 35,880 uniformed members of the service intentionally discharged their weapons in adversarial conflicts.

Calls for service topped more than 6.4 million in 2021, a 4.5% increase from the previous year and a return to the trend, experienced from 2016–2019, of an annual increase in calls for service requiring police response. Calls involving weapons totaled 71,969 in 2021, a 3.2% decrease from the previous year and the second highest annual total on record since this report began. 2021’s arrests totaled 155,505, a 10.7% increase from 2020, and included 22,199 arrests for weapons possession. Of these arrests for weapons possession, 4,363 were gun arrests, more than 2% higher than the total of 4,253 gun arrests in 2020, and the highest annual total of gun arrests in the history of this report. Beyond arresting armed suspects, uniformed members of the service experienced thousands of additional interactions with the public, many fraught with unpredictable risks and the potential for volatility. These include investigative encounters, vehicle stops, responding to calls for a person in crisis and safely escorting thousands of such persons to hospitals and care facilities. In the overwhelming majority of incidents in which uniformed members took armed subjects or persons in crisis into custody, members did not discharge their weapons.

In 2021, there were 36 intentional discharge-adversarial conflict (ID-AC) incidents, involving 50 uniformed members of the service who discharged their firearms. These conflicts involved 43 subjects. In 12 different ID-AC incidents, subjects discharged firearms directly at members of the service. As a result of the ID-AC incidents occurring in 2021, 21 subjects were shot, of whom six died.

The year 2021 was the third consecutive year that saw an increase in the total number of uniformed members of the service shot and injured by gunfire. While the amount of members shot and injured by gunfire has fluctuated annually since the department began tracking such data—from a high of 50 members in 1973, to a low of zero in 2009—the most recent trend has shown an annual increase, rising from one member shot and injured by gunfire in 2018, followed by four in 2019, and six in 2020.

In 2021, seven members of the service were shot and injured by subject gunfire in ID-AC incidents, an increase of 16.6% when compared with 2020, 75% more than in 2019, and 600% higher than the 2018 total. 2021 marked the second consecutive year that no member of the NYPD was shot and killed in the line of duty.

MEMBERS OF THE SERVICE

Of the 36 ID-AC incidents in 2021, there were no fatal injuries to any members of the service. However, a total of ten members of the service—including seven members shot by subject gunfire—were injured in eight separate ID-AC incidents. As compared to the previous year, the number of uniformed members of the service injured in ID-AC’s represents an increase of 25% more than the eight members injured in 2020.

In five separate ID-AC incidents, seven members of the service were shot and injured during an exchange of gunfire with armed subjects. In a separate incident that also included an exchange of gunfire with an armed subject, one member of the service was injured as the result of the subject’s gunfire. In another separate incident, one member was injured as the result of a physical assault. The final member injury from an ID-AC incident occurred when, during a car stop, a member was struck by the subject’s vehicle. When comparing the annual amount of members injured during ID-AC incidents to recent years, 2021 represents the second highest annual total since the inception of this report.



Figure 9

SUBJECT DEATHS

While the total number of subjects killed by members of the service during adversarial exchanges has varied, since this report began in 2016, an average of eight subjects were shot and killed in ID-AC incidents annually. 2021's total of six subjects killed by police firearm discharges during ID-AC incidents marked the second straight annual decline in subject deaths, 25.0% less than eight subjects in 2020 and 50.0% below 2019's total of 12 subjects. Furthermore, six subjects mark the second lowest number of subjects killed by police gunfire since departmental recordkeeping began in 1971 and falls significantly below the 20-year average of ten subjects shot and killed annually by police discharges in New York City.

Of the six subjects killed by police gunfire during ID-AC incidents in 2021, all six possessed a weapon or dangerous instrument that appeared to be capable of causing death or serious physical injury. Three subjects possessed a firearm, two subjects possessed cutting instruments, and one subject possessed an imitation firearm (the six ID-AC incidents in which subjects were killed are described in Appendix B).

SUBJECT INJURIES

There were 15 subjects shot and injured as a result of police firearm discharges in 2021, 11 more than the previous year's four subject injuries, the lowest since the department began discharge recordkeeping in 1971. While slightly higher than the departmental annual average of 12 recorded since the inception of this report, these 15 subject injuries, occurring amid 14 separate incidents, falls below the 20-year average of 17 subjects shot and injured by police firearm discharges yearly.




Figure 10

Of the 15 subjects shot and injured in 2021, 11 were armed with firearms, one was armed with a knife, and one subject was armed with a metal pipe. The remaining two subjects were operating stolen vehicles in a manner that threatened imminent serious physical injury or death to the members of the service on scene.

Ten incidents included subjects armed with a firearm and, within these instances, were seven incidents in which eight subjects discharged firearms at members of the service and were shot as a result of an exchange of gunfire with members. These incidents also resulted in five injured members of the service, including four members who were shot.

Three other incidents occurred in which subjects armed with a firearm were shot and injured. One incident occurred when members discharged their firearms at two subjects, striking one, who had just shot another individual. That individual died as a result of the subject's discharge. In another, members discharged their firearms at a subject who had just discharged a firearm and shot several individuals. In the last incident, members discharged their firearms during a confrontation with a subject who did not comply with numerous directions to drop the firearm.

Of the remaining four incidents that subjects were shot and injured by member discharges, two involved stolen vehicles. In one incident, a subject operated a stolen vehicle and, upon being stopped by members of the service, refused to exit the vehicle and instead accelerated onto the sidewalk at the time of the member discharge. Another incident involved a subject operating a stolen vehicle that, upon being stopped by members, accelerated back and forth striking two marked police vehicles. The injured subject was the front passenger of the vehicle at the time of discharge.



In one incident, a subject brandished a knife while advancing towards a member of the service at the time of the discharge. The final incident included a subject armed with a metal pipe, who, at the time of discharge, was brandishing the pipe while advancing at members.

BYSTANDER INJURIES

Unfortunately, bystanders may be injured during ID-AC incidents—either as a direct result of, or incidental to, police action. In 2021, one bystander died as a result of injuries sustained during an ID-AC incident. This occurred as members of the service discharged their firearms in response to two subjects who had just shot, ultimately fatally, another individual. The bystander, who was struck in the arm during the incident, succumbed to their injuries at a later date.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

An actual or perceived weapon or dangerous instrument was involved in 35 of the 36 ID-AC incidents in 2021. In 18 incidents, the weapon or dangerous instrument was a firearm, all of which were loaded and capable of discharging live rounds, including three incidents that involved revolvers and 15 incidents that involved semiautomatic pistols. In one incident, the weapon possessed by the ID-AC subject was a pellet pistol, defined in this report as an imitation firearm.

In eight incidents, ID-AC subjects operated a vehicle in a manner capable of causing serious physical injury to members of the service and/or bystanders on the scene. Five ID-AC incidents involved subjects in possession of cutting instruments, all knives, and one incident involved a subject in possession of a metal pipe.

In two incidents, members perceived the threat of a firearm or weapon, and in the remaining incident, the discharging member was the victim of physical force.

Threat Type in ID-AC Incidents, 2021




Figure 11

There were a total of 43 subjects involved in ID-AC incidents in 2021; 40 known subjects and three unknown subjects. Of the 40 known subjects, all were male and ranged in age from 14 to 65 with a median age of 31. Of all the known ID-AC subjects, 57.5% were between the ages of 21 and 39, 27.5% were aged 40 or over, and 15.0% were under 21 years of age. Otherwise stated, 23 subjects were between the ages of 21 and 39, 11 were aged 40 or over, and six were under 21 years of age.

Gunfire in New York City, 2021




Figure 12

The race and ethnicity of the 40 known subjects was determined by eyewitness reports, the subject's self-identification, existing government-issued documentation, racial/ethnic physical characteristics, medical examiner reports, and other available sources. Of the 40 known subjects involved in ID-AC incidents, 19 were Black, 19 were Hispanic, and two were White. Expressed as percentages, 47.5% were Black, 47.5% were Hispanic, and 5.0% were White. Among the 912 identified criminal shooting suspects associated with the 1,562 criminal shooting incidents that occurred in New York City in 2021, approximately 68.9% were Black, 27.9% were Hispanic, 1.7% were Asian, and 1.5% were White. Among the 1,876 shooting victims in 2021, approximately 72.2% were Black, 24.7% were Hispanic, 1.9% were White, and 1.2% were Asian. While not the case in 2021, since the inception of this report in 2016, the racial and ethnic composition of the ID-AC subjects has similarly corresponded to the known criminal shooting suspects associated with the criminal shooting incidents that occurred in New York City.

Race/Ethnicity of Known Criminal Shooting Suspects vs. Criminal Shooting Victims vs. Known ID-AC Subjects, 2021




Figure 13

In 2021, 50 members of the service intentionally discharged their weapons during ID-AC incidents. Of these 50 members, 45, or 90% were male and five, or 10%, were female. The uniformed staff of the NYPD, taken as an average over the course of 2021, was approximately 19% female, 80.9% male and less than 0.1% non-binary. Of the members of the service involved in ID-AC incidents in 2020, 40% were Hispanic, 40% were White, 18% were Black, and 2% were Asian.

Race/Ethnicity of Members in ID - AC Incidents, 2021




Figure 14

Within the rank structure of the NYPD, members in the rank of police officer account for approximately two-thirds of the entire department. Members of the service in this rank, and those members with fewer years of service, are among the likeliest members to be serving in a patrol capacity. This assignment, whether through public dealings, assigned response to calls for police service, enforcement actions, or preservation of the peace, has a high volume of engagement and interaction with the community. It also has an elevated possibility to encounter situations that may lead to adversarial conflicts.

Rank of Members in ID-AC Incidents vs. Dept Staffing, 2021




Figure 15

Rank of Members in ID-AC Incidents, 2012-2021




Figure 16

Of the 36 ID-AC's in 2021, approximately 80.5%, or 29, occurred with relation to a member's performance of patrol. Of the remaining seven ID-AC's, four occurred while the involved members were off-duty. Of the four off-duty ID-AC's, one occurred in the Bronx, one in Brooklyn, one in Queens, and one in Nassau County. Two ID-AC's occurred in relation to two separate investigations (not patrol related) and one ID-AC occurred during the attempt to effect a warrant. In the 29 patrol-related ID-AC's in 2021, 41 members discharged their firearms, or 82.0% of all discharging members in adversarial conflicts. Of these 41 members, 80% were in the rank of police officer and, of those, approximately 82% had 10 years of service or less at the time of their discharge incident.

Among the 36 ID-AC's in 2021, 76% of the members discharging their firearms—or 38 out of 50— were in the rank of police officer. This is consistent with historical trends since this report began in 2016, as members in the rank of police officer have accounted for approximately 65% of the total uniformed staff and comprised approximately 73% of members who discharged their firearms in ID-AC's.

Detectives, who comprised approximately 14% of all uniformed staffing in 2021, represented 4% of ID-AC discharging members, which falls below the approximate average of 9% of ID-AC discharging members since 2016. Sergeants represented more than 12% of uniformed members in 2021 and accounted for 16% of discharging members in that same time, slightly higher than annual average (approximately 14%) that members in that rank have represented as discharging members in ID-AC's since 2016. There were two members in the rank of lieutenant who discharged a firearm in an ID-AC in 2021, representing the remaining 4% of discharging members and slightly above the average of less than 3% annually for members in that rank since 2016. No member of the service in the rank of captain or above discharged a firearm in an ID-AC in 2021.

In 2021, of all the 50 members who discharged their firearms in an ID-AC, 35 members (70%) had 10 years or less of service at the time of their discharge. Thirty-two of

these members were in the rank of police officer, two were in the rank of sergeant, and one was in the rank of lieutenant.

Twenty-six of the 36 ID-AC's in 2021 involved only members in the rank of police officer. Eight ID-AC's included sergeants in some capacity: three incidents involved a sergeant and one or more police officers, two involved a sergeant and a detective, and three incidents only involved a sergeant. Two ID-AC's included a member in the rank of lieutenant, one with a police officer and one without any other involved members.

Twenty-four ID-AC's, 66.7%, in 2021 involved only a single discharging member of the service. Ten, 27.8%, involved two members discharging, and the remaining two incidents, 5.5%, involved three discharging members of the service. Of the seven members of the service shot during ID-AC incidents in 2021, five were shot during incidents that involved two discharging members. The remaining two members of the service shot in ID-AC incidents in 2021 occurred during two separate incidents involving just a single discharging member of the service.

During 28 ID-AC's incidents, all participating members were attired in a uniform and in the remaining eight ID-AC's, all members were in plainclothes. Of the members involved in ID-AC's, 40 were attired in a uniform, all of whom were performing patrol-related functions. The remaining 10 members, five of whom were off-duty, were attired in plainclothes at the time of their ID-AC's. The plainclothes on-duty members included two sergeants, two police officers, and one detective. Four of these members were performing investigative functions and the remaining member was attempting to effect a warrant.

In 2021, 80%, 40 of 50, of the members who discharged their firearms during ID-AC incidents were assigned to the Patrol Services Bureau. Of the remaining 10 discharging members, four were assigned to the Detective Bureau, two were assigned to the Housing Bureau, two were assigned to the Transportation Bureau, and two were assigned to Special Operations.

Member Assignment, ID-AC Incidents, 2021




Figure 17

Twenty ID-AC incidents in 2021 occurred during the third platoon, between 3:31 p.m. and 11:30 p.m.; ten took place during the first platoon, between 11:31 p.m. and 7:30 a.m.; and six occurred on the second platoon, between 7:31 a.m. and 3:30 p.m.

Every borough except Queens experienced an increase in ID-AC's in 2021, as compared to the previous year. Twelve ID-AC's occurred in the borough of Brooklyn, up from eight the previous year, accounting for 33.3% of 2021's ID-AC discharges. Eleven ID-AC's, 30.6%, occurred in the Bronx, an increase from eight in 2021, followed by seven in Manhattan (19.4%), up from four occurrences the previous year. Queens matched 2020's total with four, 11.1% of this year's discharges, and Staten Island, which did not experience an ID-AC in 2020, recorded one (2.8%) in 2021. Additionally, one ID-AC took place outside of the confines of New York City in 2021, occurring in Nassau County.

ID - AC Incidents by Platoon, 2021




Figure 18

ID-AC and Criminal Shooting Incidents by Geographic Borough, 2021




Figure 19

ID-AC incidents occurred in 28 separate precincts throughout New York City, an increase of more than 47% from 2020 when the ID-AC's occurred in 19 precincts across the city. Additionally, five precincts experienced multiple ID-AC's in 2021. Since the inception of this report in 2016, the highest number of ID-AC's in any precinct during a single calendar year has been three, which occurred five times in four different precincts. In 2021, this occurred in two precincts in the same geographic borough, Brooklyn's 71st and 75th Precincts. In addition, three precincts also experienced two ID-AC's apiece; the 32nd Precinct in Manhattan and the 42nd and 44th Precincts in the Bronx.

Since 2016 when this report began, the highest percentage of ID-AC incidents, approximately 35%, occurred in Brooklyn followed by the Bronx with 28.2%, Queens with 15.3%, Manhattan with 14.7% and Staten Island with 3.1% of all incidents. The remaining 3.7% of incidents occurred outside the confines of New York City.

Over the same period, twenty-three precincts did not experience an ID-AC and 15 precincts experienced just one incident apiece. Since 2016, the highest concentration of incidents has occurred in the following precincts: the 73rd Precinct (eight), the 75th Precinct (eight), and the 67th Precinct (seven), all in Brooklyn, and the 40th Precinct (six) and 47th Precinct (six) in the Bronx. These five precincts account for more than 21% of all ID-AC incidents within the confines of New York City’s five counties since 2016 and correlate greatly with criminal shooting incidents by geographic borough during that same period. An additional five precincts, the 41st, 44th, 48th, and 52nd in the Bronx and the 83rd Precinct in Brooklyn each recorded five ID-AC’s during that time, accounting for another 15% of the total adversarial conflict incidents.

Adversarial conflict police firearms discharges tend to take place in areas of New York City that experience greater levels of gun violence. Since 2007, when the Annual Firearms Discharge Report first mapped police and criminal shootings, the, “Criminal Shooting Incidents vs. NYPD Intentional Discharges - Adversarial Conflicts,” maps have demonstrated a general consistency of geographical correlation between police adversarial discharges and criminal gun violence. As shown on the map on page 25, the frequency and locations of ID-AC’s in 2021 are comparable to criminal gun activity and criminal shootings in New York City.

Rounds Discharged per ID-AC Incident, 2021




Figure 20

Uniformed members of the service discharged a total of 281 rounds during ID-AC incidents in 2021, 8.5% higher than the total in 2020, and just the second time since 2016 that the total number of rounds discharged increased from the previous year. The increase in rounds discharged, while 19.6% higher than the average of 235 rounds discharged annually since this report began in 2016, is largely the result of five incidents that together tallied 133 rounds discharged, an average of 27 per each incident. These five incidents were responsible for 47.3% of ID-AC rounds discharged and also accounted for three members of the service shot, one member injured, four subjects shot, including one fatally, and four instances in which members were directly fired upon.



Criminal Shooting Incidents vs. NYPD Intentional Discharges - Adversarial Conflicts, 2021




Figure 21

Rounds Discharged per Member in ID-AC Incidents, 2021




Figure 22

ultimately stops the threat. This is the objective completion rate, and it is determined irrespective of the number of rounds discharged at a particular subject. The objective is considered to be completed when the actions of the subject, specifically those actions that threaten imminent serious physical injury or death are stopped by a member's use of deadly physical force. The objective completion rate is used for statistical and informational purposes, and is not a factor considered in the investigation of individual incidents. The department does not calculate a "hit percentage" when describing an ID-AC incident, in part because the percentages are sometimes unknown (for example, in cases when a subject flees) and also because of the widely differing circumstances in individual incidents.

Objective Completion Rate, 2016-2021




Figure 23

In 2021, uniformed members of the service, by discharging their firearms and striking at least one subject, successfully stopped the threat in 19 of 36 ID-AC incidents for an objective completion rate of 53%. This is a 5% increase from the previous year. The subjects in two incidents fled, were not apprehended and may have been struck by members' bullets, so the objective completion rate for 2021 may be higher than reported.

SHOOTING TECHNIQUE

Due to the nature of an adversarial conflict, using a two-handed grip, standing, and carefully aligning a firearm's sights on the target are not always practical in the midst of such an incident. There are occasions when follow-up investigations are unable to determine the shooting grips and/or shooting stances used by discharging members of the service. Of the 50 members involved in ID-AC's in 2021, 15 were determined to have used a two-handed supported position, and two utilized a one-handed unsupported position.

ID-AC Distance to Target by Discharging Member, 2021




Figure 24

Post-shooting investigations also determined that 19 members involved in ID-AC incidents were in a standing position at the time of their firearms discharge. The investigations also determined the distance of 49 discharging members from the respective subjects during ID-AC incidents. Twelve members discharged their weapons at a distance of 15 feet or less from their target subjects, including six members who discharged their weapon from five feet or less. Thirty-seven members were at a distance of more than 15 feet. While all uniformed members of the service are trained to discharge their weapons at a target from as far away as 75 feet, these close-contact adversarial conflicts elevate the severity and immediacy of such a circumstance that, regardless of the distance, already requires instantaneous, life-or-death decisions by each discharging member of the service.

INTENTIONAL DISCHARGES – ANIMAL ATTACK

Among the more than 6.4 million service calls that members of the NYPD responded to in 2021, thousands pertained to dogs and other animals. While this report does not catalog every service call concerning an animal, nor every animal incident involving members of the service, this report does contain all such instances when an animal service call involves a police firearms discharge.

Rounds Discharged per Member in ID-AA Incidents, 2021




Figure 25

Department policy authorizes uniformed members of the service to intentionally discharge their firearms at a dog or other animal only to protect themselves or others from imminent physical injury and when there is no opportunity to retreat or other reasonable means to eliminate the threat. Members are equipped with less-lethal options that may counter an animal attack, including batons and OC spray, but these options may not be feasible or effective in every circumstance.

The NYPD, in 2021, recorded five instances of intentional firearm discharges during animal attacks (ID-AA), an increase of 150% from the two incidents recorded in 2020, and just the second time since the inception of this report that ID-AA's increased from the previous year. All five ID-AA's involved on-duty members of the service, four of which occurred when members responded to 911 service calls and one occurred during the execution of a warrant. Four of 2021's ID-AA incidents stemmed from a dog aggressively advancing on uniformed members of the service and the remaining incident involved a dog that aggressively attacked and bit a member of the service.

Rounds Discharged per ID-AA Incident, 2021




Figure 26

Five members of the service, three in the rank of police officer, one in the rank of detective and one in the rank of sergeant, discharged a total of 11 rounds in ID-AA's in 2021, two less than in 2020. While the number of discharging personnel increased by 150%, 2021's ID-AA discharges decreased by more than 15% from the previous year as four members discharged a single round each and one member discharged seven rounds. Two members of the service were injured during ID-AA's in 2021, one as a result of a firearms discharge and one the result of bite from an aggressive dog. Two dogs were killed during ID-AA's in 2021, a total equaling that of 2020.

Two incidents occurred on the second platoon (between 7:31 a.m. and 3:30 p.m.), two occurred on the third platoon (between 3:31 p.m. and 11:30 p.m.), and one incident occurred during the first platoon (between 11:31 p.m. and 7:30 a.m.).

Three of 2021's ID-AA's occurred in the Bronx, one occurred in Brooklyn, and one took place in the confines of Staten Island. Manhattan and Queens did not record an ID-AA incident in 2021.

ID-AA Incidents by Platoon, 2021




Figure 27

ID-AA Incidents by Borough, 2021




Figure 28

UNINTENTIONAL DISCHARGES

In 2021, the NYPD experienced a total of four unintentional discharges, a 60% decrease from the previous year and the lowest on record for any year since the inception of this report. This also marks the second consecutive year that there were no injuries to any member of the service, any bystander, or any subject as a result of an unintentional discharge. Each incident involved one member of the service unintentionally discharging a single round resulting in minor property damage only.

Of the four unintentional discharges, three occurred while the discharging members were on-duty, a decrease of over 57% from the previous year. One occurred while the discharging member was off-duty, a decrease of more than 66% from 2020. All three on-duty incidents occurred within department facilities while the incident involving the off-duty member occurred within that member's residence. Three of the four overall incidents involved members discharging their own firearm, all pistols, and one incident involved a rifle that was recovered as the result of an arrest of a perpetrator.

All four members of the service that unintentionally discharged their firearms in 2021 held the rank of police officer, three of whom were assigned to the Patrol Services Bureau and one who was assigned to the Housing Bureau.

Rank, Unintentional Discharge vs. Department Staffing, 2021




Figure 29

YEARS OF SERVICE

At the time of their respective incidents, two of the members that unintentionally discharged their firearms in 2021 had five or less years of service with the department while the remaining two members both had eighteen years of service. As compared to the previous year, the former is a decrease from the five members that had less than five years of service, while the latter, however, is an increase as no member involved in an unintentional discharge in 2020 had more than fourteen years of service.

Years of Service, Unintentional Discharge vs. Department Staffing, 2021




Figure 30

LOADING/UNLOADING

In 2021, two unintentional discharges occurred while a member was loading or unloading a firearm. One incident involved an off-duty member of the service and occurred within that member's residence. The remaining incident involved an on-duty member in the process of cleaning their gun and occurred within a department facility.

HANDLING

The remaining two unintentional discharges in 2021 both occurred within department facilities as the result of member's mishandling of a firearm unrelated to the actions of loading/unloading or holstering. Of the two occurrences, one instance included a member mishandling their own firearm while attempting to remove it from a locker and one incident occurred when a member, while processing an arrest, mishandled a firearm recovered as the result of an arrest of a perpetrator.

UNAUTHORIZED DISCHARGES

Seven firearm discharges in 2021 were categorized as unauthorized. Though this represents an increase of 16.6% from the previous year, it remains the second lowest total since the inception of this report in 2016. All seven unauthorized discharge incidents occurred off-duty, three of which were completed suicides by members of the service, equaling the lowest annual total of members to die by suicide using a firearm since the onset of this report.

Of the remaining four incidents, one involved a member of the service discharging a firearm and killing a subject during an off-duty dispute. That member was arrested and suspended from duty. Another incident involved an off-duty member who discharged a weapon while engaged in a dispute. No injuries were reported as a result of the discharge and that member was arrested and suspended from duty. A third incident consisted of an off-duty member discharging a firearm into the ocean. No injuries were reported as a result and the member was arrested and suspended from duty. The remaining incident involved a member who discharged a firearm inside a private residence. There were no reported injuries and the member was suspended from duty. The members in these incidents included three males and one female. Three of the members involved in unauthorized discharges held the rank of police officer and the remaining member held the rank of sergeant.

Additionally, during the course of a separate incident, a non-member gained access to a member's firearm and subsequently discharged multiple rounds. However, due to the intentional firearms discharge of the responding officers at the scene, the incident is categorized as an Intentional Discharge-Adversarial Conflict (ID-AC) and is categorized within the ID-AC section of this report.

UMOS SUICIDES

Three members of the service, all males, died by suicide using a firearm in 2021. Two of these members held the rank of police officer and one held the rank of deputy inspector. At the time of their respective incidents, one member had seven years of service, one member had nine years of service, and one member had 20 years of service. Two incidents occurred inside vehicles and one in a private residence. All occurred while the members were off-duty. The three member suicides in 2021 is a 66.6% decrease from 2019's nine members, the highest annual total since this report began.

UMOS Suicides by Firearm by Year, 2012-2021




Figure 31

HEALTH AND WELLNESS

Throughout the course of their assigned duties, members of the service encounter incidents that may result in varying levels of emotional and psychological trauma. Recognizing the effect posed by the potential stress and trauma of such events, the department actively encourages its members to seek assistance through a host of resources available both within, and outside, the department. Internally, available resources include the Employee Assistance Unit, the Counseling Services Unit, the Chaplain's Unit, the NYPD Helpline, Peer Support, the Early Intervention Program, and the Psychological Evaluation Unit. External resources include Police Officers Providing Peer Assistance (POPPA), Finest Care, the Police Self Support Group, NYC Well, Lifeline, and the Crisis Text Line.

Formed in 2019, the Health and Wellness Section (HWS) was established to encourage and support the physical and mental health of members of the service in matters of both a professional and personal nature with a host of resources, many available 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Among the resources offered by the Health and Wellness Section include Finest Care, a free and confidential counseling service for all uniformed members of the service provided through a partnership with New York Presbyterian Hospital and the Critical Incident Stress Management Program, implemented to support members in the wake of a critical, high stress, or traumatic incident. Another resource is the Peer Support Program, which is made up of more than 250 volunteer peer representatives embedded in commands citywide. These members maintain their regularly assigned positions but voluntarily fulfill this role in order to provide a co-worker with confidential, informal support and guidance as well as to share information on mental and physical health, including suicide prevention, and overcoming the stigma that a member may associate with

seeking help. The department also maintains publicly available Health and Wellness social media pages, in addition to a nutritional needs phone application, and a Health and Wellness phone application, both of which are available on all department smartphones. Moreover, the Health and Wellness Section works to steadily enhance and update, as necessary, department policy and training with the intention of improving the physical, mental, and emotional health and well-being of members of the service.

Since 2020, when the department and New York City as a whole, began to face a wide array of unprecedented challenges in both health and civil matters, the NYPD proactively adapted, seeking alternative methods to supporting the well-being of its members. Through the Health and Wellness Section, the department began a virtual focus, assuring that members have multiple and easily accessible avenues in which to seek support, by offering webinars on topics such as mental health, grief support, fitness, nutrition, resiliency, finance, and retirement planning. Recognizing that member wellness is foundational to every aspect of the NYPD, the department continues to evaluate the factors that contribute to stress and trauma of its members along with the effects of these elements, and remains dedicated to the continued emphasis of strengthening and advancing member support services. In 2021, SPRING 3100, the official magazine of the NYPD, highlighted the Employee Assistance Unit's K-9 program, a unit that works alongside peer support officers to help members in need. Along with useful strategies to maintain a healthy and balanced lifestyle, the publication routinely provides guidance on issues specific to members of the service, emphasizes the importance of health, both on and off the job, and features information about the various physical and mental health resources available within the department.



Conducted Electrical Weapons

CONDUCTED ELECTRICAL WEAPONS

Conducted electrical weapons (CEWs) – commonly referred to as tasers or electronic control weapons/devices – are a less-lethal use of force option for law enforcement personnel.

Under department policy, CEWs may be used to gain control of non-compliant subjects who are actively resisting, exhibiting active aggression, or to prevent subjects from physically injuring themselves or other persons present. Intended to augment members' existing force options, these less-lethal devices provide an enhanced margin of safety, for both subjects and members, during the occurrence of a confrontational situation.

A CEW may be deployed in two separate modes: "cartridge" mode and "drive-stun" mode. Cartridge mode, the primary method of deployment, qualifies as a Level 1 force incident in department policy, while drive stun mode, the far less utilized manner of deployment, would qualify as a Level 2 force incident. While no national standard exists for the utilization of CEWs within law enforcement, NYPD policy remains largely in line with the best practices recommended by nationally recognized independent bodies, including the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the National Institute of Justice, and the Police Executive Research Forum.

CEWs use replaceable cartridges that contain compressed nitrogen to propel two small probes that are attached to the handheld unit by insulated conductive wires. The wires transmit short controlled pulses of electricity in five-second cycles that stimulate the skeletal muscles of the human body. These short electrical pulses affect the sensory and motor functions of the peripheral nervous system causing temporary incapacitation by preventing coordinated muscular action, without affecting vital organs. Once the five-second cycle is complete, an immediate recovery occurs. CEWs collect and store data regarding each use for post-incident review.

In 2021, a total of 28,983 uniformed members of the service were trained and authorized to use CEWs, and 7,580 CEWs were deployed to personnel on a rotating deployment basis. Both of these totals represent increases from the previous year, a 1.7% increase from 2020's 28,504 total members trained and authorized to employ CEWs, and an increase of 2% from the 7,428 CEWs deployed to personnel during that same time. 2021's increase in members trained and authorized in CEW

usage also reversed the slight decline that the department experienced in this category in 2020, which was due mainly to the numerous challenges that COVID-19 presented, affecting scheduled training and hiring opportunities during that time.

The number of members trained and authorized in CEW usage in 2021 represents a 164% increase from 2016 when, at the inception of this report, just 10,979 uniformed members of the service were CEW-trained and authorized. Overall this represents an increase of members trained and authorized from approximately 30% to more than 83% of all uniformed members of the service department-wide.

Conducted electrical weapon deployment in cartridge mode is a force option that allows members of the service to engage non-compliant and/or aggressive subjects from a distance, affording members additional time to react and develop tactical solutions in situations that, while often sudden and swift, may also be violent and hostile. Additionally, CEWs often help facilitate a member's goal to gain control and compliance rapidly, thereby minimizing the chance of injury or fatal medical consequences for both members and subjects. However, when a subject presents members or others with an imminent threat of serious physical injury or death, the utilization of a CEW may not be a suitable or reasonable force option.

In 2021, there were 1,193 CEW discharge incidents, which included 1,487 individual discharges. Multiple discharges may occur during a single CEW discharge incident and there may be CEW discharges during incidents classified under higher levels of force, for example, in a firearms discharge incident when a CEW was also utilized. During 2021, CEW discharge incidents and individual discharges both experienced an increase, by 11.2% and 14.9% respectively, from the previous year. This increase in CEW discharge incidents and individual CEW discharges may be attributable to a year that saw increases in both calls-for-service and arrests, and, while there was a reduction in department staffing, the total number of members trained and authorized in CEW usage increased in 2021.

2021 CEW Discharge Incidents, Event Type




Figure 32

A sizeable majority, approximately 77%, of 2021’s CEW discharge incidents occurred during situations when members encountered a crime in progress or where members were attempting to subdue an emotionally disturbed person (EDP). Equal to the percentage total for the same two incident types from the previous year, this number also directly correlates with the CEW discharge incidents recorded annually since 2016, where approximately 78% of all CEW discharge incidents were for arrests (which includes the category of crimes in progress) or EDP situations. Of the 1,193 CEW discharge incidents in 2021, 482 occurred during crime in progress situations while another 446 occurred as members were attempting to bring EDPs into custody. The remaining CEW discharge incidents occurred in situations that included: vehicle stops, suspicious activity, wanted subjects, and investigations of past crimes.

Emotionally disturbed persons, as defined by the NYPD Patrol Guide, are persons who appear to be mentally ill or temporarily deranged and are conducting themselves in a manner that a uniformed member of the service reasonably believes is likely to result in serious injury to themselves or others. Often, encounters with EDPs are not arrest-related situations. Consistent with the New York State Mental Hygiene Law, NYPD policy directs members to take an EDP into protective custody for the subject’s safety and the safety of the public, and to ensure that proper medical and psychiatric evaluation can take place at a safe location.

In many encounters, particularly upon the initial contact, members of the service often do not know the emotional and/or psychological status of a subject, but are trained to recognize situational and behavioral cues to properly respond to EDPs. Department policy guides members to utilize all necessary time and de-escalation tactics, along with only the reasonable amount of force necessary, in order to bring an EDP into custody. When verbal directions fail, and a subject exhibits active aggression, a CEW discharge often remains one of the safer options for both the subject and members of the service. The 446 CEW discharge incidents during EDP encounters in 2021 comprise just a fraction of a percent among the 166,494 service calls classified as an EDP call. In the vast majority of these service calls, members of the service handled the incident without the need to utilize a CEW or resorting to the use of any level of force.

DEPLOYMENT MODE

As stated earlier, CEWs can be deployed in two separate modes: “cartridge” mode and “drive-stun” mode. The primary method of operation, as per department policy, is cartridge mode, also referred to as probe mode. When a CEW is utilized in cartridge mode, two metal probes are propelled by the CEW’s cartridge toward a subject across an intervening space. This mode, which is beneficial in providing members adequate separation from the intended subject, may cause neuromuscular incapacitation and effectively immobilize a subject. Of 2021’s 1,193 CEW discharge incidents, 967 (more than 81%) were cartridge mode deployments. In approximately 86% of all CEW discharge incidents citywide since this report began in 2016, the deployment method utilized has been cartridge mode.

Discharge incidents utilizing only drive-stun mode discharges totaled 166 in 2021, an amount that accounts for approximately 13.9%, of all discharge incidents for the year. In drive-stun mode, the CEW is brought into direct contact with the subject’s body or clothing, without a cartridge or after a cartridge has been discharged. A discharge of this type does not, by itself, achieve the immobilizing effects of probe deployment as this mode does not generally cause neuromuscular incapacitation. Additionally, circumstances may arise in which both modes, cartridge and drive-stun, are used in concert. As an example, in instances when only one probe penetrates a subject or when the distance between probes may be insufficient, the use of a CEW in drive-stun mode is necessary to “complete the circuit” to achieve neuromuscular incapacitation. In 2021, both cartridge and drive-stun modes were utilized in 5.0% of all CEW incidents.

CEW Deployment Mode, 2021




Figure 33

EFFECTIVENESS

Within each and every application of force by a member of the service, CEW discharges included, the goal is to safely gain control of violent, actively resistant, and/or aggressive subjects without the need for any further use of force. Traditionally, to be deemed “effective,” a CEW discharge, regardless of the mode of deployment, had to result in members rapidly gaining custody and control of the subject immediately after its use. In October 2019, the NYPD adopted and codified the following definition of CEW effectiveness in NYPD Patrol Guide 221-08: “Any immediate reaction, even if momentary, that causes a change in an actively aggressive subject’s or emotionally disturbed person’s physical actions and/or psychological behavior as the result of a pre-deployment verbal warning, activation, laser warning, warning arc, or discharge of a CEW.” The verbal warning, CEW activation (to arm by releasing the safety), laser warning, and warning arc are all actions that could occur prior to the actual CEW discharge.

A comprehensive examination of force data indicates that, in 2021, 799 CEW discharge incidents were categorized as effective in gaining rapid control of the target subject. Of the 1,193 discharge incidents in 2021, 1,133 were intentional, of which 70.5% were deemed effective.

Effectiveness of CEW Discharges, 2021




Figure 34

Ineffective discharge incidents were attributable to such situations as the probes failing to make adequate contact with the subject’s skin or clothing, probes missing a subject entirely, a subject fighting through the pain, or the probes falling out. A single ineffective discharge incident may have multiple, often simultaneous, causes.

DISCHARGING PERSONNEL

Personnel in the rank of police officer and sergeant accounted for 92.8% —1,380 of 1,487— of all individual CEW discharges in 2021, matching the percentage total from the previous year. These two ranks also represent 92.3% of the discharging personnel, accounting for 1,101 of 1,193 CEW discharge incidents during 2021. Police officers and sergeants assigned to patrol-related functions, unlike members serving in investigative capacities, or members of a higher rank, have a higher likelihood to encounter, and ultimately engage in hostile and violent interactions with a subject and are increasingly more likely to be first on scene at an incident that may lead to CEW discharges. As a result, since 2021, personnel in the rank of police officer have accounted for the highest proportion of individual discharges, as well as discharge incidents, annually.

CEW Discharges by Rank, 2021




Figure 35

TIME AND PLACE OF DISCHARGES

In 2021, the highest percentage of CEW discharge incidents occurred during the third platoon (3:31 p.m. to 11:30 p.m.), accounting for approximately 41.8% of incidents and continuing the trend that, since 2017, CEW discharge incidents occur most frequently on this platoon, averaging more than 41% of all incidents during that period. The second platoon recorded the next highest total, 367 incidents, which represent approximately 30.8% followed by 327 incidents on the first platoon, approximately 27.4%, of discharge incidents in 2021.

A higher total of CEW discharge incidents typically occur in geographic boroughs that account for a higher number of service calls, with the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Manhattan, consistently among the top three boroughs in both CEW discharge incidents and the number of service calls. In 2021, the Bronx led New York City in CEW discharge incidents, accounting for 31.7% of all CEW discharge incidents. Brooklyn had slightly fewer with approximately 28% of the city’s discharge incidents, followed by Manhattan accounting for 22%, Queens with 14.4%, and Staten Island responsible for 3.9%.

CEW Discharges by Platoon, 2021




Figure 36

During the most recent three-year period and five times overall from 2016-2021, the Bronx experienced the highest proportion of annual CEW discharge incidents in the city. During that same span, Brooklyn, which led the city in 2018, and Manhattan have both consistently accounted for the other two of the top three boroughs with regard to CEW discharge incidents.

CEW Discharges by Geographic Borough, 2021




Figure 37

911 Calls For Service by Borough, 2021




Figure 38



General Uses of Force

Every member of the New York City Police Department is responsible and accountable for the proper use of force. Under current New York State law, a law enforcement member may use force to effect an arrest, prevent escape, and protect life and property. Any force utilized by a member of the service must be in compliance with both state and federal law, as well as with departmental policy. In all circumstances, any application or use of force must be the reasonable amount necessary to gain compliance. When appropriate and consistent with personal safety, members of the service seek to gain voluntary compliance in order to reduce or eliminate the necessity to use force. However, as voluntary compliance is not always an achievable outcome, some interactions may result in the use of force.

Historically, the documentation of NYPD force incidents occurred through paperwork such as Arrest Reports, Medical Treatment of Prisoner Forms, Aided Reports, and Line-of-Duty Injury Reports. Use of force data, while captured, lacked a centralized repository and did not adequately provide a comprehensive account of any such incident. The department, recognizing this deficiency, introduced the Threat, Resistance or Injury (TRI) Report in June of 2016. The TRI Report sought to heighten accountability, advance efforts to identify training deficiencies, and improve oversight by recording more complete data about the aspects regarding a force incident, including, but not limited to: the type(s) of force utilized, the demographic information of individuals subjected to force, the members of the service who used force and/or were subjected to force, any injuries inflicted and/or sustained, and other circumstances surrounding use of force incidents.

The TRI Report has become the primary manner by which members of the NYPD document use of force incidents, whether force was used by, or against, a member of the service. The TRI Report process is entirely digital, highly intuitive, and works in continuance of the department's goals to enhance accountability and transparency.

Threat, Resistance or Injury Reports, 2021




Figure 39

*Two firearms discharges, both categorized as unauthorized discharges that occurred outside the confines of New York City, were not captured within the TRI data. Both discharges are, however, included in the yearly discharge total and covered in the Unauthorized Discharge section. Additionally, three CEW incidents, though captured in TRI data and recorded in the yearly incident total, are not included within the Electrical Weapon category in this chart as they took place in concurrence with a firearms discharge incident.

In 2021, 7,910 TRI Interaction Reports were completed, documenting 6,440 reportable use of force incidents. Among these completed TRI Reports, 1,470 were for incidents that, although reportable under the department's force policy, did not involve the use of force by a member of the service. As an example, if a subject in department custody were to be assaulted by another subject in custody, a TRI Report would be prepared but not be categorized as a use of force incident. Similarly, the suicide of a subject in police custody is reportable by a TRI Report, though not considered a use of force incident. Additionally, an instance where a subject assaults a member of the service, without any force utilized by a member of the NYPD, would also generate a TRI Report. While these incidents do not involve any application of force by a member of the service, such occurrences still invoke a meticulous oversight mechanism governed by the department's force investigation policy.

Under the department's four level force classification rubric, 2021's force incidents consisted of 93.7% Level 1 use of force, 4.6% Level 2 use of force, 1.0% Level 3 use of force and 0.7% Level 4 use of force.

In 2020, the first year to fully utilize the NYPD's redefined use of force policy that utilized four levels of force in lieu of the previous definition of three levels, force incidents comprised of 95.1 % Level 1 use of force, 3.1 % Level 2 use of force, 1.2% Level 3 use of force, and 0.6% Level 4 use of force.

The majority of 2021's 6,440 force incidents involved the minimum amount of physical force by a member of the service. This physical force, defined to include such actions as forcible take-downs, hand strikes, and foot strikes, totaled 5,047 incidents, accounting for approximately 78.4% of all force incidents for the year. The next highest force utilized, CEWs, represented 18.5% of force incidents, of which 1,133, more than 95%, were intentional discharge incidents.

The remaining force incidents by equipment or force option included: 97 uses of OC spray (1.5%), 53 uses of impact weapons (0.8%), two uses of mesh restraining blankets (0.03%), 50 firearms discharges (0.7%), and one canine bite (0.01%). 2021 continued the trend that, since 2016, the initial year of this report, the NYPD has shown an annual decrease in the cumulative amount of four specific less-lethal force incidents; impact weapons, mesh restraining blankets, OC spray, and canine bites. There was, however, an increase in CEW discharge incidents, a return to the trend the department experienced from 2016 through 2019, that saw an annual increase in these incidents over that time. Overall, in 2021, a total of 153 force incidents involved either impact weapons, mesh restraining blankets, OC spray, or canine bites. This is 69 incidents fewer than the 222 incidents of the same categories in 2020, 113 fewer than 266 incidents in 2019, 180 fewer than the 333 incidents in 2018, and 365 fewer than the 518 incidents in 2017.

From June to December 2016, there were a total of 396 force incidents in these categories. The NYPD began tracking the use of these force options in June 2016, after instituting its revised force policies and updated reporting system. Thus, the information for 2016 is limited to the last seven months of that year and is not available for prior years.

In 2021, incidents involving the use of less-lethal force options, including CEWs, increased by 3.9% in these categories from 2020. However, excluding CEW incidents, which increased by 11.2% from 2020, the remaining categories combined represent a decrease of more than 31% from the previous year as the use of mesh restraining blankets fell by 60% compared to 2020, the use of OC spray fell by 27.6%, incidents of canine bites fell by 50%, and the use of impact weapons fell by 34.5% from the previous year.

Of the total 6,440 force incidents recorded on TRI Reports in 2021, 56%, or 3,607 incidents, occurred during four arrest-related categories: crimes in progress, past crime/violation investigations, wanted suspect investigations, and prisoner interactions. Force was used in approximately 3% of total arrests (4,657 of 155,505) effected by members of the department in 2021. Combined with incidents involving emotionally disturbed persons, these arrest-related incidents accounted for approximately 81.8% of all NYPD uses of force. The highest remaining categories involving the use of force include crowd control, accounting for 2.4% of the total, vehicular summons enforcement at 4.0%, and suspicious activity, accounting for 1.9%.

Force Reporting Levels, 2021




Figure 40

Type of Encounter in Which Police Used Force, 2021




Figure 41

Force Used During Arrests by Subject Race, 2021




Figure 42

Total Arrests by Subject Race, 2021




Figure 43

Of the uniformed members of the service that used force in 2021, the race and ethnicity of these members largely correlates with the racial and ethnic breakdown of uniformed staff in the department as a whole. The racial composition of the subjects of police force reflects the racial composition of the violent criminal population in the city, as measured by overall arrests, subjects who resist arrest, and information provided from crime victims that include the descriptions of assault suspects, robbery suspects, and shooting suspects.

Uniformed Members Using Force, 2021




Figure 44

Violent Crime and Force Used to Effect Arrest, 2021




Figure 45

In 2021, the highest percentage of individuals subjected to police force, approximately 64.5%, were between the ages of 16 and 35. Of individuals subjected to force between the ages of 16 and 25, 56.5% were Black, 30.7% were Hispanic, 5.0% were White, and the remaining 7.8% were Asian or other ethnicities. Of the subjects between the ages of 26 and 35, 55.8% were Black, 28.2% were Hispanic, 8.7% were White, and the remaining 7.3% were Asian or other ethnicities. Of the individuals subjected to force between the ages of 36 and 59, 52.9% were Black, 26.4% were Hispanic, 14.0% were White, and the remaining 6.7% were Asian or other ethnicities. Of subjects ages 60 and older, 45.8% were Black, 23.2% were Hispanic, 22.6% were White, and the remainder, 8.4%, were Asian or other ethnicities.

Subjects of Force by Age/Race, 2021




Figure 46

Force Reporting by Geographic Borough, 2021




Figure 47

Force Reporting by Platoon, 2021




Figure 48

Geographically, Brooklyn had the highest percentage of use of force, accounting for 29.4% of citywide uses of force, while Manhattan (24.6%) and the Bronx (24.3%) combined, accounted for 48.9%. Queens (17.9%) and Staten Island (3.8%) accounted for the remaining 21.6% of force used in each geographic borough by members of the service. Across all five boroughs, use of force incidents in 2021 occurred most often on the third platoon, from 3:31 p.m. to 11:30 p.m., followed by 29.4% on the second platoon, from 7:31 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., and 24.6% occurring on the first platoon, from 11:31 p.m. to 7:30 a.m. The use of force in these two groupings, by borough and by tour, largely mirrors the data recorded in the preceding three years within the same categories.

Force Reporting by Subject Race, 2021




Figure 49

Subjects of Force by Age, 2021





Figure 50

CIVILIAN FORCE COMPLAINTS

Since 2019, force complaints received by the Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) have declined by approximately 27.2%, from 1,956 complaints in 2019 to 1,424 complaints recorded in 2021, the lowest on record since the inception of this report. The year 2021 recorded 203 fewer force complaints to the CCRB than recorded in 2020 and 532 less complaints than in 2019. Although the overall number of force complaints to CCRB has declined, 2021 did experience an increase of force allegations substantiated by CCRB. When compared with data since this report began in 2016, the 127 substantiated allegations in 2021 is approximately 29.6% greater than the previous high of 98 substantiated allegations recorded in 2019 but is, however, just the second time during this period that the department experienced an annual increase within this category.

Historical CCRB Force Complaints vs. Substantiated Force Allegations, 2012 - 2021



NYPD members, in the course of responding to the millions of calls for service that New York City experiences annually, come in direct contact with victims, witnesses, suspects, and other civilian bystanders. The overwhelming majority of these calls for service and other public interactions occur without any actual police use of force or complaints of unnecessary force. In 2021, NYPD personnel responded to more than 6.4 million calls for service, and only a fraction of a percent of those interactions resulted in force complaints against uniformed members of the service. The ratio of calls for service to force complaint cases in 2021 is approximately 4,560 to 1. The ratio of calls for service to substantiated allegations is about 51,133 to 1. The ratio of use of force incidents to substantiated force allegations is approximately 50 to 1.

FORCE USED AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE SERVICE

One simple, yet, substantial aspect that is understood by members of the service, is the inherent danger present within police work and the realization that at any time, an event, encounter, or interaction may ultimately turn violent. Although the goal for every member is to achieve voluntary compliance, the efforts of NYPD personnel to accomplish voluntary compliance are not always successful. Some encounters between uniformed members of the service and the public become contentious, some ultimately violent, and lead to injuries to both subjects and members of the service.

In 2021, the NYPD recorded 5,783 incidents in which subjects used force against members of the service. While incidents of force against members often occur during instances in which members use force, for analytical purposes, force used by members and force used against members are viewed independently of one another. The majority of force used against NYPD personnel, 55.5%, took place during arrest-related situations, which includes: crimes in progress, past crime/violation investigations, wanted subject investigations, and violent prisoner interactions situations. Additionally, encounters with emotionally disturbed persons represented approximately 26.7% of incidents in 2021. Since the inception of this report, arrest-related incidents and encounters with EDPs have consistently ranked as among the top incident types most likely to result in force against a member of the service. Several other situations that represented significant percentages in force against member of the service in 2021 include vehicle summons

enforcement (4.0%), crowd control (2.3%), and suspicious activity (1.7%). Of incidents where force was used against a member of the service, physical force without weapons was the vast majority, representing 97.6% of all force used against NYPD personnel. In the remaining 139 incidents of force used against members of the service, a weapon was used or displayed by a subject in each incident.

Force Used Against Members by Event Description, 2021




Figure 52

Type of Force Used Against Members, 2021



Figure 53

Incidents where force was used against members of the service in 2021 occurred most often in Brooklyn (29.1%) followed by Manhattan (25.3%) and the Bronx (24.4%). Queens (17.7%) and Staten Island (3.5%) accounted for the remaining 21.2% of all occurrences. These percentages, as stated earlier, strongly correlate with that of members' use of force. The first platoon, from 11:31 p.m. to 7:30 a.m. accounted for close to half (46.0%) of all incidents where force was used against members, followed by 29.4% of instances on the third platoon from 3:31 p.m. to 11:30 p.m., and the remaining 24.6% on the second platoon, from 7:31 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.

In 2021, of the 8,311 subjects of police force, 8,059 individuals (approximately 97%) sustained no injuries or minor injuries. A total of 252 subjects sustained substantial or serious physical injuries. During the 6,432 incidents of force used against members of the service, 3,973 members of the NYPD sustained injuries, of which 302 injuries were deemed substantial or serious. Substantial injuries are generally those that require treatment at a hospital. Serious injuries are generally those that require admission to a hospital.

Force Used Against Members by Platoon, 2021




Figure 54

Force Used Against Members by Geographic Borough, 2021




Figure 55

Use of Force Related Injuries (Subject vs. Members), 2021




Figure 56

Appendices

APPENDIX A

NYPD Use of Force Documentation and Investigation Process

In all use of force incidents, an immediate supervisor responds to the scene to assess the circumstances. The supervisor must determine the level of force and/or type of injury in order to clarify the appropriate reporting and investigative requirements. All reportable uses of force by members of the service are investigated, including those determined to be within department guidelines.

LEVEL 1

Use of hand strikes; foot strikes; forcible take downs; wrestling/grappling; O.C. spray; mesh restraining blanket; CEW (cartridge mode)

OR

A physical injury to a non-member of the service resulting from police action (unless consistent with use of higher level of force)

LEVEL 2

Use of any object as an impact weapon; police canine bite; CEW (drive stun mode); any prohibited act (excluding the alleged or suspected use of a chokehold, or prohibited method of restraint, or those that result in a serious physical injury, or those related to a firearm discharge)

OR

Alleged/suspected excessive force (no injury/physical injury); attempted prisoner suicide (excluding serious physical injury)

OR

A physical injury to a non-member of the service consistent with use of Level 2 force; unconsciousness; loss of tooth; application of stitches/staples

The **Member of the Service** completes the **Threat, Resistance or Injury (TRI) Interaction Report**.

The **Immediate Supervisor** conducts the investigation, completes the **TRI Incident Report**, and closes the incident unless any further investigation is warranted.

The **Member of the Service** completes the **(TRI) Interaction Report**.

The **Duty Captain** conducts the investigation and completes the **TRI Incident Report**.

The **Patrol Borough Investigations Unit** may assist in the investigation.

All reports and follow-up investigations are reviewed by the members' **Immediate Supervisor**.

All reports and follow-up investigations are reviewed by the members' **Commanding Officer**.

FID or IAB may respond to any force incident or subject injury and may assume responsibility of the investigation based on the circumstances of the incident.

LEVEL 3

Use of force readily capable of causing death or serious injury, except firearm discharges
OR
Alleged or suspected use of a chokehold or prohibited method of restraint
OR
Alleged/suspected excessive force (serious physical injury); attempted prisoner suicide (serious physical injury)
OR
A serious physical injury to a non-member of the service

LEVEL 4

ALL police firearm discharges
OR
Any discharge of a member of the service's firearm fired by someone *other* than the member
OR
A non-member of the service dies, or is seriously injured and likely to die

The **Member of the Service** completes the **TRI Interaction Report** unless superseded by the investigative authority of the **Force Investigation Division**.

Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) conducts the investigation and completes the **TRI Incident Report**.

The **Force Investigation Division (FID)** conducts the investigation and completes the **TRI Interaction Report** and the **TRI Incident Report**.

All reports generate an Internal Affairs case. Follow-up investigations are reviewed by **IAB** investigators, supervisors and executives before being closed.

The **NYPD's Use of Force Review Board** reviews all cases for which a member of **FID** is the investigating supervisor. Additionally, any violations of force prohibitions at any level may be reviewed on a per-case basis to determine whether, under the circumstances, the actions were reasonable and justified.

Figure 57

APPENDIX B

Subjects Killed During Intentional Discharge – Adversarial Conflict Incidents

Disclaimer: In some cases, information is based on preliminary findings of ongoing investigations. Additional information may develop as the department's investigation progresses and/or related court or grand jury proceedings are conducted.

Incident 1 – 47th Precinct (Male/Black/51) – 01/21/2021

On January 21, 2021, at approximately 1815 hours, officers in plainclothes stopped and exited their vehicle to investigate a dispute that, prior to the officers' arrival, involved the male subject menacing a female individual with a knife. Officers approached the dispute when the male subject, holding a knife, advanced towards the officers. In response, officers discharged their firearms multiple times and struck the subject. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. Six knives were recovered from the scene. The toxicology report indicated that there was neither alcohol nor controlled substances in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 2 – 83rd Precinct (Male/Black/53) – 07/08/2021

On July 8, 2021, at approximately 2227 hours, officers on patrol encountered three males who had been shot by the subject. As the officers proceeded in the subject's direction of flight, as indicated by the gunshot victims, they located the male subject crouched beside a parked vehicle, holding a firearm. Officers issued numerous verbal commands to drop the weapon. The subject ignored the commands and raised the firearm in the direction of one of the officers. In response, the officers discharged their firearms, striking the subject multiple times. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. A Glock 19 9mm semi-automatic handgun was recovered on scene. The toxicology report indicated the presence of ethanol in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 3 – 46th Precinct (Male/Hispanic/24) – 08/29/2021

On August 29, 2021, at approximately 0415 hours, off-duty officers were in an off-site precinct parking lot when they heard gunshots. Exiting the parking lot on foot and responding towards the gunfire, officers observed a male subject with a firearm. In response, one officer discharged their firearm striking the subject. After being struck, the subject dropped the firearm, at which time a second male subject retrieved it and discharged it at the officers. In response, a second officer discharged their firearm. The first subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. A Glock 17 9mm semi-automatic handgun was recovered as part of the investigation. The toxicology report indicated the presence of THC, 11- OH-THC, THC-COOH, cotinine, and ethanol in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 4 – 62nd Precinct (Male/White/65) – 11/11/2021

On November 11, 2021, at approximately 1554 hours, an officer attempted to conduct a vehicle stop of the male subject when the subject fled in the vehicle. The officer pursued and stopped the vehicle further along the same roadway, at which time the subject exited the front driver-side door, opened the rear driver-side door, and retrieved a firearm. The subject re-entered the driver-side door as an additional officer arrived, then exited the front driver-side door holding the firearm. Officers issued numerous verbal commands to drop the firearm. The subject ignored the officers' commands and pointed the firearm in the direction of the officers. In response, officers discharged their firearms, striking the subject multiple times. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. A Daisy Power Line Model 415 .177 CO2 air pistol was recovered at the scene. The toxicology report indicated the presence of EDDP and methadone in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 5 – 108th Precinct (Male/Hispanic/20) – 12/16/2021

On December 16, 2021, at approximately 0309 hours, an off-duty officer, while sitting inside their personal vehicle, was robbed at gunpoint by three male subjects. During the course of the robbery, the officer discharged their firearm in an exchange of gunfire with the subjects. As a result, the officer was struck in the chest, arm, hand, and leg and was grazed in the head. The three subjects were struck by gunfire, resulting in non-fatal injuries to two of the subjects. The third subject was struck multiple times and removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. A Taurus 9mm PT 111G2 semi-automatic handgun was recovered on scene. The toxicology report indicated that there was neither alcohol nor controlled substances in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 6 – 71st Precinct (Male/Black/26) – 12/20/2021

On December 20, 2021, at approximately 0408 hours, the subject called 911 to report a male armed with a firearm and a knife, providing a physical and clothing description matching his own. Officers responded and encountered the male subject holding a knife in his hand. Officers issued numerous verbal commands to drop the knife and deployed two CEWs at the subject with no effect. Officers tactically retreated while continuing to issue verbal commands when the subject advanced toward an officer while holding the knife. In response, officers discharged their firearms, striking the subject multiple times. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. A knife was recovered on scene. The toxicology report indicated the presence of THC and THC-COOH in the subject's system at the time of death.

APPENDIX C

Other Death Investigations Conducted by the Force Investigation Division

Disclaimer: In some cases, information is based on preliminary findings of ongoing investigations. Additional information may develop as the department's investigation progresses and/or related court or grand jury proceedings are conducted.

Death in Custody

Death in custody incidents typically occur after the restraint of a particular subject. The term "in custody" refers to a subject whom officers have either decided that there was probable cause to arrest or that restraint was necessary for the safety of the subject or other persons present. In death in custody situations, subjects may be located anywhere, (e.g., at the scene of an incident, at a hospital, at a police facility, or in a courthouse awaiting arraignment), and death may occur due to intervening circumstances beyond police control. Such intervening circumstances include: medical crises such as heart attacks or strokes; suicides; drug-related deaths from drugs taken or ingested prior to custody; and injuries inflicted before custody during accidents or assaults by people other than involved parties. In 2021, there were six death in custody incidents.

Incident 1 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 33rd Precinct (Male/Black/52) – 04/08/2021

On April 8, 2021, officers were executing a search warrant when they encountered the male subject who appeared to be suffering a medical episode. The subject was placed into custody, officers requested emergency medical service (EMS) personnel, and the subject was transported to the hospital. While at the hospital, the subject suffered a cardiac episode and was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was acute intoxication by the combined effects of cocaine and methadone.

Incident 2 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 72nd Precinct (Male/Hispanic/42) – 05/21/2021

On May 20, 2021, the male subject was involved in a motor vehicle collision. After treatment at the hospital for suspicion of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of a narcotic, officers transported the subject to Red Hook Community Justice Center. While awaiting arraignment, the subject was lying down in the cell when the escorting officer noticed a change in the subject's breathing and requested EMS. The subject was transported to the hospital where he was subsequently pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was acute fentanyl, cocaine, and norbuprenorphine intoxication. The toxicology report indicated the presence of fentanyl, norfentanyl, 4-ANPP, B-hydroxyfentanyl, naloxone, norbuprenorphine, cocaine, and benzoylecgonine in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 3 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 60th Precinct (Male/White/65) – 06/04/2021

On June 4, 2021, after being placed in custody for driving while intoxicated, the male subject was treated and released from the hospital, then transported to the precinct for arrest processing. While awaiting processing, officers found the subject unconscious and unresponsive in the precinct holding pen. Officers attempted life saving measures, which were continued by EMS personnel upon their arrival. The subject was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was hypertensive and atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease.

Incident 4 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 122nd Precinct (Male/Hispanic/22) – 07/30/2021

On July 24, 2021, the male subject was admitted to the hospital after attempting to harm himself. On July 29, while inside the hospital, the subject was placed under arrest for forcible touching and remained, in custody, while admitted to the hospital. On July 30, the subject was experiencing difficulty breathing, prompting the guarding officer to summon the assistance of hospital personnel. The subject's condition deteriorated and he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was sudden death following prolonged agitation of unknown etiology. The toxicology report indicated the presence of fentanyl, norfentanyl, lorazepam, and haloperidol in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 5 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 40th Precinct (Male/Black/52) – 08/25/2021

On August 25, 2021, officers arrested the male subject and transported him to the precinct without incident. Upon investigation, the subject, while lodged in the precinct holding pen, appeared to reach into his sock and place an unknown substance into his mouth. The subject then later appeared to snort an unknown substance and, shortly thereafter, collapsed onto the floor from the bench upon which he was sitting. Subsequently, another prisoner brought the subject's condition to the attention of an officer in the holding area and officers began performing life saving measures until the arrival of EMS. The subject was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was acute intoxication by combined effects of fentanyl, p-fluorofentanyl, and benzodiazepines.

Incident 6 – Suicide/Police Force Used – 110th Precinct (Male/Hispanic/33) – 11/01/2021

On November 1, 2021, officers responded to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person and, upon arrival, they were informed that the male subject was attempting to harm himself with a knife. Officers entered the residence and observed the subject pouring lighter fluid onto the kitchen stove, causing a fire. New York City Fire Department (FDNY) members arrived and began to extinguish the fire, at which time the subject retreated to a rear bedroom, doused himself with lighter fluid, and lit himself on fire. As the flames about his person were extinguished, the subject stabbed himself repeatedly. Officers deployed a CEW and took the subject into custody. The subject was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was sharp force injury to neck and torso.

Death Preceding Custody

Death preceding custody incidents typically occur immediately before the intended restraint of a particular subject, after officers have either decided that there was probable cause to arrest or that restraint was necessary for the safety of the subject or other persons present, but had not, in fact, established control of the person. Ten cases investigated by the Force Investigation Division in 2021 are categorized as death preceding custody. In one case, the subject was fleeing the police when the death occurred.

Incident 1 – Suicide – 26th Precinct (Female/Hispanic/31) – 01/05/2021

On January 5, 2021, officers responded to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person on a roof. Upon arrival at the location provided, officers observed the female subject standing on the ledge of an adjacent roof. As they sought to determine the address of that adjacent roof in an effort to gain access, officers attempted to establish a dialogue with the subject from the rooftop they were located. After approximately three minutes of dialogue, the subject leapt from the roof ledge, falling to the ground below. The subject was pronounced deceased on the scene by EMS. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt impact injuries of the head and torso. The toxicology report indicated that there was neither alcohol nor controlled substances in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 2 – Suicide – 26th Precinct (Male/Asian/29) – 01/11/2021

On January 11, 2021, officers responded to a 911 call of trespassing. Upon arrival, officers encountered a female individual and the male subject on the fire escape of the location. The female asked for help while informing the officers that the subject was going to jump. As the officers were attempting to establish a dialogue with the subject, the subject stepped over the fire escape railing and jumped, landing on the ground below. The subject was pronounced deceased on the scene by EMS. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was multiple blunt force trauma. The toxicology report indicated that there was neither alcohol nor controlled substances in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 3 – Suicide – 17th Precinct (Male/Hispanic/23) – 03/29/2021

On March 28, 2021, officers responded to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person threatening to jump from the roof of a building. While officers were attempting to establish a dialogue, the male subject jumped from the ledge of the building, falling to the ground below. The subject was pronounced deceased on the scene by EMS. According to the subject's death certificate the cause of death was multiple blunt force injuries. The toxicology report indicated the presence of ethanol, cocaine, ethylbenzoyllecgonine, and benzoyllecgonine in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 4 – Suicide – 44th Precinct (Male/Hispanic/44) – 03/31/2021

On March 31, 2021, officers responded to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person and, upon arrival, encountered the male subject inside his bedroom, refusing to open the door. While officers were attempting to establish a dialogue, the subject climbed out of the bedroom window onto the fire escape, over the railing, and proceeded to hang from the outside railing when he fell to the ground below. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate the cause of death was blunt force injuries of the head and torso. The toxicology report indicated the presence of fentanyl in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 5 – Suicide – 7th Precinct (Male/Black/22) – 06/23/2021

On June 23, 2021, officers responded to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person. Upon arrival, the officers encountered the male subject on the roof of the location. While officers were attempting to establish a dialogue, the subject leaned backward off the ledge, falling to the ground below. The subject was pronounced deceased on the scene by EMS. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt force injuries of the head, torso, and extremities. The toxicology report indicated that there was neither alcohol nor controlled substances in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 6 – Suicide – 121st Precinct (Male/Hispanic/51) – 07/04/2021

On July 4, 2021, officers responded to a 911 call of a male with a firearm threatening to kill himself. Prior to police arrival, the subject discharged the firearm several times in the yard of the location then barricaded himself in his bedroom. Responding officers made entry into the bedroom and found the subject with a self-inflicted gunshot wound. The subject was pronounced deceased on the scene by EMS. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was a gunshot wound of the head. The toxicology report indicated the presence of benzoylcegonine and ethanol in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 7 – Suicide – 5th Precinct (Female/Black/Unk) – 08/18/2021

On August 18, 2021, officers responded to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person and, upon arrival, encountered the female subject on the Brooklyn Bridge walking adjacent to the guardrail. As the officers exited their vehicle, the subject climbed over the guardrail, onto the exterior support beams of the bridge, and before dialogue could be established, leapt from the beam, landing on a construction barge at the base of the bridge. The subject was removed to the hospital where she was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's autopsy report, the cause of death was blunt impact injuries of the head and torso. The toxicology report indicated the presumptive presence of cannabinoids in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 8 – Suicide – 60th Precinct (Male/White/72) – 08/23/2021

On August 23, 2021, officers responded to a 911 call of a disorderly person. Upon arrival, an individual escorted officers to the location of the male subject, who was on the roof of the location, on the outside of the railing. While awaiting the arrival of Emergency Service Unit (ESU) personnel, officers attempted to establish a dialogue when the subject released his grip on the railing and fell to the ground below. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate the cause of death was multiple blunt force injuries. The toxicology report indicated the presence of ethanol in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 9 – Suicide – 104th Precinct (Male/Asian/28) – 10/26/2021

On October 26, 2021, officers responded to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person. Upon arrival, officers were escorted into the residence by the subject's family member when they heard a loud noise emanate from the basement. Officers entered the basement area and the male subject fled the location through a rear door. Officers exited through the same door and, while pursuing the subject, observed him fall to the ground a distance away from them. Officers approached the subject when they observed blood on the ground, a knife in the subject's hand, and numerous self-inflicted stab wounds to the subject's chest. Officers began performing life saving measures on the unresponsive subject and requested EMS. The subject was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate the cause of death was stab wounds of the chest with injuries of the heart and lung.

Incident 10 – Fleeing Subject – 43rd Precinct (Male/Hispanic/52) – 12/26/2021

On December 26, 2021, officers attempted to conduct a vehicle stop of a male subject. When the subject refused to stop, officers pulled their vehicle ahead of the subject's vehicle in order to halt vehicular traffic on the parkway. Once traffic ceased, officers exited their vehicle to locate the subject's vehicle but were unsuccessful. Traffic resumed and the officers, while traveling back to the initial location of the attempted stop, observed the subject's vehicle stopped in the right lane of traffic on the opposite side of the parkway. Upon arrival, officers observed the subject lying motionless in the left lane of the road and requested EMS. The subject was pronounced deceased on the scene by EMS. A subsequent investigation by NYPD Highway Patrol Collision Investigation Squad revealed the subject exited his vehicle on foot and was struck by oncoming traffic. According to the subject's death certificate the cause of death was blunt impact to the head and torso.

Death No Custody Contemplated

Death no custody contemplated occurs when a person becomes deceased during a police interaction, and that person was not taken into police custody, nor did the police contemplate taking them into custody. In 2021, the Force Investigation Division investigated six cases categorized as death no custody contemplated.

Incident 1 – Fleeing Subject – 121st Precinct (Male/Asian/70) (Female/Asian/68) – 02/16/2021

On February 16, 2021, an officer attempted to conduct a vehicle stop for a traffic infraction. The subject vehicle fled at a high rate of speed and the officer ceased efforts to conduct the stop. As the subject vehicle continued to flee, it collided with two uninvolved vehicles. The operator and the passenger from one of the struck vehicles were removed to the hospital where they were both subsequently pronounced deceased. According to their death certificates, the cause of death for the operator was complications of blunt force injuries of the head and neck and, for the passenger, multiple blunt force injuries.

Incident 2 – Suicide – 60th Precinct (Female/White/52) – 04/14/2021

On April 14, 2021, officers escorted the subject to her former residence to retrieve belongings pursuant to a court order. Upon arrival, officers were met by the subject's family member, who appeared disheveled and agitated by the officers' presence. While the officers engaged with the family member, the subject exited onto the balcony, stepped over the railing and jumped, falling to the ground below. The subject was removed to the hospital where she was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was multiple blunt force trauma. The toxicology report indicated the presence of codeine, isopropanol, and a presumptive positive of cannabinoids in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 3 – Fleeing Subject – 7th Precinct (Male/Asian/24) – 07/08/2021

On July 8, 2021, officers attempted to conduct a vehicle stop for a traffic infraction when the vehicle fled at a high rate of speed, striking a bicyclist. As the vehicle continued to flee, officers stopped to render aid to the struck bicyclist. The bicyclist was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was multiple blunt impact injuries. The toxicology report indicated that there was neither alcohol nor controlled substances in the subject's system at the time of death.

Incident 4 – Fleeing Subject – 88th Precinct (Female/Asian/3 Months) – 09/11/2021

On September 11, 2021, officers observed a vehicle commit a traffic infraction and, with the intention of conducting a vehicle stop, proceeded to follow the subject vehicle. The vehicle was approximately one block away and moving at a high rate of speed when the officers lost sight of it. While canvassing the area for the vehicle, officers were alerted to a vehicle collision between the subject vehicle and another vehicle. The collision caused the vehicles to strike pedestrians on the sidewalk, including an infant in a stroller. The infant was removed to the hospital where she was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt force trauma of the head and torso.

Incident 5 – Collision – 75th Precinct (Male/Asian/35) – 10/11/2021

On October 11, 2021, a police vehicle, with its emergency lights activated, was stopped on the Belt Parkway behind the scene of a two vehicle collision when it was struck by another vehicle. That vehicle then struck the operator of one of the vehicles involved in the initial collision who had been standing outside of his vehicle. EMS pronounced the operator deceased on the scene. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was multiple blunt force trauma.

Incident 6 – Fleeing Subject – 72nd Precinct (Male/Hispanic/42) – 10/17/2021

On October 17, 2021, officers responded to a 911 call of a suspicious person. Upon arrival, officers observed two subjects enter a vehicle, depart the location, and subsequently disobey a steady red traffic light. Officers activated their emergency lights and attempted to conduct a vehicle stop when the subject vehicle fled at a high rate of speed. While fleeing, the subject vehicle collided with another vehicle. The operator of the second vehicle was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate the cause of death was blunt force trauma of the head and torso.

APPENDIX D: 2021 FIREARM DISCHARGE INCIDENTS BY PRECINCT/LOCATION OF OCCURRENCE

Precinct/Location	Adversarial Conflict	Animal Attack	Unintentional	Unauthorized/Suicide	Total
005 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
013 Precinct	1	0	0	1	2
MTN Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
032 Precinct	2	0	0	0	2
033 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
034 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
040 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
041 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
042 Precinct	2	0	0	0	2
043 Precinct	1	0	1	0	2
044 Precinct	2	0	0	0	2
046 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
047 Precinct	1	2	0	0	3
048 Precinct	1	1	0	0	2
052 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
060 Precinct	0	0	2	0	2
062 Precinct	1	0	0	1	2
067 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
071 Precinct	3	0	0	0	3
075 Precinct	3	0	0	0	3
077 Precinct	0	0	1	0	1
078 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
079 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
081 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
083 Precinct	1	1	0	0	2
103 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
104 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
106 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
108 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
109 Precinct	0	0	0	2	2
120 Precinct	0	1	0	0	1
122 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
Nassau County	1	0	0	1	2
Suffolk County	0	0	0	2	2
TOTAL	36	5	4	7	52

Figure 58

APPENDIX E: HISTORICAL DATA ON POLICE FIREARM DISCHARGES




Figure 59




Figure 60




Figure 61




Figure 62




Figure 63

APPENDIX F: 2021 USE OF FORCE INCIDENTS BY MEMBERS' COMMAND

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
001 PRECINCT	1	8	0	0	0	0	36	45
005 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
005 PRECINCT	0	3	1	0	0	0	19	23
006 PRECINCT	0	3	1	0	0	0	41	45
007 PRECINCT	0	15	0	0	0	0	28	43
009 PRECINCT	0	10	0	0	0	0	42	52
009 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
010 PRECINCT	0	6	0	0	0	0	41	47
013 PRECINCT	0	7	0	0	0	0	48	55
014 PCT-MIDTOWN SO. PCT	0	14	0	0	0	0	83	97
017 PRECINCT	0	4	1	0	0	0	28	33
018 PCT-MIDTOWN NO. PCT	0	5	0	0	0	0	22	27
019 PRECINCT	0	7	2	0	1	0	35	45
020 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
020 PRECINCT	1	3	0	0	1	0	16	21
023 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
023 PRECINCT	0	11	0	0	0	0	56	67
024 PRECINCT	0	11	0	0	0	0	31	42
025 PRECINCT	0	11	1	0	1	0	53	66
026 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
026 PRECINCT	0	2	1	0	0	0	10	13
028 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
028 PRECINCT	0	31	0	0	0	0	44	75
030 PRECINCT	0	5	0	0	0	0	19	24
032 PRECINCT	1	12	0	0	0	1	50	64
033 PRECINCT	1	12	1	0	0	0	49	63

Figure 64

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
034 PRECINCT	2	19	0	0	1	0	53	75
040 PRECINCT	1	42	1	0	1	0	86	131
041 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
041 PRECINCT	1	8	2	0	0	0	34	45
042 PRECINCT	2	24	1	0	0	0	92	119
043 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	2
043 PRECINCT	0	26	2	0	1	0	72	101
044 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
044 PRECINCT	2	57	0	0	2	0	87	148
045 PRECINCT	0	7	0	0	1	0	46	54
046 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
046 PRECINCT	1	32	1	0	1	0	191	226
047 PRECINCT	2	49	1	0	0	0	115	167
048 PRECINCT	1	22	1	0	0	0	60	84
049 PRECINCT	0	12	1	0	0	0	25	38
050 PRECINCT	0	5	0	0	0	0	13	18
052 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
052 PRECINCT	0	45	1	0	0	0	64	110
060 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
060 PRECINCT	1	6	1	0	3	0	58	69
061 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
061 PRECINCT	0	10	1	0	0	0	59	70
062 PRECINCT	0	3	0	0	1	0	37	41
063 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
063 PRECINCT	0	28	1	0	0	0	47	76
066 PRECINCT	0	1	0	0	0	0	18	19

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
067 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
067 PRECINCT	0	27	0	0	0	0	108	135
068 PRECINCT	0	4	0	0	0	0	31	35
069 PRECINCT	0	14	0	0	2	0	27	43
070 PRECINCT	0	9	0	0	2	0	67	78
071 PRECINCT	4	16	0	0	3	0	54	77
072 PRECINCT	1	6	2	0	4	0	57	70
073 PRECINCT	2	26	0	0	2	0	77	107
075 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
075 PRECINCT	2	33	1	0	6	0	135	177
076 PRECINCT	0	4	0	0	0	0	23	27
077 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
077 PRECINCT	1	18	1	0	1	0	50	71
078 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
078 PRECINCT	1	4	0	0	0	0	37	42
079 PRECINCT	0	8	0	0	0	0	66	74
081 PRECINCT	1	13	2	0	1	0	53	70
083 PRECINCT	2	16	1	0	0	0	40	59
084 PRECINCT	0	2	2	0	0	0	41	45
088 PRECINCT	0	11	0	0	0	0	42	53
090 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
090 PRECINCT	0	19	0	0	0	0	44	63
090 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
094 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
094 PRECINCT	1	9	0	0	0	0	29	39
100 PRECINCT	0	7	0	0	0	0	23	30

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
100TH DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
101 PRECINCT	1	8	1	0	1	0	75	86
101ST DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
102 PRECINCT	1	6	0	0	0	0	46	53
102ND DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
103 PRECINCT	0	26	0	0	2	0	110	138
104 PRECINCT	1	11	0	0	0	0	56	68
105 PRECINCT	0	34	1	0	1	0	66	102
105TH DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
106 PRECINCT	0	7	1	0	2	0	42	52
107 PRECINCT	1	4	0	0	1	0	48	54
107TH DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
108 PRECINCT	0	1	0	0	0	0	32	33
108TH DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
109 PRECINCT	0	5	0	0	0	0	38	43
109TH DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
110 PRECINCT	0	8	1	0	1	0	34	44
110TH DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
111 PRECINCT	0	1	0	0	0	0	8	9
112 PRECINCT	0	4	0	0	0	0	25	29
112TH DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
113 PRECINCT	0	8	0	0	1	0	71	80
113TH DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
114 PRECINCT	0	14	0	0	1	0	103	118
114TH DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
115 PRECINCT	0	11	0	0	0	0	42	53

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
120 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
120 PRECINCT	0	19	0	0	0	0	57	76
121 PRECINCT	0	8	0	0	0	0	44	52
122 PRECINCT	1	8	0	0	0	0	38	47
123 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
123 PRECINCT	0	3	0	0	0	0	13	16
BRONX COURT SECT	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	2
BRONX EAST SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	1	8	9
BRONX WEST SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	8
BROOKLYN COURT SECTION	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	8
CANDIDATE ASSESSMENT DIVISION	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
CANINE TEAM	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
CENTRAL PARK PRECINCT	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	4
CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT OFFICE	1	0	0	0	0	0	6	7
CHIEF OF DEPT INV REVIEW SECT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
CRIME SCENE UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE INVEST SEC	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
CRITICAL RESPONSE COMMAND	0	1	1	0	0	0	5	7
DET BORO BRONX OPER	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
DET BORO MANHATTAN NORTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
DRUG ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
EMER SERV SQ 01	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	4

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
EMER SERV SQ 02	0	1	1	0	0	0	4	6
EMER SERV SQ 03	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	4
EMER SERV SQ 05	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	3
EMER SERV SQ 06	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	4
EMER SERV SQ 07	0	2	0	0	1	0	2	5
EMER SERV SQ 08	0	3	1	0	0	0	3	7
EMER SERV SQ 09	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
EMER SERV SQ 10	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	2
EMER SERV UNIT	0	1	0	0	0	0	6	7
FIREARMS SUPPRESSION SECTION	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
GUN VIOL SUPP DIV Z1 (BK,Q,SI)	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	4
GUN VIOL SUPP DIV Z2 (MAN,BX)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
HB BRONX/QUEENS RESPONSE TEAM	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
HB MANHATTAN RESPONSE TEAM	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
HIGHWAY UNIT NO 1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
HIGHWAY UNIT NO 2	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	3
HIGHWAY UNIT NO 3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
HIGHWAY UNIT NO.5	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
HOUSING PSA 1	1	10	0	0	1	0	19	31
HOUSING PSA 2	0	7	1	0	1	0	41	50
HOUSING PSA 3	1	5	0	0	0	0	41	47
HOUSING PSA 4	1	13	0	0	1	0	18	33
HOUSING PSA 5	0	6	0	0	0	0	48	54
HOUSING PSA 6	0	7	0	0	1	0	30	38
HOUSING PSA 7	0	9	1	0	5	0	45	60

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
HOUSING PSA 8	0	6	0	0	0	0	39	45
HOUSING PSA 9	0	5	0	0	1	0	20	26
INTEL-CRIMINAL INTEL SECTION	0	3	0	0	1	0	39	43
MAJOR CASE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
MAN COURT SECTION	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	10
MEDICAL DIVISION	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
MILITARY & EXTEND LEAVE DESK	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
MTN SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
MTS DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
NARC BORO BRONX	1	0	0	0	0	0	35	36
NARC BORO BROOKLYN NORTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	8
NARC BORO BROOKLYN SOUTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
NARC BORO MANHATTAN NORTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	26	26
NARC BORO MANHATTAN SOUTH	0	1	0	0	0	0	10	11
NARC BORO QUEENS NORTH	0	1	0	0	0	0	11	12
NARC BORO QUEENS SOUTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	8
NARC BORO STATEN ISLAND	1	2	0	0	0	0	11	14
OTHER	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	7
PATROL BORO BKLYN NORTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
PATROL BORO BRONX	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
PATROL BORO MAN NORTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
PATROL BORO MAN SOUTH	1	2	0	0	1	0	32	36
PATROL BORO QUEENS NORTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
PATROL BORO QUEENS SOUTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
PATROL BORO STATEN ISLAND	0	6	1	0	3	0	15	25
PBBN SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
PBBN SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
PBBS	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
PBBS SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
PBBS SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
PBBX SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
PBBX SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	10
PBMN SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	9
PBMN SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	3
PBMS SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	11
PBMS SPECIALIZED UNITS	1	3	0	0	0	0	9	13
PBQN SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
PBQS SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6
PBQS SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
PBSI SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
PBSI SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
POLICE LABORATORY	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
QUARTERMASTER SECTION	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
QUEENS ROBBERY SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
REAL TIME CRIME CENTER	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
RECRUIT TRAINING SECTION	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
SCHOOL SAFETY DIVISION	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
SPECIAL FRAUDS SQUAD	0	0z	0	0	0	0	1	1
STRATEGIC RESP GRP 1 MANHATTAN	0	0	0	0	0	0	22	22
STRATEGIC RESP GRP 2 BRONX	0	1	0	0	2	0	18	21
STRATEGIC RESP GRP 3 BROOKLYN	0	0	1	0	0	0	12	13
STRATEGIC RESP GRP 4 QUEENS	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	8
STRATEGIC RESP GRP 5 SI	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	7
STRATEGIC RESPONSE GROUP	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
STRIKE FORCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TB ANTI TERRORISM UNIT	0	3	1	0	0	0	32	36
TB CITYWIDE VANDALS TASK FORCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
TB SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
TRANSIT BORO BKLN TASK FORCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TRANSIT BORO MANH TASK FORCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	7
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 1	0	0	1	0	3	0	17	21
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 11	0	10	1	0	3	0	19	33
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 12	0	7	0	0	1	0	34	42
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 2	0	5	0	0	4	0	33	42
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 20	0	2	0	0	3	0	17	22
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 23	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 3	0	1	2	0	0	0	16	19
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 30	0	5	0	0	2	0	17	24
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 32	0	2	0	0	0	0	17	19
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 33	0	3	0	0	5	0	30	38

Command/Precinct	Firearm	Electrical Weapon	Impact Weapon	Police Canine	OC Spray	Restraining Mesh Blanket	Physical Force	Total
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 34	0	0	0	0	1	0	5	6
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 4	0	10	1	0	8	0	38	57
TRB BRONX TRAFFIC ENF UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
TRB BROOKLYN TRAFFIC ENF UNIT	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	3
TRB BX/BKYN/QNS TOW PND UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TRB CITYWIDE TRAFFIC T/F	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TRB MAN SUMMONS ENF SEC	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	7
TRB SOUTH INTERSECTION CONTROL	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TRB TRAFF SPECIAL OPS SECTION	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TRB TRAFFIC OPERATIONS DIST	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
VED MAJOR CASE SECTION	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
VICE ENFORCEMENT DIV ZONE 1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	3
VICE ENFORCEMENT DIV ZONE 2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
WARRANT SECTION	1	26	0	0	0	0	60	87
WORLD TRADE CENTER COMMAND	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	50	1,190	53	1	97	2	5,047	6,440

*Two firearms discharges, both categorized as unauthorized discharges that occurred outside the confines of New York City, were not captured within the TRI data. Both discharges are, however, included in the yearly discharge total and covered in the Unauthorized Discharge section. Additionally, three CEW incidents, though captured in TRI data and recorded in the yearly incident total, are not included within the Electrical Weapon category in this chart as they took place in concurrence with a firearms discharge incident.